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This dissertation is a collection of three papers that cover contemporary issues at 
centre stage in the development of Aceh, Indonesia. The first, ‗Testing the resource 
curse hypothesis in Aceh‘, empirically tests the resource curse hypothesis in this oil-
and-gas rich region. Using data from 1975 to 2006, the model results reject the 
hypothesis of a resource curse. The empirical models indicate that the boom in the 
mining sector in Aceh from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s did not reduce the 
output of the non-mining manufacturing and agriculture sectors as predicted by the 
resource curse theory. On the contrary, the increase in mining output actually had a 
positive impact on the other two sectors‘ output. Conflict, on the other hand, although 
not being significant in the model, shows a negative relationship with output in non-
mining manufacturing and in agriculture. The Asian economic crisis, interestingly, is 
also found to have had a positive impact on the non-mining manufacturing and 
agricultural sector. 
The second paper, ‗Determinants of inflation in Aceh‘, examines inflation 
behaviour in Aceh before and after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The wild increase 
in inflation in post-tsunami Aceh was assumed to be influenced by two ‗shocks‘: the 
tsunami and the nation-wide fuel price increase in 2005. Multivariate time series 
regression models are developed to describe the inflationary process. It is found that 
Aceh‘s inflation is determined mainly by inflation expectations and the exchange rate, 
in a way similar to Indonesia‘s national inflation behaviour. Productivity is also 
 significantly associated with inflation, but with a contradictory sign when decomposed 
into productivity based on oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas GDP. Additionally, 
contrary to a common assumption, a structural change test indicates that it was the oil 
price increase, rather than tsunami-driven factors, that changed the structure of Aceh‘s 
inflation. This paper also incorporates an analysis of the output and price relationship 
in Aceh‘s economy to examine further policy implications of inflation. Using 
structural vector autoregression with Blanchard-Quah restrictions, I find that shocks 
based on aggregate supply policy would have been more effective than aggregate 
demand policy in stimulating growth while maintaining moderate inflation in Aceh.  
The third paper, ‗Social capital as determinants to return among women IDPs of 
the 2004 tsunami in Aceh‘, investigates determinants of the decision to return to their 
original settlements among female internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-tsunami 
Aceh. Data from the 2005 survey by the UN Development Fund for Women on the 
situation of women after the tsunami are used to explore the existence and use of 
social capital in post-disaster communities. Although the paper is based on migration 
literature, its approach differs in looking at the role of ‗resource/origin‘ as a pull 
factor, rather than ‗host/destination‘, as generally found in that literature. Using 
logistic regression analysis, the study finds that women IDPs with strong associations 
to friendships in temporary settlements and acquaintances from original villages are 
more likely to return than those with fewer or no such friendships. Indirect 
associations with a community through shelter type, shelter size and land ownership 
are also found to be significant factors in the decision to return. Understanding 
determinants of the decision to leave temporary shelter among women IDPs is 
expected to help refine post-disaster shelter management so it can be more gendered 
and culturally sensitive. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
TESTING THE RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS IN ACEH 
 
Abstract 
 This paper investigates the presence of ―resource curse‖ syndrome in Aceh‘s 
economy, an oil and gas rich region in Indonesia to test for the resource curse 
hypothesis. Using a series of data from 1975-2006, a model based on OLS method 
was estimated. The model rejects the hypothesis of resource curse in Aceh‘s economy. 
Contrary to what the resource curse theory predicts, this paper proves that the mining 
sector does not have a negative impact on Aceh‘s non-mining manufacture and 
agriculture output. The findings in this paper lend support to the new development 
policy in Aceh that tries to revive its more diffused economic linkages such as from 
agriculture and fisheries while investing heavily in its human resources development 
using its revenue sharing fund from oil and gas.   
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1.1. Introduction 
Aceh is one of the most resource-rich regions in Indonesia. It is the third 
richest province in per capita revenues after Papua and East Kalimantan (BPS, 2005).
1
   
Its contribution to Indonesia‘s exchange revenues has always been very significant. 
Dawood and Sjafrizal (1989), for example, note ―Aceh has, since 1980, been 
contributing between $2 and $3 billion annually to Indonesian exports.... By 1985, 
Aceh was the third largest source of exports, behind only Riau and East 
Kalimantan….‖ (p. 115).  Its natural gas used to supply around 30% of Indonesia‘s oil 
and gas export, and with agricultural products, it constituted 11% of foreign exchange 
revenues [in the 80s].
2
 By the mid-90s, Aceh was contributing roughly 17% of 
Indonesia‘s total foreign exchange earnings.3  
Despite the fact that Aceh is a very rich region, poverty and income 
distribution inequality has been a growing problem since, surprisingly, the 90s at the 
peak of industrialization following the recovery of huge natural gas reserve in North 
Aceh. In the 70s, ―…there is substantial evidence that poverty rates were unusually 
low, due in part to a large surplus of rice, the staple food crop. Measured in 1980, just 
1.8 percent of the rural population, and 1.7 percent of the urban population, was below 
the poverty line – among the lowest in [Indonesia]‖ (Ross, 2003). By contrast, in 
1999-2000, 16.30 percent of rural and 10.15 percent urban population in Aceh 
―subsisted below Indonesia‘s already low poverty line‖ (Milich, 2001).  According to 
BPS report in 1993, 40% of 5,643 villages in Aceh fall below the minimum 
government-set welfare standard.   
                                                 
1
 Based on provincial RGDP by Indonesia Office of Statistics (BPS), 2005 
2
 Aceh: ecological war zone. Down to Earth No. 47, November 2000 
3
 Husin, Z. (1998:1) as cited in Robinson (2001:221). 
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Many scholars and analysts see the conflict of 1989-2004 between the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM)
 4
 and Indonesia‘s military as the culprit for the rampant 
poverty and slow economic growth (See for example Hill, Resosudarmo, and 
Vidyattama, 2008; Resosudarmo and Vidyattama, 2006; Tadjoedin, 2007; Tadjoedin, 
Sjuharyo, and Mishra, 2001). The then Governor Abdullah Puteh noted in October 
2003 ―The unemployment and poverty rates caused by the conflict in Aceh are 
alarming‖. The governor cited data showing that 40 percent of its 4.2 million5 people 
were living below the poverty line.
6
 In term of household, the situation was worse. 
Aceh‘s National Coordinating Office for Family Planning (BKKBN) reported that 
476,579 (54.09%) out of 881,078 households in Aceh live in poverty with 
unemployment more than 300,000 in 2003.
7
 By headcount, 28.4% of Aceh‘s 
population was poor in 2004, much higher than the Indonesia‘s national poverty level 
of 16.7% (BPS, 2004). Moreover, more people in rural areas have been poorer since 
the gas boom. Additionally, like the rest of Indonesia, Aceh was also impacted by the 
economic slowdown triggered by the Asian economic crisis in 1997-8.  
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004 worsened the outlook. 
Although progress has been made since (thanks to the unprecedented global solidarity 
in supporting Aceh‘s rehabilitation and reconstruction), Aceh‘s poverty level stands at 
23.5% by October 2008, still higher than the national average of 15.4%. A comparison 
of poverty rates in Aceh and Indonesia from year to year is shown in Table 1.1.  
                                                 
4
 GAM proclaimed Aceh as the successor state of Aceh‘s glorious sultanate, claiming it has nothing to 
do with Indonesia, on December 4, 1976. But its struggle did not get widespread support from the 
Acehnese until 1989 after a brutal crackdown by the Indonesian military.   
5
 The population of Aceh has been unclear since the conflict intensified in 1999. Many cited 4.2 million, 
the highest number based on year 1990 census. According to BPS data in 2003, however, Aceh 
population was 3,899,367 (Serambi Indonesia, 5 February 2004). The decrease might have been caused 
by IDPs movement to neighboring provinces, refugees to Malaysia, and death toll during the martial 
law of 2003-2004. After the Tsunami, Aceh population is about 4 million (SPAN, BPS, 2006).  
6
 ―Alarming Poverty & Unemployment in Aceh,‖ Laksanama, 29 October 2003 available at 
http://www.laksamana.net/vnews.cfm?ncat=35&news_id=6246 (accessed 20 May 2005) 
7
 ―476.579 KK Warga Aceh Masih Miskin‖, (476,579 households in Aceh are poord), Serambi 
Inonesia, 1 November 2003. 
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Table 1.1 Poverty Rate Comparison: Aceh vs. Indonesia8 
Percentage 1980 1987 1999 2004 2005 2007 
Aceh   16.5 28.5 28.7 26.7 
Aceh-urban 11.7 9.0 13.8 17.6 19.0 18.7 
Aceh-rural 11.2 8.9 17.4 32.6 32.6 29.9 
Indonesia 28.6 32.2 19.1 16.7 16.0 16.6 
        Source: BPS as cited in Booth (1992a:348), and in World Bank (2008b)  
 
The data indicates that while the rest of Indonesia has seen a decrease in poverty 
rate from year to year, Aceh has seen its own poverty rate increase. The poverty rate in 
Aceh was so bad in the midst of its oil and gas boom, Brown (2005) has noted that  
 
In 1980, Aceh was a mid-income province, ranking tenth out of 26 
provinces in terms of regional GDP, with very low poverty rates – only two 
provinces had a lower poverty rate than Aceh. As the exploitation of its 
natural resources progressed, Aceh‘s GDP increased relatively quicker than 
most other provinces. In 1998, more than 40 per cent of Aceh‘s GDP was 
due to oil. But this increase in wealth generation was accompanied by a 
drastic increase in poverty. Poverty in Aceh increased by 239 percent from 
1980 to 2002; over the same period, poverty in Indonesia as a whole fell by 
47 per cent. (p.4) 
  
 Clearly, Aceh‘s rich natural resources, especially gas and oil, did not manifest 
in its people‘s welfare. Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) found that between 
1975 and 2004 ―Aceh is the only other province [beside Papua] where poverty has 
increased, and this is due to the effects of prolonged conflict.‖  By 2006, Aceh is the 
                                                 
8
  Poverty indicators for Aceh seem to be robust across various poverty measurements. For different 
measurements of poverty in Indonesia, see Esmara (1975), Bidani and Ravallion (1993), Pradhan et al 
(2000), and Akita (2003), van Leeuwen and Földvári (2007) 
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third richest province in per capita revenue among 33 provinces, after Papua and East 
Kalimantan. But, at the same time, Aceh ranked fourth in poverty levels under Papua, 
Maluku and Gorontalo. North Aceh, the district where oil and gas explorations are 
mostly located, is among the poorest of 21 districts in Aceh with almost a 35 per cent 
poverty head count before the 2004 Tsunami (World Bank, 2008:34), .  
In Aceh, the massive exploitation of gas and oil have mostly benefited foreign 
companies and the centralized government in Jakarta, at least until 2002 when a 
special autonomy for the region started to be implemented.
9
  Until then, it was 
estimated that less than 5 per cent of the benefits flowing to Jakarta from Aceh‘s 
natural resources returned to the province (Tippe, 2000). For example, when annual 
profits of Arun NGL Co., a joint venture natural gas refinery of Pertamina, US Mobil 
Oil (now ExxonMobil), and JILCO Japan, amounted to about US $2.1 billion annually 
in the 90s, Aceh Provincial Budget was only $82 million (Abdullah and Syahrel, 
2005). This disparity is considered the main causes of discontent among Acehnese that 
led to Aceh‘s conflict as noted by Brown (2005): ―The disparity between Aceh‘s oil-
and-gas-boom wealth generation as a province and the continued impoverishment of large 
sections of its population is often cited as one of the root causes of the separatist struggle 
in the province (e.g. Kell 1995).‖ (p. 4) 
Figure 1.1 shows the fluctuation of Aceh‘s GDP annual growth from 1976 to 
2006. The availability of such series gives a clear picture of how Aceh‘s economy 
reacted to various shocks, i.e. the gas boom in late 70s, the protracted conflict starting 
in late 80s, the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8, the regional autonomy in 2001, and 
the Tsunami of 2004. The figure indicates that Aceh experienced a negative growth 
                                                 
9
 Aceh special autonomy is based on Indonesian Law  No. 18/2001 furthering a decentralization process 
for the whole Indonesia after  the 1998 ―Reformasi‖ and the fall of Soeharto. The first two 
decentralization laws are Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance, and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal 
Balance between Center and the Regions.    
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twice, that is, the years following the Asian economic crisis, and two years following 
the Tsunami. While, the years following the Tsunami were not anymore influenced by 
the conflict, it is difficult to separate the impact of Asian economic crisis from that of 
the conflict. However, it is obvious that the trend of economic growth during the 
conflict of 1989 – 1998 has a downward slope. Therefore, we can assume that the 
Asian economic crisis has anything but worsened the economic growth in Aceh.  
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As shown in Section 1.3, resource curse literature theorizes that there is usually 
a tradeoff between mining growth and manufacturing and agriculture growth in a 
mining-rich region. General findings of such literature in Indonesia, however, are 
conflicting. Although most claim that Indonesia did not experience a ―resource curse‖ 
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during the oil boom of early 70s, there are several more recent papers that challenge 
those claims. This paper investigates the resource curse phenomena in Aceh, an oil 
and gas rich region in the western part of Indonesia. This is a different account of the 
issue on Indonesia as it investigates the phenomena at a sub-national level rather than 
that of a whole country.     
In Aceh case, while the conflict has been a ubiquitous explanation for slow 
economic growth, there have been only a few attempts to look for alternative accounts. 
This paper is an attempt to explore another strain of explanation; that is, to test the 
hypothesis of natural resource curse in Aceh by looking at how Aceh‘s mining boom, 
in addition to the conflict, has influenced its agriculture and non-mining manufacture 
sectors. In other words, this paper investigates the existence of ―Dutch disease‖ 
syndrome in Aceh‘s economy, that is, to investigate whether the mining sector, 
especially oil and gas, has become a primary sector in Aceh‘s economy at the expense 
of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. In addition, this paper also examines the 
impact of the other shocks on Aceh economic structure.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 gives a brief 
historical descriptive on Aceh to provide context for the overall analysis. Section 1.3 
reviews current literature on ―resource curse‖, from international, national, and local 
experience. Section 1.4 discusses data and methodology used in this study. Section 1.5 
shows and discusses the results of descriptive and empirical data analysis, and Section 
1.6 offers conclusions.    
 
1.2. Aceh: A Brief Historical Descriptive Account   
Aceh is located at the northern tip of Sumatra, one of the five bigger islands in 
the archipelago, known as Indonesia since 1945. Surrounded by the Malacca Strait at 
its northern and eastern parts and the Indian Ocean to its west, Aceh is situated at an 
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important world trade route. Besides its rich sea resources and potential, Aceh is also 
blessed with a fertile land and rich mineral resources, especially in oil and natural gas.  
Aceh‘s history is distinctive compared to other regions in Indonesia. In fact, its 
history is one of the attributes that sets Aceh apart from the rest of the country 
(Schulze, 2007). Schulze notes ―It was the only part of Indonesia that had existed as an 
internationally recognized independent state, a Muslim sultanate, before the republic‘s 
establishment…‖ (p.183). In addition, Aceh has been referred to by historians for ―its 
commercial and cultural significance in past eras, and to its independence from Jakarta 
governments both before and after independence.‖ (Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989: 108) 
Before becoming part of Indonesia, Aceh was under one of the first known 
kingdoms in the archipelago. Marco Polo visited one of the kingdoms, Perlak, in 1292, 
―giving us the first evidence of Islamic sultanate in Southeast Asia‖ (Siegel, 1969:4). 
Pasai, another early kingdom, has been illustrated as ―an important center for the 
diffusion of Islam in the Indian Archipelago‖ until the fifteenth century (Th. W. 
Juynboll–[P. Voorhoeve], 1960 in Siegel, 1969:4). Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah unified 
the various kingdoms under the Sultanate of Aceh in the early sixteenth century.  
The golden era of this sultanate, however, was not achieved until the early 
seventeenth century, during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). During 
his reign, Aceh had political influence in both sides of the Malacca Strait and, in fact, 
almost succeeded in taking Malacca from the Portuguese (Siegel, 1969; Newitt, 
2005).
10
 He was also successful in developing his regions to be one of the most 
important military and trading powers in the archipelago. Under his leadership, Aceh 
became a famous port in Malacca Strait and supplying half of pepper for the world 
consumption. In addition, Sultan Iskandar Muda was also good in managing 
                                                 
10
 Malacca is now one of the Strait States in Malaysia. 
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diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire, France, Great Britain and the 
United States (World Bank, 2006).   
Aceh‘s political influence started to decline after the death of Sultan Iskandar 
Muda and following the destruction of most of the Acehnese fleet during the final raid 
on Malacca (Siegel, 1969). Although Aceh‘s earlier rivalry was mostly with the 
Portuguese in the Malacca Strait, it was the Dutch that wanted to control Aceh for its 
colonial interest in the archipelago in the nineteenth century. But the Dutch could not 
do anything until 1871 when they were released from The London Treaty (1824) in 
which ―the Dutch had pledged to the English not to extend their control of societies of 
Sumatra to Aceh‖ (Siegel, 1969:5). After negotiations with the Acehnese to gain 
control over waters surrounding the kingdom failed, the Dutch declared war in 1873. 
The war has never officially concluded, but ―the Dutch had to maintain their military 
government in Aceh until 1918‖ (Siegel, 1969:5).  
The Netherlands‘ rule, nevertheless, was continuously distracted by waves of 
guerilla wars, especially those led by religious leaders who were sidelined by the 
colonial administration that favored local chieftains (uleebalang). One of the famous 
such leader is Teungku Chik Di Tiro (1836-1891) whose legacy extended to 
contemporary Aceh‘s history. Although the Acehnese aristocrats decided to 
collaborate and signed an agreement with the Dutch in 1903, the Aceh War, according 
to the Dutch higher officers, was already the most expensive war during Dutch 350 
years of colonial era in the archipelago (Robinson, 2001). Because the war was never 
concluded and the opposition to the Dutch‘s power never ceased, Acehnese believe 
that they had never surrendered to the Dutch, thus Aceh had never been part of the 
Dutch colony. Some scholars attest to the fact, such as Schulze (2007) who notes that 
Aceh ―was…the only part of the archipelago never to have been totally conquered and 
subdued by the Dutch‖ (p. 183). Later in the 70‘s, this fact was used by the nationalists 
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of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), led by Hasan Di Tiro, to argue that Aceh should 
have never been part of Indonesia as the de-colonization should have never included 
Aceh as part of the Dutch‘s colony that became Indonesia. Hasan Tiro is a descendant 
of Teungku Chik Di Tiro. 
 Dutch colonial rule in the archipelago, including Aceh, was replaced by 
Japan‘s in 1942. Japan colonialized Indonesia until it was defeated by other Allied 
forces, the US and the Britain, in 1945. As Japan left Indonesia and the Allies had not 
arrived, independent movement leaders seized ―the vacuum of power‖ to proclaim 
Indonesia‘s independence on 17 August 1945 (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999). 
When the Dutch returned on September 1945, embedded to the Allied forces, it could 
not accept the fact that Indonesia had declared its independence. Assisted by the 
Allies, the Dutch tried to get their colony back, which led to the Indonesian 
revolutionary war from 1945 to 1949 (Robinson, 2001; Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 
1999). Dutch attempts succeeded in conquering Java, Borneo and some other parts of 
Indonesia. However, it failed to conquer Aceh. The new government of Indonesia then 
formed an emergency government in Aceh, to show the world that Indonesia still 
existed. Aceh subsequently played a critical role during the revolution times, until the 
Dutch agreed to acknowledge Indonesia‘s independence and left its territory in 1949.  
 As the Dutch did not return to Aceh, the Acehnese aristocrats (chieftains, 
uleebalang) who had been siding with the Dutch were overthrown from power by their 
rival groups led by members of modernist Islamic youth groups which had emerged in 
the 1930s. From 1945 to 1949, Aceh was governed chiefly by Teungku Daud 
Beureuèh, the leader of Islamic modernist movement (Siegel, 1969).  
Besides its critical role for the new independent Indonesia, the Acehnese also 
gave another significant contribution to the new country during the revolutionary war. 
The people of Aceh collected money and gold throughout the region that was then 
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enough to buy two airplanes donated to the government of Indonesia for its 
international diplomacy, trade and military operations. The airplanes were named after 
the highest mountain in Aceh, ―Seulawah‖, and later became Indonesia‘s first flag 
carrier. Seulawah 001 and 002 are two Douglas DC-3 Dakota airplanes that started 
Garuda Indonesia Airways on 26 January 1949.
11
 
Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia and other leaders in Jakarta failed to 
recognize this significant role of the Acehnese people in Indonesia‘s history. In 1949, 
Aceh was put under North Sumatra province, causing discontent among the Acehnese. 
―The replacement of Acehnese in governmental positions by other Indonesians, 
coupled with Acehnese dissatisfaction with the kind of nation Indonesia was 
becoming, precipitated a rebellion which began in 1953‖ (Siegel, 1969:6).   
 The central government tried to solve the problem by persuading the rebel 
leader, Teungku Daud Beureuèh, the reformist Muslim leader who was once an 
Indonesian nationalist himself, promising him that the central government would grant 
Aceh a special status and more autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters 
(Robinson, 2001). Aceh then became a special region in Indonesia, named ―Daerah 
Istimewa Aceh‖ or Special Region of Aceh in 1959. Although Beureuèh‘s movement 
was largely settled by 1957, followed by a special region status for Aceh in 1959, the 
rebellion continued until 1961 (Siegel, 1969). 
The new autonomy status, however, did not really mean anything. The 
province remained at the periphery of Indonesia‘s centralized system, neglected by the 
central government (World Bank, 2006). Later, when Indonesia adopted a regional 
development system, Aceh even became a sub-periphery when North Sumatra was 
considered the center of the western regional development. In addition, Aceh also 
                                                 
11
 Source: the Garuda Indonesia airlines: http://www.garuda-indonesia.com/about-us (accessed 12 May 
2009) 
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experienced Indonesia‘s bad economic conditions like other regions in the new 
country. Busy with his political maneuver at the height of the Cold War, Soekarno, the 
Indonesian nationalist leader, failed to jump-start Indonesia‘s economic growth. As 
shown in Figure 1.2, the annual growth of Indonesia‘s GDP in percentage during 
Soekarno administration, from 1962 to 1966, was in general very low, with a negative 
growth in 1963.  
 
 
Source: Author‘s calculation based on the World Bank‘s data  
Figure 1.2 
Indonesia‘s GDP Annual Growth, 1962-2006 
 
Soekarno‘s regime became unpopular due to economic hardship and 
unfavorable world political situation in the late 60s. His regime was toppled by then a 
not-very well-known army officer, Soeharto, in 1966 following a bloody coup in 1965. 
Soeharto became the second president of Indonesia in 1967 with the support from 
western countries, especially the US. Under Soeharto‘s regime, known as ―the New 
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Order‖, Indonesia reformed its economy by opening its door to industrialization and 
trade liberalization in return for generous ―developmental aid‖ from industrial 
countries that wanted to stop Indonesia from falling into the Communist bloc. 
The economic reform during the Soeharto era attracted a large number of 
foreign investments and generated enormous capital inflows to the country, which 
enabled the country to expand its economy (Azis, 2000). Accordingly, economic 
expansion opened more opportunities and more jobs, increased productivity and 
income per capita. In the end, it reduced poverty and enhanced the economic growth 
of Indonesia. As also shown in Figure 1.2, the annual growth of Indonesia‘s GDP 
soared from one percent in 1965 to 12 percent in 1968, after Soeharto took office 
(Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 1999).  
In early 1970s, Indonesia economic growth was even better as the country 
began the explorations of its rich mineral resources. Oil and natural gas started to 
generate enormous revenues for the country in mid 70s and early 80s, with one of the 
biggest exploitations being in Aceh. The mining boom in Aceh started in 1971, after a 
massive natural gas reserve was discovered in Lhok Sukon, North Aceh by then Mobil 
Oil Indonesia (MOI), a subsidiary of US Mobil Oil. A joint venture company, PT. 
Arun, was founded to refine the natural gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 1977. 
The operation of PT. Arun then led to other petrochemical industries, such as the Kraft 
Paper Factory established in 1982, the Iskandar Muda Fertilizer Company in 1982, 
and the ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer  in1983 (Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989). 
The industrialization in Aceh from mid 70s through the 1980s had transformed 
the region from a remote place of little significance into an industrial center, 
significantly contributing revenues to the central government. As the LNG boom 
boosted its economy, the province became ―the fastest-growing provincial economy‖ 
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in Indonesia (Robinson, 2001, p.221). Figure 1.3 shows the significance of oil and gas 
production in Aceh‘s GDP.  
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        Source: author calculation with data from BPS   
Figure 1.3 
The role of Oil and Gas in Aceh‘s GDP 1973-2006,  
Based on Year 2000 Constant Price (in billions IDR) 
 
Although industrialization in Aceh had significantly increased its GDP by the 
late 70s, it had not brought prosperity to the people in the region, including those of 
the immediate districts where the industrialization centered. In fact, as indicated in 
Figure 1.4, North Aceh (Aceh Utara) District, where PT. Arun and now Exxon-Mobil 
Indonesia (EMOI) operate, and East Aceh, where the oil refineries located, have 
among the worse poverty rate compared to other districts in the province while its per 
capita GDP has been among the highest (World Bank, 2008).  Aceh in general did not 
get much from the oil and gas revenues as most of them were accrued to the central 
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government, supposedly to be redistributed to the rest of the country (Booth, 1992; 
Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989).  
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2008, p. 34 
Figure 1.4 
Per capita GDP and poverty in oil/gas producing districts, 2004 
 
The poverty level increased as the industrialization did not bring new sizeable 
opportunity and employment to the area. The jobs in PT. Arun and other industries 
were filled in by either foreigners or Indonesian from other places. The industries 
centered around LNG facilities in North Aceh itself are ―point‖ instead of ―diffused‖ 
linkage industries (Booth, 1992). That is, they are capital intensive with few direct 
beneficiaries compared to, for example, manufacturing and agricultural industries. As 
many local people remained jobless and lived under poverty line, it subsequently led 
to dissatisfaction toward the government. In the end, the (failed) industrialization in 
the province had become one of significant factors that created a fertile ground for the 
emergence (and re-emergence) of the Aceh Freedom Movement or GAM (Kell, 1995; 
Sulaiman, 2000; Robinson, 2001; Schulze, 2007). 
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The Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) was established 
by Hasan Di Tiro on 4 December 1976 in the interior of Pidie district.
12
 Like the first 
rebellion led by Daud Beureuèh in the 50s, this movement was also ―triggerred by 
unsatisfactory center-pheripery relations, namely the removal of special status in all 
but name‖ (Schulze, 2007:183). But, unlike Beureuèh‘s rebellion, the GAM 
insurgency ―had a distinct economic dimension‖ which was ―directly, but not solely, 
linked to the discovery and extraction of natural gas‖ (Schulze, 2007:184).  At the 
beginning, GAM had only a limited support from the population. The core group was 
less than a hundred persons in Pidie and North Aceh, with a few old weapons.  But a 
brutal crackdown by the military forces sent by Jakarta garnered sympathy for the 
GAM and then wider support from the Acehnese, especially those in disadvantaged 
rural areas.  
GAM was founded on the basis of Acehnese nationalistic ideology. The 
founder, Hasan Di Tiro, believed in the strength of the glorious past of Aceh as the 
source of spirit to fight for an independent state. Additionally, as he writes in his book 
‗Demokrasi untuk Indonesia‘ or ‗Democracy for Indonesia,‘ Hasan Di Tiro argues that 
the form of a unitary state does not fit a diversed archipelago like Indonesia.  
The level of insurgency by GAM was up and down. After its declaration, it 
was directly suppressed by a limited military operation sent by the central 
governmnent that wanted to make sure its ―vital projects‖13 in North Aceh were safe 
and secure. Due to this operation, Hasan Di Tiro had to flee Aceh on 28 March 1979 
(Sulaiman, 2000). He then lived in Malaysia and several other countries before settling 
in Sweden, where he was granted asylum and has been living until now. The decline 
                                                 
12
 This date was when Maat Di Tiro died. He is the cousin of Hasan Di Tiro‘s mother, who the later 
claimed to be the last successor of The Sultanate of Aceh (Sulaiman, 2000:26). 
13
 The industrial complex that centered around the Arun natural gas refinery near Lhokseumawe is 
commonly called ―provit‖ or ―proyek vital‖ by government officials, indicating its significance to 
Indonesia‘s economy.  
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of GAM activities continued until the 80s. At the end of the 80s, however, GAM re-
emerged with a more open armed insurgency. Some of its members were reported to 
have returned from a military training in Libya.
14
 To quell the ever stronger GAM, 
Jakarta put Aceh under a military operation zone known as ‗Daerah Operasi Militer 
(DOM)‘ in 1989. The period following 1989 is later known as a dark period of gross 
human rights violations in Aceh. Due to intensified and repressive military operations, 
GAM activities declined once again, but never totally stopped. Many of its members 
and sympathizers fled Aceh to neighbouring provinces and countries, especially to 
Malaysia.  
The Asian economic crisis that started in 1997 struck Indonesian economy 
badly. As the economy worsened, students and pro-democracy movement brought 
down Soeharto‘s regime in May 1998. This marked the beginning of ‗reformasi‘ in 
Indonesia allowing more free press, freedom of expression, and public scrutiny on the 
government and the military. The ‗reformasi‘ euphoria made national and local media 
possible to report military brutality during DOM era in Aceh. At this time, GAM re-
emerged again. This time, it received a popular support as the population had found 
out more about the widespread brutal treatment on their fellow Acehnese by the 
Indonesian military. At this period, many of GAM‘s member and sympathizers 
returned from Malaysia. GAM was also advantaged by, if not itself orchestered, a civil 
society call for a referendum for Acehnese to decide whether to stay within or seceede 
away from the republic.
15
  
Then, the new president who replaced Soeharto, B.J. Habibie, terminated 
DOM status on Aceh and withdrew non-organic troops from Aceh followed by a 
                                                 
14
 Majalah Aceh Kita (Aceh Kita Magazine), August 2005, p. 28 
15
 A demand for referendum in Aceh was spearheaded by SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh) a 
group formed at an Aceh‘s student and youth diaspora congress on 31 January – 4 February 1999. With 
the support of GAM, SIRA brought together a rally of more than a million people in Banda Aceh on 8 
November 1999 to demand for a referendum.  
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public apology for the atrocities the military had perpetrated in the region by the 
Indonesian military highest commander, General Wiranto, in August 1998 (Schulze, 
2007). President Abdurrahman Wahid who replaced Habibie after a power dispute in 
Jakarta increased the efforts to resolve Aceh conflict by starting a dialog with GAM 
on January 2000. This dialog was facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a 
Geneva based non-governmental organization which subsequently opened its office in 
Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh. 
Humanitarian Dialog facilitated by the HDC produced a ‗Humanitarian Pause‘, 
a ceasefire agreement between TNI, the Indonesian military, and GAM on 12 May 
2000. However, violence continued in Aceh, and the agreement was hardly in effect 
until 15 January 2001 when a new deal was reached under the name of ‗Violence 
Moratorium‘. When the violence did not stop, HDC tried to save the agreement once 
again under the ‗Peace through Dialog‘ agreement until July 2001 when Indonesia 
government unilaterally left the dialog and detained GAM‘s negotiators in Banda 
Aceh. Another attempt to stop the conflict was made in February 2002. Indonesia was 
then under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the first Indonesia‘s 
president, Soekarno, who ascended to power with the support of a nationalist base. 
HDC brought in the ‗wise men‘, some prominent figures like retired US Marine 
General Anthony Zinni and former Thai Prime Minister Surin Pitsuan, to strengthen 
the dialog. With a pledge of economic aid from Japan, the European Community and 
the World Bank if Aceh conflict can be resolved, Indonesia and GAM once again 
agreed on a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 9 December 2002. Under 
this agreement, a Joint Security Committee (JSC) consisting of 50 Thai and Filipino 
soldiers, 50 members of the TNI, and 50 members of GAM was formed to monitor the 
agreement implementation on the ground (Schulze, 2007). 
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But after ―TNI-inspired systematic attacks‖ on all Joint Security Committee 
(JSC) offices outside Banda Aceh, the CoHA ―was dead in all but name‖ by April 
2003 (Schulze, 2007:212). Efforts by the HDC and international community to save 
the agreement through a meeting in Tokyo on 18 May 2003 failed. The following day, 
Megawati placed Aceh under martial law, initially for a six month period. This failed 
to stop the insurgency and the martial law was extended for another six month from 19 
November 2003 to 18 May 2004. The martial law was then reduced to ―civil 
emergency‖ on 19 May 2004 for another six month. With this status Aceh was still 
closed to foreigners and mobility was still limited. Aceh was still under these 
restrictions when it was struck by the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.  
Although the new administration under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Vice President Jusuf Kalla had started a new approach on the Aceh conflict before the 
Tsunami, it was the disaster that gave momentum for the two sides to come to an 
agreement faster. A new dialog was started in January 2005, facilitated by Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI), a Helsinki based organization led by Finland‘s former 
president, Martti Ahtisaari. After several rounds of negotiation, a peace agreement 
under Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by Indonesia and 
GAM on 15 August 2005, eight months after the Tsunami.  
In summary, Aceh has been in conflict with the central government in Jakarta 
during most of the time it has been part of Indonesia. Figure 1.5 shows the fluctuation 
of manifest conflict intensity in Aceh between 1945 and 2004 as suggested by Age 
(2007). 
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            Level of Manifest Conflict between Aceh and Indonesia, 1945-2004 
            Source: Age (2007), used with permission 
Figure 1.5 
Level of manifest conflict between Indonesia and Aceh, 1945-2004 
 
 
1.3. Resource Curse: A Literature Review  
The notion that natural resources can be a curse rather than a blessing emerged 
in the 1980s, following the oil boom. ―Resource curse‖ is a term used to describe the 
failure of a country or region to benefit from its natural wealth (Humphreys, Sachs and 
Stiglitz, 2007). The term originates from Auty (1993) as ―resource curse theory‖ in 
which he describes how countries rich in natural resources were unable to capture that 
wealth to boost their economic performance and that their economic growth was lower 
than those with limited natural resources. The term is sometimes also referred to as the 
―paradox of plenty‖ (Karl, 1997). But it should not be confused with the term ―Dutch 
disease‖ (Corden and Neary, 1982) which can be thought as one of the syndromes or 
causes of resource curse (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007).  
Sachs and Warner (2001) assert that numerous studies have shown a link 
between natural resource abundance and poor economic growth. Gylfason (2000), for 
example,  points out that from 1965-1998, gross national product per capita growth 
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decreased on average by 1.3% in the OPEC countries, while in the rest of the 
developing world per capita growth was on average 2.2%. In addition, Auty (2001) 
observes that resource-abundant developing countries have under-performed when 
compared with the resource-deficient developing countries in recent decades. Similar 
conclusions have been put forward before by Ranis (1991), Lal and Myint (1996), 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999).  Resource curse phenomena can be caused by various 
reasons. Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) summarize them into five sources: 
(1) Unequal expertise, that is, asymmetry between governments acting as an 
―agent‖ for the people who own mineral resources and international 
corporations which have great interest and expertise in mineral sectors and 
extensive resources to draw on; 
(2) “Dutch disease”, in which extraction of mineral resources gives primacy to 
two domestic sectors—mineral sectors and the non-tradable sectors, such as 
the construction industry—at the expense of more traditional export sectors, 
such as manufacturing and agriculture;  
(3) Volatility, that is, when oil and gas are considered sources of income, it has 
three sources of volatility: (i) the variation over time in rate of extraction; (ii) 
the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states; and (iii) the 
fluctuations in the value of the natural resources produced;    
(4) Living off capital, is a problem that arises once the government starts spending 
the earnings from mineral resources and views it as consumption of income 
rather than consumption of capital; 
(5) Insufficient investments in education, is a problem arising from the lack of 
diversified and skilled workforce that can support other economic sectors as 
states start relying on natural resource wealth.  
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Resource curse theory, however, has been scrutinized for its use of resource 
measurement, calculation, and time sensitivity.  To counter the argument, Auty (2001) 
proves that the tendency for resource-abundant countries to underperform is 
insensitive to classification criteria of the natural resources endowment. Nevertheless, 
he also shows that the tendency is not robust to the period under observation.  
One of the causes of resource curse that has been studied extensively is the 
―Dutch disease‖ phenomenon. Corden and Neary (1982) explain the phenomenon in a 
three-sector model: (i) a resource sector, such as oil, gas or other primary export 
product; (ii) tradable sectors, which would include both manufacturing and 
agriculture; and (iii) non-tradables. They argue that a boom in the resource sector has 
three separate effects: a spending effect; a relative price effect; and a resource 
movement effect. A three-sector model has since been a standard approach in 
diagnosing a Dutch disease syndrome.  In line with Corden and Neary (1982), Bevan, 
Collier, and Gunning (1999) argue, ―Dutch disease is a story of resource allocation 
between sectors‖ (p. 46). Moreover, they state that,  
 
The oil windfall raises expenditure on both internationally tradable and 
nontradable goods but enhances only the supply of tradables (through 
imports). This imbalance is equilibrated by an increase in the relative 
price of the non-tradable sector, thereby attracting resources away from 
the non-oil tradable sector. In developed oil economies (such as the UK), 
this declining sector is manufacturing. In Nigeria, the non-oil tradable 
sector is primarily export-crop agriculture. (p. 46)    
 
They further note that oil earnings as a Dutch disease phenomenon is due to its 
two distinctive respects: they accrued as foreign exchange and they accrued to the 
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government. ―Because the earnings accrued as foreign exchange, the extra income 
could be spent only on tradable goods unless domestic resources were reallocated to 
the non-tradable sector‖ (p. 46).   
There are several studies on the resource curse phenomenon in Indonesia both 
by national and international scholars. Early studies were done primarily by experts 
from the World Bank like Gelb and Associate (1988) and Bevan, Collier, and Gunning 
(1999). There is, however, a growing literature on the issue, albeit piecemeal, by 
national scholars addressing Indonesia‘s natural resource management since 
Indonesia‘s transformation to democracy in 1998.   
Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1999) compare Indonesia‘s and Nigeria‘s 
economic performance during 1950-85 in order to study why Indonesia was so much 
more successful than Nigeria in navigating the oil boom in the 70s to early 80s. They 
note that ―Indonesia turned oil income into productive investment, whereas Nigerian 
oil income was either siphoned abroad or used for prestige projects‖ (p. 1). On the 
Dutch disease spending effect, they observe that Nigeria‘s attempts, compared to 
Indonesia‘s, to convert the oil windfall very quickly into domestic real assets—to buy  
more than its economy was capable of supplying, had exaggerated the disease‘s effect 
(p. 389).   
Accordingly, Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1999) conclude that ―There is no 
prima facie evidence of Dutch disease‖ (p. 304) in Indonesia. They argue, unlike in 
Nigeria, agriculture in Indonesia continued to grow through the oil boom. 
Furthermore, manufacturing grew extremely rapidly before, during, and after the oil 
boom, while services, if considered as non-tradable were not growing notably more 
rapidly than tradables. Given that both countries have marked difference in 
liberalization and windfall management, they conclude that the comparison ―provides 
dramatic evidence that policy matters‖ (p. 424). They suggest three areas of policy 
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divergence where Indonesia: (1) put higher priorities on agriculture; (2) poverty 
targeting; and (3) a gradual shift away from import-substituting industrialization.  
In relation to the importance of policy, a similar conclusion is put forward by 
Auty and Kiiski (2001). They illustrate the experience of Southeast Asian countries 
which confirms ―that many tropical crops retained considerable potential for growth, 
but the outcome depended upon policy choices.‖ They also conclude that ―mineral 
economies are potentially more vulnerable to policy error than countries with more 
diffuse economic linkages are….‖ (p. 33). 
Earlier, Gelb and Associate (1988) have also concluded that Indonesia  ―has 
managed to avoid the most serious problems of the Dutch disease, and its economic 
performances stands out as being relatively successful‖ (p. 224) compared to the other 
five resource rich countries in a six country comparative study. They argue that 
Indonesia‘s good performance during the oil booms reflected an institutional success 
to nurture the economy, the approach to policy set during Soeharto government‘s 
formative years, and the unusual degree of continuity.  
Also in the case of Indonesia, Rosser (2004, 2007) presents evidence to claim 
that the curse cannot be generalized. Blessed with natural wealth, he argues, Indonesia 
had also been experiencing moderate economic performance. In fact, Rosser finds that 
Indonesia experienced higher economic growth during 1967-2000 relative to other oil 
exporting countries. Rosser suggests that Indonesia‘s success stemmed from two 
factors, the policy and institutional building employed during Soeharto‘s New Order 
era, and the nature of Indonesia‘s geo-economic environment, especially its proximity 
to high energy consuming countries like Japan, Taiwan and Korea.  
In contrast, Pangestu (1990) claims that Indonesia did experience a Dutch 
disease after the oil boom. She studies the adjustment problem Indonesia had to face 
during the oil windfall of the 1973-1982. Using simulation of a simplified 
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macroeconomic model, she provides evidence of the Dutch disease in Indonesia in that 
period. The economy in the model was divided into three sectors: oil, non-traded 
goods, and non-oil traded goods. She finds that the real supply of non-oil traded goods 
was significantly lower, as predicted by Dutch disease literature.  
At the regional level, studies on the resource curse phenomenon are still 
limited. However, with the decentralization and democratization process taking place 
in Indonesia, more can be expected. This is especially true for the resource rich 
regions tainted by conflict like Aceh, Papua, and Kalimantan where studies on conflict 
have been initiated earlier. For example, Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) test 
the natural resource curse hypothesis in Indonesia using data from 246 districts in 28 
provinces. The authors empirically investigate the relationship between abundant 
resources and their impact on economic development at the regional level using a 
cross-section regression approach. They claim that when total resource rent is used, 
the results are insignificant, that is, there is no apparent resource curse phenomenon. 
However, they report significance when the resource rents are estimated in their three 
components: mining, oil and natural gas, and forestry. They conclude that ―forestry 
and the oil and gas sector have a positive effect on regional economic growth, but the 
resource curse may occur if these resources revenues are not invested properly in the 
public sector.‖ Additionally, they note that the mining sector has a persistent negative 
effect on regional economic growth.  
With the adoption of a decentralization policy by Jakarta in 2001, studies on 
revenue sharing have also become more important. Mahi (2006), for example, studies 
the impact of oil price fluctuations on oil revenue sharing in Indonesia to understand 
problems of revenue sharing. He then analyzes the impact of oil revenue sharing on 
regional government expenditures. The author concludes that ―oil price fluctuations 
give uncertainties both to central and regional government‖, the cause of resource 
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curse known as volatility as summarized by Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007). 
Mahi (2006) also notes that oil producing regions in Indonesia can gain from the 
increase in oil price, but it also increases fiscal pressure to the central government. 
There are also concerns of increasing income disparity among the regions, and unwise 
spending in oil producing regions.  
Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006) also find the significant role of oil and 
gas in sub-national level growth in Indonesia. They concur determinants of growth in 
an inter-country study such as physical investment, trade openness, and the role of oil 
and gas are also significant determinants of growth in an intra-country (sub-national) 
study. In the case of Indonesia, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama note that ―The general 
situation in 1971 was that GDP per capita in Java‘s provinces was in general lower 
than in the off-Java islands, …‖. They also observe that  
 
From 1972 to 1983, the five fastest growing provinces were East 
Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, Riau, and Jakarta. Looking at the GDP per 
capita without including mining for the same period, the growth rates for 
East Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, and Riau were significantly lower, 
confirming the important role of mining for these provinces; i.e. oil and 
gas for East Kalimantan, Aceh, and Riau, and minerals for Papua. …. 
 
Nevertheless, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006) further observe, from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, ―Aceh, Riau, and East Kalimantan, which were previously 
among the fastest growing provinces, were now among the five slowest.‖16 By mid 
                                                 
16 Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006) underline that ―The number of provinces in Indonesia changes 
over time. From its independence up to 1976, there were twenty six provinces, namely: Aceh, North 
Sumatra, Riau, West Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, Lampung, Bengkulu, Jakarta, West Java, Central 
Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East 
Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Bali, West Nusa 
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90s to the early 2000s, Aceh was among nine provinces that had a negative average 
annual GDP per capita growth due to ―the economic crisis and social unrest.‖ This, 
they conclude, makes Aceh among only a few provinces whose growth rates 
fluctuated significantly. Others with similar high fluctuations include Papua and East 
Kalimantan, which, similar to Aceh, are conflict prone regions. Hence, Hill, 
Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) speculate that, ―The indifferent record of the 
four resource-rich provinces is suggestive of a Sachs and Warner (2001) ‗resource 
curse‘ at work.‖ But then they argue that conflict has caused the problem at two 
provinces (Aceh and Papua) as the other two (Riau and East Kalimantan) have become 
more prosperous, thus failing to recognize the conflict as part of the curse. The nexus 
between economic crisis and social unrest on one hand and economic growth on the 
other is also investigated by Alm, Aten, and Bahl (2001), Tadjoedin, Sjuharyo, and 
Mishra (2001), Kuncoro and Resosudarmo (2004) as cited in Resosudarmo and 
Vidyattama (2006).  
Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) expand Resosudarmo and 
Vidyattama (2006)‘s findings with a longer series, a 30 years Indonesia‘s socio-
economic database. Similarly, they conclude that ―there continues to be diversity in 
economic and social outcomes‖ among provinces in Indonesia, ―but growth and social 
progress have been remarkably even.‖  They also conclude that, ―As expected, conflict 
is harmful to economic development,‖ and that ―there is no clear natural resource 
curse story: the performance of the resource-rich provinces has varied considerably.‖ 
On Aceh, Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama (2008) note that, ―Aceh would have 
belonged in „Consistently non-poor‟ provinces, but the protracted conflict until 2005, 
                                                                                                                                            
Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Papua. In 1976, East Timor, formerly occupied by the 
Portuguese, joined Indonesia, but was separated again in 1999. In 2001, Bangka-Belitung, Banten, 
Gorontalo, and North Maluku became new provinces separated from South Sumatra, West Java, North 
Sulawesi, and Maluku, respectively. In 2004, another new province was established, namely West Irian 
Jaya, which used to be part of Papua.‖ 
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combined with the devastation of the 2004 tsunami, has sharply lowered living 
standards: its 2004 household expenditure was just under half the national average.‖ 
Studies on resource rich regions in Indonesia indeed involve examinations of 
the relation between natural resources and conflict, e.g. Ross (2003, 2004) and 
Tadjoeddin et al (2001, 2002). Tadjoeddin (2007) surveys international literature on 
resource conflicts and finds its relevance to Indonesia. He claims that initial literature 
on the issue only considered economic disruption as the channeling mechanism, while 
later developments in the literature on the subject have also emphasized institutional 
failure and conflict in addition to economic disruption. Thus, he terms conflict as part 
of the resource curse.   
Schulze (2007) illustrates a compelling link between conflict and resources, 
particularly natural gas, in Aceh. Although she emphasizes that, ―the struggle in Aceh 
was and remains above all ideological in nature‖ there were factors that determined 
―the dynamics of the violence…and served to prolong insurgency‖ (p. 220). One of 
the factors was ―the uneven development of the economy and infrastructure… and the 
fact that throughout much of the conflict in Aceh, most of the gas and oil revenue went 
to Jakarta with little return.‖ (p. 219)   
There is only one study specifically dedicated to Aceh‘s economic outlook 
during and after the oil and gas boom. Dawood and Sjafrizal (1989) touch the issue of 
Dutch disease in Aceh‘s economy, but do not investigate it extensively. They examine 
‗enclave development‘ around Lhokseumawe, North Aceh as a spatial consequence of 
the LNG (liquefied natural gas) boom in the 1970s. The exploitation of massive 
natural gas reserves has transformed Aceh‘s economy, making Aceh one of provinces 
with the highest per capita GDP in Indonesia, as well as a major foreign exchange 
earner. The extraordinary rapid growth occurred in the three years of 1978-80, peaking 
at 69 percent in 1979. These were the early years of gas boom. Although mining led 
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the growth in Aceh, growth in ―virtually all sectors‖ was surprisingly rapid during and 
after the boom. Therefore, they argue that there have been ―no localized ‗Dutch 
disease‘ effects.‖  This argument is understandable as they include manufacturing of 
‗downstream linkages‘ such as fertilizer industries in 1983-4 into the balance, giving a 
boost to Aceh‘s GDP growth in 1985 due to ―manufacturing‖ contribution.17 Dawood 
and Sjafrizal (1989), however, observe that structural change outside the oil and gas 
sector was quite limited, ―reflecting the relatively even sectoral growth rates.‖ They 
suggest three key variables for Aceh to avoid enclave development. First, modification 
of the central government‘s rigid economy pricing policy to allow regional electricity 
prices to better reflect the real cost of power generation; Second, continuing massive 
investments in infrastructure, particularly roads; and third, expansion in agricultural 
extension programs in fisheries, forestry, livestock, non-rice food crops, and selected 
estate crops.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Major developments following the gas industry included ASEAN Aceh Fertilizer plant (1983), 
nationally owned Iskandar Muda (PIM) fertilizer plant (1984), Kraft Paper factory (PT KKA), and LPG 
project all near Lhokseumawe. Andalas Cement factory (PT SAI) near Banda Aceh also started during 
the same period. 
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1.4. Data and Methodology 
In order to examine the influence of the mining sector on agriculture and non-
mining manufacturing in Aceh, this study uses series of values of Aceh‘s GDP in 
Mining, Non-mining Manufacture (NMM), and Agriculture (AGR) from 1977 to 
2006. All series are in natural logarithm term of the GDP values, which are based on 
Year 2000 constant price. To investigate the influence of conflict on NMM and AGR, 
this paper employs manifest conflict intensity. The intensity is measured based on data 
from Age (2007) using an ordinal-scaled dummy variable generated by the Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK, 2008). In this scale, 0 = no 
conflict; 1 = non-violent, latent conflict; 2 = non-violent, manifest conflict; 3 = crises, 
partly violent; 4 = serious crises, repeated and/ or organized use of violence; and, 5 = 
war, which are in line with Age (2007) proposition of no conflict, fragmentation, 
confrontation, violence, and escalation, respectively. A brief description of HIIK scale 
can be found in Appendix 1A. Furthermore, a binary dummy variable of 0 and 1 is 
used to indicate series before and after the Asian economic crisis. As there are not 
enough series after the autonomy and the Tsunami, these variables are neglected in 
this study. Variables used in the model estimation, therefore, are as shown in Table 
1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 Variables in the model and data sources 
Notation Variable Data source 
ln(NMM)t Log of non-mining manufacturing output in year t BPS, CEIC 
ln(AGR)t Log of agricultural output in year t BPS, CEIC 
ln(NMM)t-1 Log of non-mining manufacturing output in year t-1 BPS, CEIC 
ln(AGR)t-1 Log of agricultural output in year t-1 BPS, CEIC 
ln(MINING)t Log of mining output in year t BPS, CEIC 
CONFLICT Dummy variable of 0 to 5, measuring manifest conflict 
intensity 
Age (2007), 
HIIK (2008) 
ACRISIS Dummy variable of 0 or 1, indicating before (1977-1997) 
and after (1998-2006) the Asian economic crisis 
Author‘s  
 31 
 
The model used in this study is straightforward. Using OLS method, a 
dependent variable of log difference in output of non-mining manufacturing (NMM) 
sector of year t and t-1 is regressed on ln(NMM)t-1,  ln(MINING), CONFLICT, and 
ACRISIS. Similarly, log difference of agricultural output of year t and t-1 is regressed 
on ln(AGRI)t-1, ln(MINING), CONFLICT, and ACRISIS.   
 
 
1.5.  Results and Discussion 
 This section presents results and discussion on observations based on 
descriptive data in sub-section 1.5.1, followed by results and discussion on empirical 
models found in this study in 1.5.2. 
 
1.5.1. Structural Change in Aceh’s GDP 
Although it is fairly more challenging to collect a long series of economic data 
at the sub-national level in Indonesia, series extending over 30 years have recently 
started to emerge in Indonesia so one can draw inferences about regional development 
dynamics (Hill, Resosudarmo, and Vidyattama, 2008).  This is also the case for Aceh 
where early series were diligently compiled by the Aceh Development Board, now 
BAPPEDA (Aceh Development Planning Board), and newer series have been more 
widely available after the autonomy and after the tsunami.
18
 Earlier in the first section, 
a 31 year pattern, 1975-2006, of Aceh‘s GDP annual growth based on year 2000 
constant price is shown in Figure 1.1. As expected, the pattern is similar to the pattern 
found by Dawood and Sjafrizal (1989) for the early series and of Hill, Resosudarmo, 
and Vidyattama (2008) for overall series. Aceh experienced an extraordinary rapid 
growth in the three years of 1978-80, peaking in 1979 due to gas production. The 
                                                 
18
 Heavy presence of international organizations after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami has helped refine 
better data collection, documentation, and especially, publication on various sectors in Aceh. 
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second spike of growth occurred in 1984 after the gas derivative industries (fertilizer 
plants, paper pulp and other petro chemical) started production in 1983, which is also 
similar to the finding of Booth (1992). However, as military operations to crush the 
GAM movement were launched in late 80s, Aceh‘s GDP started to dwindle. 
Then, like the rest of Indonesia, Aceh‘s GDP also experienced the worst 
contraction, some negative 9.26 percent at 2000 constant price in 1998, following the 
1997 Asian economic crisis. But, Aceh‘s GDP increased quite drastically again in 
2002 after the special autonomy, which gave Aceh a bigger share of revenues from its 
mineral sectors, was adopted by Jakarta in 2001. The growth was again in its declining 
pattern when the Tsunami hit Aceh‘s coastal-urban areas in December 2004, further 
decreasing the growth to about negative 8.5 percent.  
It is worth noting here that Aceh‘s economy contraction triggered by the 
Tsunami was actually not as bad compared to the one caused by the Asian economic 
crisis. Exacerbated by the intensifying military operations, Aceh experienced negative 
growth between 1997 and 2001, all in five consecutive years. Meanwhile, the 
declining growth caused by the Tsunami in 2004, resulting in negative growth in 2005, 
was immediately corrected by huge aid and reconstruction spending started also in 
2005, but with a positive effect only in 2006. Aceh‘s economic growth has been 
declining again after 2006.  By 2007 the growth was -2.2 percent and the preliminary 
figure for 2008 is -5.8 percent (World Bank, 2008c). Whether this is an indication of 
resource curse from aid, as described by Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 
(2005), will need to be further investigated and can only be observed in the coming 
years. 
Overall, GDP growth in Aceh has been positive on average, but with a wide 
range from negative 9.26 percent at the height of Asian economic crisis in 1998 to 
positive 87.71 percent at the peak of the gas and oil boom in 1979. Table 1.3 shows 
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summary statistics of growth in GDP, mining, agriculture, and non oil-gas 
manufacture sectors in Aceh from 1975 to 2006. The growth mean is 8.07 percent, but 
its median of 5.10 percent probably is a better simple and arbitrary estimate of Aceh‘s 
long term economic growth average. 
All the four sectors in Table 1.3 had at least once experienced negative growth 
as indicated by its minimum growth. However, the negative growth in mining and non 
oil-gas manufacturing is more extreme while the agricultural sector growth is more 
moderate. This indicates volatility in the mineral sector as noted by Humphreys, Sachs 
and Stiglitz (2007). 
  
Table 1.3  
Summary statistics of Aceh‘s GDP and three economic sectors, 1975-2006  
2000 constant price) 
Growth  Mean Std.Dev     Min      Q1 Median       Q3   Max 
GDP 
Mining 
Agriculture 
Non oil-gas manufacture 
8.07 
23.40 
12.56 
25.40 
17.78 
78.80 
39.70 
106.10 
-9.26 
-27.90 
-5.21 
-37.30 
0.48 
-10.50 
1.52 
1.60 
5.10 
1.40 
4.41 
9.40 
9.06 
9.90 
7.53 
15.80 
87.71 
304.80 
222.36 
589.30 
Source: author calculation based on BPS and CEIC data 
 
In addition, as indicated by Figure 1.6, while indicating steady growth along in 
the overall period, the agricultural sector did not indicate significant growth until 
recently. In fact, agriculture is one of the few sectors experiencing positive growth 
after the conflict and Tsunami, with 1.5 percent growth in 2006, 4.9 percent in 2007 
and 4.5 percent in the first half of 2008. In the same period, mining declined by 2.6 
percent in 2006, worsened in 2007 with a decline of 21.6 percent, and already noted a 
decline of 39.1 percent in the first half of 2008 (World Bank, 2008c).  
The pattern is confirmed by sectoral contributions to total GDP as shown in 
Figure 1.7. Between 1973 and 1983, obviously mining (oil and gas) was booming 
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alongside the decline of the agricultural sector. This might be an indication of ―Dutch 
disease‖, which will be discussed in later section. Additionally, when overall 
manufacturing contribution spiked in 1984, reaching 35-40 percent of GDP, 
agriculture contributed only about 12-13 percent of GDP. Non oil-gas manufacturing, 
however, remained weak, contributing only fewer than 10 percent along the period 
under this study. 
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Source: author calculation. Non oil-gas manufacturing includes output from gas downstream industries 
Figure 1.6 
Aceh Sector Growth in Mining, Agriculture, and Non Oil-Gas Manufacturing,  
1976-2006 (2000 Constant Price) 
 
Figure 1.7 clearly indicates that Aceh‘s economy was dominated by the 
agricultural economy prior to the gas boom. But since 1978, the mining sector, 
dominated by gas production in North Aceh, changed Aceh‘s economic structure for 
the rest of the period under study. The increase in the mining sector‘s share came 
alongside the decrease of the agriculture sector‘s contribution. 
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Source: author calculation based on data from BPS and CEIC 
Figure 1.7 
Sectoral Contribution in Percentage to Aceh‘s GDP, 1976-2006 (2000 Constant Price) 
 
The structure might change again in the near future as the mining sector has 
been declining due to reserve depletion while other sectors have been increasing or at 
least remained constant.  The implementation of special autonomy for Aceh since 
2002, and post Tsunami – post conflict reconstruction after 2004 might be another 
turning point for Aceh. Aceh‘s government, with a huge fund at its disposal, can 
determine the path of Aceh‘s future economic trajectory. Aceh‘s 2009 budget, for 
example, is IDR 9.7 trillion (about USD 97 billion), among the highest in the country. 
In addition, Aceh now has a fairly better physical infrastructure as the result of post-
tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
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1.5.2  Empirical Models  
A multivariate regression analysis is employed to clarify whether there is a 
presence of a ―Dutch disease‖ in Aceh‘s economy as indicated in Section 1.5.1. To 
start with, some characteristics of the variables in the analysis are investigated, as 
shown in Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.4 Some characteristics of the variables in the model 
Variable Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ln MININGt   9.197 1.143     5.657    10.112 
ln AGRt  8.090     0.969     6.460 8.996 
ln NMMt 6.512     1.433     3.848     7.981 
 
The result of the OLS for non-mining manufacturing (NMM) output is 
presented in Table 1.5. Regression (1) in this table is the initial model estimated using 
complete series. Diagnostic tests indicate a reasonable normal probability plot and 
residual scattered around zero, although with a couple of obvious outliers. Taking out 
the outlier with large leverage, namely observation 1 (1977), produces the results as in 
Regression (2). In both models, previous year non-mining manufacturing output is a 
significant negative determinant of a designated year non-mining manufacturing 
output.  
 
Table 1.5 Results of the OLS for non-mining manufacturing 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
ln (NMM)t-1 -0.201 ** -2.44  -0.308 *** -3.28 
ln (MINING)t   0.246 ** 2.30  0.509 *** 3.10 
CONFLICT  -0.073  -0.91  -0.045  -0.58 
ACRISIS 0.039  0.21  0.206  1.08 
R-squared 0.325    0.424   
adj. R-squared 0.217    0.327   
D-W statistics 2.041    1.984   
Note: *, **, and *** are 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance respectively     
The dependent variable is (ln(NMM)t – ln(NMM)t-1). 
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Meanwhile, contrary to the resource curse theory, mining has a positive 
influence on non-mining manufacturing output. That is, the higher mining output, the 
higher non-mining manufacturing output is, too.  Conflict, while showing the expected 
negative sign, is not significant in both models. Interestingly, Asian economic crisis 
indicate positive influence on non-mining manufacturing output, but is also not 
significant in both models.  
A similar procedure is used to investigate how independent variables influence 
agricultural output. Model (3) and Model (4) in Table 1.6 are models with complete 
series and without observation 1 (1977), respectively. Again, contrary to what the 
resource curse theory predicts, mining has a positive impact on the output of 
agriculture sector. Similar to non-mining manufacturing output, conflict also has an 
expected negative impact, though not statistically significant, on agricultural output. 
Model (4) indicates that the Asian economic crisis indeed has a positive impact on 
agricultural output. 
 
 
Table 1.6 Results of the OLS for agriculture output 
 Model (3)  Model (4) 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
ln (AGRI)t-1 -0.189 *** -2.72  -0.285 *** -3.75 
ln (MINING)t 0.160 *** 2.83  0.315 *** 3.73 
CONFLICT  -0.047  -1.04  -0.038  -0.92 
ACRISIS 0.139  1.21  0.266 ** 2.24 
R-squared 0.313    0.438   
adj. R-squared 0.203    0.345   
D-W statistics 2.330    2.372   
Note: *, **, and *** are 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance respectively     
The dependent variable is (ln(AGRI)t – ln(AGRI)t-1). 
. 
Recall that the main goal of this paper is to investigate whether Aceh 
experienced a ―resource curse‖ between 1977 and 2006. Models (1) to (4) show both 
‗non-mining manufacturing‘ and ‗agriculture‘ outputs in Aceh have not been reduced 
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by the increase of ‗mining‘ output as indicated by descriptive analysis in Sub-section 
1.5.1. Quite to the contrary, the models indicate that the ‗mining‘ sector in Aceh has 
actually helped increase output in the other two sectors as ‗mining‘ always has a 
positive coefficient in all the models. Therefore, it can be safely inferred that there is 
not enough empirical support to claim that Aceh experienced a resource curse. That is, 
no indication of ‗mining‘ sector has taken over the more traditional sectors in Aceh 
like agriculture and manufacturing. The decline in output of non-mining 
manufacturing and agriculture along the years of 1977 to 2006, thus, cannot be 
attributed to the mining sector. Instead, the model indicates that ‗conflict‘ might 
indeed be the main culprit for such decline. However, as the ‗conflict‘ in Aceh 
intertwined closely with the management of its natural resources, one might argue that 
Aceh had experienced a resource curse that was channeled through the protracted 
conflict as theorized by, for example, Tadjoeddin (2007). 
On the other hand, the Asian financial crisis might have contributed to the 
return of the significance of ‗agriculture‘ and ‗non-mining manufacturing‘ in Aceh‘s 
economy as found in other part of Indonesia. It has a positive impact on agricultural 
sector output.  
  
 
1.6  Concluding Remarks 
Aceh‘s GDP growth has two booms and two busts. The first and biggest boom 
was between 1978 and 1984 known as the ―natural gas boom‖. Then, there was a 
boom as a result of special autonomy in 2002. The first boom was followed by slow 
economic growth due to the conflict, but it did not bust until the Asian economic crisis 
in 1998. The second boom of 2002 was followed by a second bust due to the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami. Based on sector contribution to the GDP, the ―natural gas 
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boom‖ changed Aceh‘s economic structure, from one previously based on diffused 
‗agriculture‘ source to ‗unsustainable point source‘ of gas-based industries. 
There is a compelling relationship between natural resources and conflict in 
Aceh. It can be seen as part of the curse as premised by Tadjoeddin (2007) when a 
resource boom effect is assumed to have been channeled through non-economic 
measures.  This paper, however, shows there is not enough empirical evidence of a 
―resource curse‖ syndrome in Aceh‘s economy. ‗Mining‘ sector had not caused a 
much lower output in ‗agriculture‘ and ‗non-mining manufacture‘. Instead, it might 
have helped the later two sectors have an increased output. With such inference from 
the model, the hypothesis of ‗resource curse‘ in Aceh can be rejected.  
Nevertheless, as the conflict is closely related to natural resources management 
in Aceh, and if the ‗conflict‘ is considered as part of or a resource curse itself, as 
suggested by Tadjoeddin (2007), one can still argue that Aceh did experience the 
resource curse before the peace agreement. Although Aceh is now enjoying a relative 
peace, the management of its unexploited natural resources might trigger another 
conflict in the future.  Whether Aceh can escape the ―resource curse‖ in the form of 
new conflict in the coming years remains to be seen. Although not being discussed in 
this paper, several authors such as Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2006), Tajdoeddin 
(2007) and Hill, Resosudarmo and Vidyattama (2008) argue that the management of 
increasing revenues from Aceh‘s special autonomy since 2002 might determine how 
Aceh copes with the curse. In addition, Aceh can also tap into the boom of its post-
conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction. 
Even though Aceh‘s fund from its natural resources has been declining, mainly 
due to depleting oil and gas reserves, its ―fiscal revenues will increase further‖ until 
2028 (World Bank, 2006) as it enjoys the new special autonomy fund—mainly from 
oil and gas, and a  higher General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, or DAU) 
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from the decentralization scheme enacted in 1999. Thus, as the World Bank 
concludes, ―Aceh has the resources to fight poverty‖, although by 2006, ―it has not yet 
made much progress‖ (p. xvi). Acehnese and Indonesian alike hope that the new Aceh 
Government‘s initiative to invest heavily in infrastructure, education, and health will 
remedy ―the curse‖ Aceh has experienced so far. Aceh has, for example, adopted the 
policy to invest at least 30 per cent of its revenues from oil and gas in education (Aceh 
Government, 2007:12). In 2009, from its IDR 9.7 trillion total budget (about USD 97 
billion), the government allocates IDR 1.5 trillion (15.46 per cent) for education, and 
IDR 2.2 trillion (22.68 per cent) for infrastructure.
19
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Aceh Government‘s Official Website: 
http://www.nad.go.id/index2.php?option=isi&do_pdf=1&id=3678 (retrieved  9 March 2009) 
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APPENDIX 1A 
 
HIIK Conflict Intensity Scale 
 
Conflict intensity 
State of 
Violence 
Intensity 
Group 
Level of 
Intensity 
Name of 
Intensity 
Definition 
non-
violent 
low 1 
Latent 
Conflict 
A positional difference over definable 
values of national meaning is 
considered to be a latent conflict if 
respective demands are ar ticulated by 
one of the parties and perceived by 
the other as such. 
Non-
violent 
low 2 
Manifest 
Conflict 
A manifest conflict includes the use 
of measures that are located in the 
preliminary stage to violent force. 
This includes for example verbal 
pressure, threatening explicitly with 
violence, or the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
Violent medium 3 Crisis 
A crisis is a tense situation in which 
at least one of the par ties uses violent 
force in sporadic incidents. 
Violent high 4 
Severe 
Crisis 
A conflict is considered to be a severe 
crisis if violent force is repeatedly 
used in an organized way. 
Violent high 5 War 
A war is a type of violent conflict in 
which violent force is used with a 
certain continuity in an organized and 
systematic way. The conflict parties 
exercise extensive measures, 
depending on the situation. The 
extent of destruction is massive and 
of long duration. 
 
Source: Conflict Barometer, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
2008 
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APPENDIX 1B 
Partial Computer Output 
 
A. Impact on Non Mining Manufacturing (NMM) 
 
1. Regression Analysis: D1LnNMM versus LnNMMt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(All observations) 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnNMM = - 0.608 – 0.201 LnNMMt-1 + 0.246 LnMINING – 0.0729 CONFLICT 
          + 0.039 ACRISIS 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant    -0.6076   0.7229  -0.84  0.409 
LnNMMt-1   -0.20058  0.08227  -2.44  0.022 
LnMINING     0.2460   0.1071   2.30  0.030 
CONFLICT   -0.07292  0.08055  -0.91  0.374 
ACRISIS      0.0387   0.1821   0.21  0.833 
 
S = 0.341855   R-Sq = 32.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 21.7% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF      SS      MS     F      P 
Regression       4  1.4069  0.3517  3.01  0.037 
Residual Error  25  2.9216  0.1169 
Total           29  4.3286 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnNMMt-1  D1LnNMM      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      3.85   0.1620  -0.2066  0.2824    0.3686      1.91 X 
  9      4.91   1.9305   0.6258  0.1733    1.3047      4.43R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.04122 
 
 
2. Regression Analysis: D1LnNMM versus LnNMMt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(Without Outlier: Obs. 1977) 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnNMM = - 2.56 – 0.308 LnNMMt-1 + 0.509 LnMINING – 0.0447 CONFLICT 
          + 0.206 ACRISIS 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant     -2.561    1.180  -2.17  0.040 
LnNMMt-1   -0.30756  0.09379  -3.28  0.003 
LnMINING     0.5091   0.1644   3.10  0.005 
CONFLICT   -0.04473  0.07721  -0.58  0.568 
ACRISIS      0.2064   0.1905   1.08  0.289 
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S = 0.322344   R-Sq = 42.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 32.7% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF      SS      MS     F      P 
Regression       4  1.8321  0.4580  4.41  0.008 
Residual Error  24  2.4937  0.1039 
Total           28  4.3259 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnNMMt-1  D1LnNMM      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      4.01   0.2063  -0.3817  0.2602    0.5880      3.09RX 
  8      4.91   1.9305   0.8381  0.1940    1.0924      4.24R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.98375 
 
B. Impact on Agriculture 
 
1. Regression Analysis: D1LnAGR versus LnAGRt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(All observations) 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnAGR = 0.249 – 0.189 LnAGRt-1 + 0.160 LnMINING – 0.0467 CONFLICT 
          + 0.139 ACRISIS 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant     0.2490   0.3885   0.64  0.527 
LnAGRt-1   -0.18860  0.06923  -2.72  0.012 
LnMINING    0.16034  0.05672   2.83  0.009 
CONFLICT   -0.04668  0.04477  -1.04  0.307 
ACRISIS      0.1388   0.1145   1.21  0.237 
 
S = 0.191441   R-Sq = 31.3%   R-Sq(adj) = 20.3% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       4  0.41698  0.10424  2.84  0.045 
Residual Error  25  0.91624  0.03665 
Total           29  1.33321 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnAGRt-1  D1LnAGR      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      6.48   0.0287  -0.2069  0.1570    0.2356      2.15RX 
  9      6.96   1.1705   0.3857  0.0978    0.7848      4.77R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.32989 
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2. Regression Analysis: D1LnAGR versus LnAGRt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(Without Outlier: Obs. 1977) 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnAGR = - 0.512 – 0.285 LnAGRt-1 + 0.315 LnMINING – 0.0381 CONFLICT 
          + 0.266 ACRISIS 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant    -0.5118   0.4844  -1.06  0.301 
LnAGRt-1   -0.28456  0.07592  -3.75  0.001 
LnMINING    0.31490  0.08440   3.73  0.001 
CONFLICT   -0.03814  0.04142  -0.92  0.366 
ACRISIS      0.2661   0.1188   2.24  0.035 
 
S = 0.176417   R-Sq = 43.8%   R-Sq(adj) = 34.5% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       4  0.58322  0.14581  4.68  0.006 
Residual Error  24  0.74695  0.03112 
Total           28  1.33017 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnAGRt-1  D1LnAGR      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      6.51  -0.0535  -0.2960  0.1431    0.2426      2.35RX 
  8      6.96   1.1705   0.5144  0.1056    0.6561      4.64R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.37160 
 
C. Using “die-down” dummy of Asian Economic Crisis (ACRISIS_1) 
 
1. Regression Analysis: D1LnNMM versus LnNMMt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(with ACRISIS_1 and all observations) 
 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnNMM = - 0.577 – 0.200 LnNMMt-1 + 0.245 LnMINING – 0.0802 CONFLICT 
          + 0.126 ACRISIS_1 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant    -0.5774   0.7091  -0.81  0.423 
LnNMMt-1   -0.20002  0.07225  -2.77  0.010 
LnMINING    0.24538  0.09927   2.47  0.021 
CONFLICT   -0.08022  0.08515  -0.94  0.355 
ACRISIS_1    0.1261   0.3776   0.33  0.741 
 
 
S = 0.341404   R-Sq = 32.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 21.9% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF      SS      MS     F      P 
Regression       4  1.4147  0.3537  3.03  0.036 
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Residual Error  25  2.9139  0.1166 
Total           29  4.3286 
 
 
Source     DF  Seq SS 
LnNMMt-1    1  0.5130 
LnMINING    1  0.7981 
CONFLICT    1  0.0905 
ACRISIS_1   1  0.0130 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnNMMt-1  D1LnNMM      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      3.85   0.1620  -0.1997  0.2692    0.3617      1.72 X 
  9      4.91   1.9305   0.6306  0.1695    1.2999      4.39R 
 22      7.98  -0.1252  -0.0896  0.2936   -0.0357     -0.20 X 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.05291 
 
 
2. Regression Analysis: D1LnNMM versus LnNMMt-1, LnMINING, ...  
(with ACRISIS_1 and without 1985) 
 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnNMM = 0.052 – 0.0554 LnNMMt-1 + 0.0490 LnMINING – 0.0199 CONFLICT 
          - 0.194 ACRISIS_1 
 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant     0.0516   0.3546   0.15  0.885 
LnNMMt-1   -0.05538  0.03893  -1.42  0.168 
LnMINING    0.04903  0.05337   0.92  0.367 
CONFLICT   -0.01990  0.04227  -0.47  0.642 
ACRISIS_1   -0.1938   0.1885  -1.03  0.314 
 
 
S = 0.167320   R-Sq = 25.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 13.3% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       4  0.23203  0.05801  2.07  0.116 
Residual Error  24  0.67190  0.02800 
Total           28  0.90393 
 
 
Source     DF   Seq SS 
LnNMMt-1    1  0.11806 
LnMINING    1  0.05830 
CONFLICT    1  0.02608 
ACRISIS_1   1  0.02959 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 46 
 
 
Obs  LnNMMt-1  D1LnNMM      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      3.85   0.1620   0.0561  0.1350    0.1058      1.07 X 
 21      7.98  -0.1252  -0.2123  0.1446    0.0871      1.03 X 
 25      7.19   0.4802  -0.0144  0.0514    0.4946      3.11R 
 27      7.69  -0.4672  -0.0397  0.0630   -0.4275     -2.76R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.09266 
 
 
3. Regression Analysis: D1LnAGR versus LnAGRt-1, LnMINING, ...  
 
(with ACRISIS_1 and all observations) 
 
Regression Analysis: D1LnAGR versus LnAGRt-1, LnMINING, ...  
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnAGR = 0.179 – 0.146 LnAGRt-1 + 0.134 LnMINING – 0.0469 CONFLICT 
          + 0.156 ACRISIS_1 
 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant     0.1785   0.3909   0.46  0.652 
LnAGRt-1   -0.14601  0.05510  -2.65  0.014 
LnMINING    0.13402  0.05098   2.63  0.014 
CONFLICT   -0.04689  0.04836  -0.97  0.342 
ACRISIS_1    0.1557   0.2151   0.72  0.476 
 
 
S = 0.194960   R-Sq = 28.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 17.3% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       4  0.38298  0.09575  2.52  0.067 
Residual Error  25  0.95023  0.03801 
Total           29  1.33321 
 
Source     DF   Seq SS 
LnAGRt-1    1  0.09316 
LnMINING    1  0.24940 
CONFLICT    1  0.02051 
ACRISIS_1   1  0.01991 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnAGRt-1  D1LnAGR      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1      6.48   0.0287  -0.1508  0.1501    0.1794      1.44 X 
  9      6.96   1.1705   0.3501  0.0922    0.8204      4.78R 
 22      8.88   0.0147   0.0918  0.1699   -0.0771     -0.81 X 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.38483 
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4. Regression Analysis: D1LnAGR versus LnAGRt-1, LnMINING, ...  
 
(with ACRISIS_1, without 1977, 1983, 1985) 
 
The regression equation is 
D1LnAGR = - 0.297 – 0.0278 LnAGRt-1 + 0.0552 LnMINING + 0.0115 CONFLICT 
          - 0.0410 ACRISIS_1 
 
 
Predictor      Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant   -0.29667   0.09311  -3.19  0.004 
LnAGRt-1   -0.02783   0.01139  -2.44  0.023 
LnMINING    0.05518   0.01365   4.04  0.001 
CONFLICT   0.011476  0.008501   1.35  0.191 
ACRISIS_1  -0.04097   0.03772  -1.09  0.289 
 
 
S = 0.0328627   R-Sq = 51.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 42.7% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       4  0.025276  0.006319  5.85  0.002 
Residual Error  22  0.023759  0.001080 
Total           26  0.049035 
 
 
Source     DF    Seq SS 
LnAGRt-1    1  0.000011 
LnMINING    1  0.022951 
CONFLICT    1  0.001040 
ACRISIS_1   1  0.001274 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  LnAGRt-1   D1LnAGR      Fit   SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  6      6.98  -0.02268  0.04194  0.01332  -0.06462     -2.15R 
 19      8.88   0.01470  0.00308  0.02925   0.01163      0.78 X 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.06016 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DETERMINANTS OF INFLATION IN ACEH 
 
Abstract  
 The wild increase of inflation in post-tsunami Aceh was assumed to be 
influenced by two ―shocks‖, the tsunami and the fuel price increase. This paper 
examines determinants of inflation in Banda Aceh and investigates the change in the 
inflation structure due to the shocks. To integrate the findings into policy, an analysis 
of price and output relation is performed using Structural Vector Autoregression 
(SVAR) with Blanchard and Quah restriction. Based on models developed using 
multivariate time series regression, I find that Aceh‘s inflation is mainly determined 
by inflation expectancy and exchange rate, similar to Indonesia‘s national inflation 
behavior. Productivity also indicates significance but with a contradictory sign when 
divided into productivity based on oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas GDP. Contrary to 
the common assumption, Chow‘s structural change test indicates that it was the oil 
price increase, rather than Tsunami-driven factors, that changed the structure of 
Aceh‘s inflation. In regard to output-price relation, I find the AS and AD curves 
follow what the textbook predicts. The post-Tsunami AS curve, as expected, is flatter 
than that of pre-tsunami and overall series, but as the AD curve after Tsunami also 
becomes flatter. Therefore, a policy based on AS rather than AD shocks to increase 
growth while keeping price in control would have been more effective in post-tsunami 
Aceh.  
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2.1   Introduction 
There is a growing concern of slowing economic growth in post-tsunami Aceh. 
―Aceh Economy Bankrupt‖ was the headline of the main local daily newspaper in 
Banda Aceh on February 1, 2008.
20
 The news quoted the chairman of Banda Aceh 
Office of Indonesia Central Bank, Bank Indonesia (BI), saying Aceh‘s economic 
growth decreased by 0.6 percent in 2007 to become 1.8 percent, from an already low 
2.4 percent in 2006. The next day, the governor of Aceh refuted the claim and argued 
that the low growth was only a reflection of the province‘s routine expenditure of 
January to October 2007, neglecting development projects starting afterwards.
21
 The 
BI office in Banda Aceh also released a statement saying that the wording of the 
headline was negative and misleading. The governor and other analysts blamed high 
inflation as one of the main culprits for the slow growth.
22
 
Indeed, inflation in post-tsunami Aceh has been consistently higher than that of 
Indonesia‘s national average as shown in Figure 2.1. The gap has been narrowing 
since the end of 2006, but it is still above the national average, at least as of the time 
this report is being written. Until the beginning of 2008, officials and analysts alike 
were still concerned about the high inflation in Aceh.
23
   
Since the tsunami, prices in the affected regions have increased more sharply 
than those of the national average. The most dramatic increase has been in Banda 
Aceh, which serves as the regional hub for reconstruction activities. Year-on-year 
inflation in December 2005 reached 41 percent in Banda Aceh, while it was 23 percent 
in Medan, the neighboring province, and 18 percent in Lokseumawe, the second 
                                                 
20
 Ekonomi Aceh Bangkrut: Merosot 0,6 Persen (Aceh Economy Bankrupt: Slipped 0.6 Percent),  
Serambi Indonesia (local daily newspaper), 1 February 2008 
21
 Gubernur Bantah Ekonomi Aceh Bangkrut (Governor Denies Aceh Economy Bankrupt), Serambi 
Indonesia, 2 February 2008 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Inflasi Aceh „Lampu Kuning‟ (Aceh‘s Inflation ‗Yellow Light‘), Serambi Indonesia, 3 January 2008 
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biggest city in North Aceh, compared to 17 percent at the national level. The major 
increase in prices occurred immediately after the tsunami. During the first four 
months, the CPI in Banda Aceh registered an increase of 15 percent. The second major 
increase took place during the nationwide fuel price increase in October 2005, after 
the government revoked the oil and gas subsides. The five year outlook of the inflation 
movement is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 
Inflation in Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe (North Aceh) in comparison to national 
inflation in Indonesia 
 
According to April 2008 Aceh Economic Update (AEU), a bi-annual joint 
analysis by the BI and The World Bank with support from the Multi Donor Fund 
(MDF) for Aceh and Nias, the high inflation in Aceh (as measured in Banda Aceh) is 
―a result of prolonged high demand for goods and services to supply the reconstruction 
effort, combined with little supply response in terms of increased production.‖ The 
analysis also maintains that, ―The festive season and the global increase in commodity 
prices contributed to higher year-end inflation‖ and that ―Prices of many commodities, 
including fuel, are projected to remain high in international markets, which is likely to 
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translate into renewed inflationary pressures in 2008.‖ On the other hand, some 
analysts assert that the high inflation in Aceh is also a result of increased money supply 
which has been coming along with the influx of international aid, agencies and their 
workers after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004.
24
  
The inflation in Banda Aceh, therefore, is assumed to be directly or indirectly 
influenced by two ―shocks‖, the tsunami and the fuel price increase. But did either or 
both of the shocks really change the structure that makes up the inflation mechanism 
in Banda Aceh? Which one is worse in affecting prices in the region? Moreover, what 
is the output-price relationship in Aceh‘s economy, given the shock of increasing 
demand for post-tsunami reconstruction? 
Given the situation, a study on inflation in Aceh is, therefore, very important 
and strategic. This study is aimed at examining determinants of inflation in Aceh. 
Subsequently, a model is estimated and its finding is compared with other relevant 
studies and the factual situation. Structural change tests were performed to see whether 
one or both the two shocks, i.e. tsunami and fuel price increase, have caused structural 
change in Aceh‘s inflation structure. Further, the link between output and price in 
Aceh‘s economy is explored by applying a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
with the Blanchard-Quah (B-Q) restriction.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the 
general impact of the 2004 Tsunami on Aceh‘s economy. Section 2.3 reviews 
literature on inflation modeling, followed by Section 2.4 which describes data and 
methodology used in the paper.  Section 2.5 discusses the results, including model 
diagnostic and interpretation. This section also includes a brief description of 
structural change in Aceh‘s inflation and its output-price relationship. Finally, Section 
2.6 concludes, followed by a note on limitations and further research direction in 2.7.   
                                                 
24
 See, for example, Kasim (2008) 
 61 
 
2.2   Impact the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Based on the damage and loss assessment by the international donor 
community, it is estimated that the tsunami has had a total economic impact across all 
affected countries of 9.9 billion US dollars. Almost half of this total has been borne by 
Indonesia. The total impact relative to the overall size of the economy in Indonesia, 
however, is only about 2 percent; higher than India (0.2 percent) and Thailand (1.4 
percent) but much lower to Maldives (83.6 percent) and Sri Lanka (7.6 percent). 
In contrast, provincial-level statistics reveal that reconstruction and economic 
recovery requirements are equivalent to nearly the size of some provincial economies. 
The impact (damage and losses) to GDP ratio in Aceh province comes close to 100 
percent, followed by Phang Nga province in Thailand (90 percent), the entire 
Maldives (84 percent), and Krabi and Phuket in Thailand (68 percent each), as Figure 
2.2 indicates.  
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Staff calculations (in BRR, 2005) 
Figure 2.2  
Province-Level Impact-to-GDP Ratios, % 
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The overall impact of the disaster on the economy depends not only on its 
aggregate scale and geographic or spatial distribution but also on its sectoral 
distribution. The bulk of damage in Indonesia has been in the housing and human 
settlements sector, which accounts for 47.9 percent of the total damage. This 
percentage is much higher than in any other affected country. At the same time, 
relative damage to productive sectors in Indonesia has been substantially less severe 
than in other affected countries.  A complete breakdown of cross country demographic 
and economic impact of the tsunami is provided in Appendix 2.A. 
The projected aggregate impact of the tsunami on Aceh‘s GDP and poverty 
rates has been well documented by the Government‘s Master Plan.  Initially, due to 
data limitations, the impact of the tsunami on Aceh‘s income growth and poverty 
headcount index is presented as a range (Table 2.1). A moderate scenario, which was 
considered most likely to materialize, predicted a 20 percent decline in Aceh‘s non-
oil-and-gas GDP in 2005.
25
 Accordingly, Aceh‘s economy would have contracted by 
13.9 percent and an additional 600,000 people would have fallen below the poverty 
line. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Growth and poverty impact scenarios 
 
Source: Master Plan for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, March 2005, World Bank Staff 
Estimates. 1/ Based on estimated 2004 GDP 
                                                 
25
 Summary table of damages and losses (page. iii of the Master Plan) puts estimated losses in the next 
4 years at US$1.5 billion (roughly Rp. 14 trillion). Assuming that about 40 percent of losses would be 
observed in 2005, estimated losses of non-oil and gas would be Rp 5.5 trillion. This is about 20 percent 
of Aceh‘s non-oil and gas GDP 
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Three years after the tsunami, its impact on poverty and growth seems to fall 
between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Based on this scenario, some 325,000 people in 
Aceh, and 149,000 in Nias and Nias Selatan combined, a total of about 475,000 
people, would have fallen below the poverty line in the absence of mitigation 
mechanisms. The actual pre-disaster poverty headcount vs. estimated post-disaster 
poverty headcount by district is presented in Appendix 2.B. The headcount indicates 
the need to pay more attention to spatial disparity. 
In regard to growth, AEU (April, 2008) reported that Aceh GDP declined by 
9.6 percent in 2005, and further declined by 10.1 percent in 2006. Growth increased 
by 1.6 percent in 2005, but then fell again by 2.2 percent in 2007
26
.  However, a more 
positive outlook is seen on GDP without oil and gas, which scores an increasing 
positive change from 1.2 percent in 2005 to 7.7 percent in 2006. Yet, although still 
preliminary, the growth seems to slow down again by 2007 with a percentage growth 
rate of 7.4.  
In the months following the tsunami, the increase in prices has been mostly 
driven by rising transportation costs.
27
 Rising transport costs also appear to be the 
major determinant of the increase in the prices of construction materials. While overall 
CPI increased by 41% from December 2004 to December 2005, the transportation 
prices grew by 93% during the same period. This rate of increase in transport costs has 
transformed into the respective increase in prices of construction materials (Figure 
2.3). 
House rents also jumped dramatically by almost 200 percent during the first 
two months after the tsunami, before stabilizing at an average of 9,600 rupiah per day 
                                                 
26
 2007 growth rate is a preliminary figure provided by BI and the World Bank.  
27
 Transportation prices increased initially due to interrupted road connections, and later due to transport 
supply constraints as the increasing amount of goods related to reconstruction process need to be 
delivered. 
 64 
 
from March to May. But June 2005 saw another 42 percent jump in daily rent prices to 
13,700 rupiah. Rent prices stayed at this level until August.
28
 The high increase of 
rooms and house rents has triggered anxiety within the affected community. One study 
reported that economic problems caused by inflation are considered bigger concerns 
than security issues after the peace agreement.
29
   
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
clo
th
in
g
ov
er
al
l C
PI
pr
ep
ar
ed
 fo
od
tra
ns
po
rt
ce
m
en
t
br
ick
wo
od
 
as
sis
ta
nt
wo
od
 w
or
ke
r
br
ick
 la
ye
r
In
cr
e
a
se
, %
 
Source: BPS, World Bank staff calculations (In Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank) 
Figure 2.3  
Increase in prices of commodities and in wages, Dec. 2004 to Dec. 2005 
 
Increase in prices during the course of 2005 affected all construction materials, 
but has been the highest for those major commodities facing the greatest demand – 
brick, wood and sand. From Dec. 2004 to Dec. 2005 the prices of brick, wood and 
sand have increased by 83%, 124%, and 164%, respectively (Figure 2.4). 
 
                                                 
28
 BPS reports annual rents for houses. Daily rents are calculated by dividing the reported rent by 365 
days. However, the rent prices reported are under-estimated, since BPS‘ sample of houses has rent 
contracts fixed for one year and therefore does not capture fully the price trends in the housing market. 
The average price of a good quality room in a guesthouse is now around 300,000 – 350,000 ($25 - $35 
per night). 
29
 ―LSI: Aceh Aman tapi Kondisi Ekonomi Buruk,‖ (LSI: Aceh is Safe but Economic Condition 
Worsening), Kompas, 28 Maret 2006 
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Source: BPS, World Bank staff calculations (In Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank) 
Figure 2.4  
Price trends for selected construction materials in 2005 
 
Since January 2006 prices stayed at high levels, but did not increase further. 
During the 1
st
 quarter of 2006 the construction materials have on average registered no 
increase in prices. It is only the price of sand that increased by 4%, while the prices of 
other materials remained unchanged (Figure 2.5). 
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  Source: BPS, World Bank staff calculations (In Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank) 
Figure 2.5  
Monthly price dynamics for key construction materials 
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The transition from the relief to the reconstruction phase pushed up the wages 
of construction workers. During 2005 the wages increased by at least 40-50% across 
all categories of construction workers. The largest rate of increase has been observed 
for higher skilled workers (Figure 6). 
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    Source: BPS, World Bank staff calculations (In Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank) 
Figure 2.6  
Construction workers‘ wages, Oct. 2005 vs. Oct. 200430 
 
2.3 Inflation Modeling and Output-Price Relationship 
Empirical studies on Aceh‘s inflation at the regional level are sketchy at best. 
For that reason, an alternative strain of literature on the study of inflation from 
developing countries and from Indonesia at the national level are used to illuminate 
the situation at the level of Aceh.  
According to Bokil and Schimmelpfennig (2005), there is a large and growing 
literature on inflation forecasting in emerging market economies. This includes 
                                                 
30
 The survey of wages for categories of construction workers presented in Figure 5 is conducted only 
once a year (in October). 
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Chauvet (2000) and IMF (2001) for Brazil, Leigh and Rossi (2002) for Turkey, and 
Sun (2004) for Thailand. They observe similar findings to those for advanced 
economies. That is, changes in money growth, nominal exchange rates, price of 
imports, inflation expectations, and exogenous supply shocks, especially to oil and 
food prices are main determinants of inflation. It is consistent with theoretical work 
that views inflation to be a monetary phenomenon in the long run when prices and 
wages are flexible and output and employment are always at their natural rates. In the 
short run, however, the findings of these studies show that inflation is also driven by 
real and nominal shocks that affect aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply. 
Subsequently, Bokil and Schimmelpfennig (2005) find that broad money 
growth, private sector credit growth, and lags in inflation as determinants for inflation 
in Pakistan. They used the leading indicator model (LIM), ARIMA and VAR 
approaches in the study, but suggested that LIM is superior in forecasting Pakistan‘s 
inflation. 
Loungani and Swagel (2001) study sources of inflation in developing 
countries. Using VAR, they found that money growth and exchange rate changes are 
far more important determinants influencing inflation in countries with floating 
exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, they found that inertial factors dominate the 
inflation process in developing countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.  
In the case of Indonesia, studies of inflation at the national level have been 
done by both national and international researchers.  Kacaribu (2004) uses an 
asymmetric trimmed-mean approach to measure core inflation in Indonesia. He found 
that core inflation is more correlated with the growth of money supply in the past and 
that it is a reliable indicator of inflation trend.  
According to Ramakrishnan and Vamvakidis (2002), among few empirical 
studies that analyze the inflation process in Indonesia, ―exchange rate movements 
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often emerged as a significant determinant of inflation.‖ Using multivariate regression 
models, their own study confirms previous empirical papers. They find exchange rate 
and foreign inflation to be the key contributors to inflation in Indonesia. Both factors 
also have a strong predictive power of inflation. Additionally, they found that base 
money growth is also statistically significant, ―but has a smaller impact on the 
headline consumer price inflation.‖ Excluding the exchange rate, they moreover found 
that base money growth emerges as a more important determinant of inflation, while 
productivity also becomes significant. Hence, they concluded that the effects of other 
important variables might be fed through the exchange rate.     
McLeod (1997) argues that the cause of continuing moderately high inflation 
in the 80s through 90s in Indonesia is excessive growth of base money. He noted that 
the policies of monetary authority were responsible for inflation in the medium and 
long term through the impact of base money supply. In regard to policy, Taguchi 
(1995) noted that price stability and investment, the former required contraction and 
the later needed expansion, is balanced by Bank Indonesia through monetary policies. 
Meanwhile, Siregar (1996) shows that changes in nominal rupiah exchange rate 
Granger caused inflation. 
Ahmed and Kapur (1990), on the other hand, find that the domestic price of 
imports and the price of rice affected domestic inflation in Indonesia. Therefore, they 
argued domestic inflation in Indonesia was only partly a monetary phenomenon. They 
concluded that the transmission of international inflation was immediate and large, 
although slowing the rate of money growth could reduce inflation.  
The importance of the study of regional inflation in Indonesia has emerged 
since it introduced a more substantial regional autonomy in 2000.
31
 With regional 
                                                 
31
 Based on Indonesia Law  No. 22/1999 and Law No. 26/1999 
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autonomy, the source of inflation in Indonesian regions can be more widespread and is 
more difficult to control than those of previous years (Brojonegoro, 2001). 
Brojonegoro at al (2005) study the relation between non-monetary factors and 
regional inflation. Using logistic regression, they found that non-monetary factors 
such as local government revenues, routine expenditure and local transportation cost 
determine regional inflation. They argue, therefore, that monetary policy alone, 
without coordination with local government, will be less effective to influence 
regional inflation. Although in this study they did not include Aceh in their survey, 
Brojonegoro at al did include Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe (a city in North Aceh) 
in their analysis of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Based on the Philip-Peron test for 
unit root with intercept and trend, they found that consumer price indexes (CPI) in 43 
cities in Indonesia, including Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe are not cointegrated, 
thus rejecting PPP.  The test with intercept but without trend, however, excludes 
Lhokseumawe from other cities, all of which also show no cointegration.   
Githarie (2005, in Wimanda, 2006) finds that different regions have different 
inflation thresholds, which, she argues, is good for economic regional growth.  
Hutabarat (2005) descriptively examines Indonesia‘s inflation. He found that 
the main determinant of inflation in Indonesia is inflation expectation which is formed 
by previous inflation (adaptive expectation). This behavior has caused inflation 
persistency due to the fact that Indonesia‘s inflation is often triggered by significant 
cost-push or supply shocks like oil and fuel price increases, and Indonesia‘s currency, 
the rupiah, devaluation and fluctuation. The inflation persistency is also determined by 
the cost-push of administered goods like electricity and minimum wage over-inflation 
indexation increase. 
Wimanda (2006) evaluates the characteristics, convergence, and determinant 
of regional inflation in Indonesia using more formal methods. He studied 26 regions 
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using data with various length and frequency, some of which needed interpolation. 
The characteristics are studied through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and 
the Granger causality test. Convergence is examined with the cointegration approach, 
while determinants are inferred from a model using OLS method. On the 
characteristics of regional inflation, Wimanda found that level and volatility of 
regional inflation after the Asian economic crisis of 1997 is higher than those before 
the crisis; that inflation of transportation and housing in most regions are higher than 
national inflation; that, other than transportation, high increases in fuel price cause 
price increase in other baskets, such as housing, food, and processed food in many 
regions. He also found that regions in Java, West Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan 
can be categorized as ―leaders‖ in inflation as their inflation is likely to affect other 
regional inflation.  
On convergence, Wimanda finds that regional inflation and its component do 
not exhibit convergence. Only eight regions (31 percent) exhibit inflation convergence 
with national inflation, i.e. West Sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung, Yogyakarta, 
West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and Maluku. 
Lastly, using multivariate regression, the study finds that the main determinant 
of regional inflation is inflation expectation (backward looking) and exchange rate. 
Regional revenue, routine expenditure, and balanced fund from the central 
government are only significant at some regions, but with very small elasticity. 
Particularly for Aceh, Wimanda concludes that only persistency (or expected inflation) 
and exchange rates are significant determinants of inflation. 
With regard to output-price relation, understanding aggregate supply (AS) and 
aggregate demand (AD) curves helps macroeconomics policy makers choose the 
appropriate shock to stimulate economic growth while managing inflation. However, 
both AD and AS shocks ―jointly determine the changes in output and prices‖ (Azis, 
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2008:2). Therefore, a decomposition procedure is needed. A multivariate approach 
using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) has been widely used, e.g. Gamber 
1996; Mio, 2002; Cover, Enders, and Hueng, 2004; Enders and Hurn, 2005; Azis, 
2008; Azis & Putanapong, 2009. In these studies, aggregate demand and supply 
shocks are identified from the VAR residual using a long run restriction proposed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) (hereafter B-Q) or its modification (e.g. Cover, Enders, 
and Hueng, 2004). 
 
2.4   Data and Methodology 
 Following previous studies, this paper empirically examines the domestic and 
international effects on inflation in Aceh. Using several factors described below, a 
multivariate regression model is developed to describe the inflationary process. The 
model initially follows those of Ramakrishnan and Vamvakidis (2002) and Wimanda 
(2006) but with some more in depth analysis. For example, a Chow Test for structural 
change is done to check for the supposedly structural change in Aceh‘s inflation in the 
wake of fuel price increase and the tsunami.   
Most data are acquired from Indonesia‘s Office of Statistics (BPS) or CEIC 
with some supplement from Ministry of Labor (MoL) and Bank Indonesia (BI), the 
Indonesia Central Bank. Most data from CEIC originally also comes from BPS. 
Quarterly data of Aceh‘s GDP is  cquired from the World Bank office in Banda 
Aceh. 
The model is developed based on a premise that consumer price inflation in 
Aceh can arise due to wage inflation and imported inflation.
32
 Wages are influenced 
by excess demand or supply of labor as reflected in unemployment rate. Shortages of 
labor, as seen in Aceh amidst the post-tsunami reconstruction, for example, results in 
                                                 
32
 As data is not available, monetary inflation due to money supply is not considered. 
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excess demand which is translated into higher wages and prices, as unit cost of 
production increases. This indicates that variables such as average wage rates and 
labor productivity have essential information about future inflation. In this case, labor 
productivity is defined as RGDP per worker. And given the substantial share of the 
mining sector, especially in oil and gas in Aceh‘s RGDP, a productivity variable 
without mining is also considered. 
To capture the shock on supply side, rice and chicken production are also 
tested in the model. Rice production is included due to the fact that it contributed up to 
0.50%  year on year. Rice price inflation, as recorded in February 2007, was the 
highest among food commodities.
33
 The food commodities themselves have 
consistently contributed higher to the overall inflation in Aceh since 2005 as shown in 
Figure 2.7. 
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       Source: Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank 
Figure 2.7  
Inflation contributors in Aceh, 2004-2007 
                                                 
33
 http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/3DDB2FF8-030F-462E-9C20 
E2C4B808351D/6754/Boks3TekananInflasikomoditiBeras.pdf. (accessed 8 July 2008) 
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Chicken production, both native and broiler chickens, is also tested in the 
model. With the influx of humanitarian workers and the booming of restaurant and 
hotel businesses in post-tsunami Aceh, there was an increased demand of chickens. 
Aceh, however, having imported at least partially from other regions even before the 
disaster, have had short supplies of poultry.  
Transportation has also been a major factor influencing inflation in Indonesia‘s 
regions. This is especially true because most regions in Indonesia get their primary 
need goods from other regions. To take this into account, sugar price is included in the 
model, assuming that all sugar in Aceh comes from other regions, especially Medan in 
North Sumatra or, occasionally, by direct imports from India, Thailand and Vietnam. 
In addition, cement price influence on inflation is also tested as this product directly 
shows high demand during the reconstruction process in Aceh.   
Meanwhile, external factors like the price of imported goods can have a direct 
impact on domestic inflation either directly by affecting imported goods in the 
consumption basket, or indirectly by influencing production costs. Import price may 
rise in two ways: in foreign currency terms, higher foreign inflation implies higher 
import prices; in domestic currency terms, a depreciation of the local currency implies 
higher import prices. Therefore, the spot exchange rate is included in the model. 
Then, the general specification of the estimated model is 
 
tttttt
tttttt
TSUNDDCEMENTDSUGARDCHICDRICE
DPWOLDPROLDWAGLDEXCLDCPILDCPI




98765
432110 )()()()()(
  
where D is the difference operator, and L is the lag operator. The list variables and 
data sources are described in Table 2.2. 
 
 
 74 
 
 
Table 2.2 Variables in the inflation model and data sources 
Notation Variable Data source 
DCPI Change in consumer price in percent BPS 
DEXC Change in spot exchange rate per US$ BI 
DWAG Change in minimum wage rate in Aceh Ministry of Labor 
(MoL) 
DPRO Change in productivity rate, defined as 
Aceh‘s RGDP per worker 
MoL, BPS, 
processed 
DPWO Change in productivity rate without oil, 
defined as Aceh‘s RGDP without oil per 
worker 
MoL, BPS,  
processed 
DRICE Change in rice production rate CEIC 
DCHIC Change in chicken production rate CEIC 
DSUGAR Change in sugar price CEIC 
DCEMENT Change in cement price CEIC 
TSUND Tsunami Dummy, 0 before December 2004, 1 
afterwards 
Author 
 
 To check for stationarity, variables are tested with Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test using the following equation  
 
   ntnttt YYYbY ...1110     (2.1) 
 
This test is based on the following hypothesis: 
H0 :  = 0   non-stationary (unit root) 
H1 :  < 0   stationary 
  Residuals of estimated model is tested using ADF test based on the 
following equation  
t
T
i
ittt eee   


1
1
ˆˆˆ        (2.2) 
This test is based on the following hypothesis: 
H0 :  = 0   non-stationary (unit root) 
H1 :  < 0   stationary 
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It should be noted that all terms in the general specification model discussed 
here are in year-to-year growth. Thus, it is expected that the variables are all I(0), that 
is, integrated stationary. This also means that data must be collected from January 
2002 in order to get a year-to-year growth rate starting January 2003. While the 
starting point of the observation is arbitrary, using 2002 as the base year (2002 = 100) 
has two advantages, that is, (1) it gives enough series to observe Aceh‘s inflation prior 
to the tsunami, and (2) most statistics, especially those collected by BPS (Indonesia 
Office of Statistics), use 2002 as the base year. The CPI published by the BPS, for 
example, uses 2002 as the base year until May 2008.
34
   
Since the observations in wage, productivity, and production are few, it is 
necessary to change the frequency from low (annually) to high (monthly) as for CPI, 
spot foreign exchange rate, and retail price of sugar and cement. The low frequency 
data are interpolated into high frequency data using cubic spline approximations. This 
spline method is available is SAS.
35
    
To investigate output-price relationship in Aceh‘s economy, I use Aceh‘s 
quarterly data of 2000 to 2008 GDP. I then create GDP Deflator to proxy the price. I 
then adopt a bivariate SVAR with B-Q restriction and a decomposition technique as 
used in Gamber (1996), Azis (2008), and Azis and Putanapong (2009). An outline of 
this methodology can be found in Appendix 1 of Azis (2008). A unit root test is 
performed using ADF test on GDP and GDP deflator series, followed by a lag 
selection using Ljung-Box test as in Gamber (1996). The tests results are shown in 
Appendix 2.F and Appendix 2.G. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 See, for example,  Monthly Indonesia‘s CPI at  http://www.bps.go.id/sector/cpi/table3.shtml (last 
accessed July 20, 2008) 
35
 http://support.sas.com/rnd/app/examples/ets/expa/index.htm (accessed on June 10, 2008) 
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2.5  Results and Discussion 
The model development begins with analysis of inflation in Banda Aceh. The 
monthly year-to-year inflation from January 2003 to December 2007 shows non-
stationarity. This is apparent from the plot as shown in Figure 2.8. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 
Plot of monthly inflation series in Banda Aceh, Jan. 2003-Dec. 2007 
 
Since the OLS τ statistics from the above analysis is –1.39 > -1.95 of Table B.6 
in Hamilton (1994), we would not reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-
stationarity), thus conclude that inflation series in Banda Aceh is non-stationary. This 
confirms the inference from informal test using the plot above. However, it is also 
proved here that the residual of the model is a white noise, indicating that there is a 
long term equilibrium of the model. The estimated models based on data from January 
2002 to December 2007 are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3  
General inflation model for Aceh, January 2002-December 2007 
Independent 
Variables  
Regression (1)  Regression (2) /1 
Constant 44.74** 
(2.10) 
8.17** 
(2.42) 
DCPI(-1) 0.44*** 
(3.76) 
0.63*** 
(5.91) 
DEXC 0.27** 
(2.53) 
0.12 
(1.47) 
DWAG -0.62 
(-1.59) 
… 
DPRO 1.65 
(1.57) 
… 
DPWO -4.40** 
(-2.05) 
-0.69** 
(-2.44) 
DRICE -1.31* 
(-1.82) 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
DCHIC -0.00 
(-0.03) 
… 
DSUGAR 0.05* 
(1.71) 
0.04* 
(1.77) 
DCEMENT 0.16** 
(2.28) 
0.08 
(1.25) 
TSUND -1.43 
(-0.52) 
… 
F-statistics 74.68*** 108.22*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.928 0.917 
D-W Statistics 2.221 2.219 
SBC 322.335 318.127 
AIC 299.482 303.584 
                      (-1) first lagged value; t-statistics in parentheses  
                      * p-value < 0.1  **p-value < 0.05  *** p-value < 0.001 
                      1/ Regression (2) drops insignificant variables in Regression (1) 
 
 
Model (1) indicates a good fit with Adjusted R-square of 0.93 and Durbin-
Watson Statistics of 2.22, which is relatively close to the expected 2.00, indicating no 
spurious regression. As expected, inflation persistency (expectation) is highly 
 78 
 
significant in determining inflation in Aceh, as the case reported at the national level. 
In Aceh‘s case, however, besides the inflation persistency and exchange rate, 
productivity without oil and gas as well as cement price are also significant at p-value 
< 0.05. Rice production and sugar price are significant although only at p-value < 0.1. 
Meanwhile, wage rate, productivity with oil and gas, chicken production, and tsunami 
dummy variables are all not significant. 
All the significant variables show expected signs. That is, inflation expectation 
and exchange rate depreciation increase or positively related to the inflation. The 
increase of cement and sugar price can also increase inflation. On the other hand, an 
increase in productivity without oil and gas, would mean a decrease of inflation in 
Aceh. Also, an increase of rice production can ease the inflation. 
When insignificant variables in Model (1) were dropped simultaneously, there 
were no significant changes in Adjusted R-square and D-W Statistics as shown in 
Model (2). However, the structure of the model is now totally different, where, 
unexpectedly, the exchange rate, rice production rate and cement price become 
insignificant. 
Nevertheless, if the insignificant variables are dropped using backward 
regression selection, more variables show significance. It is done by dropping the 
insignificant variables with the least t-statistics first from Model (1). Therefore, 
chicken production was dropped first, and then followed by tsunami dummy variable 
and sugar price rate consecutively. The estimated model based on this method is 
shown as Model (3) in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 
Backward selection regression model for inflation in Aceh,  
January 2002-December 2007 
Independent 
Variables  
Regression (3)  Regression (4)  
Constant 46.61*** 
(4.08) 
7.82** 
(3.20) 
DCPI(-1) 0.39*** 
(3.46) 
0.63*** 
(7.56) 
DEXC 0.30** 
(2.98) 
0.15** 
(2.10) 
DWAG -0.59*** 
(-3.37) 
… 
DPRO 1.83** 
(3.35) 
… 
DPWO -4.71*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.60** 
(-2.74) 
DRICE -1.49*** 
(-3.42) 
… 
DCHIC … … 
DSUGAR … … 
DCEMENT 0.17** 
(2.81) 
0.14** 
(2.59) 
TSUND … … 
F-statistics 106.25*** 154.48*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.927 0.915 
D-W Statistics 2.211 2.239 
SBC 313.680 314.027 
AIC 297.060 303.640 
            (-1) first lagged value; t-statistics in parentheses 
            * p-value < 0.1  **p-value < 0.05  *** p-value < 0.001 
                       
      
Though almost no additional gain in terms of adjusted R-square compared to 
Model (1), Model (3) indicates a slightly better D-W Statistics, thus further 
suppressing the presence of spurious regression. Moreover, it has four highly 
significant determinants of inflation in Aceh; that is, previous inflation, wage rate, 
productivity without oil and gas, and rice production. Except for the wage, the signs 
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for all other variables are as expected. Exchange rate, productivity with oil and gas, 
and cement price are all significant at p<0.05.  
It should be noted here that there is a contradicted sign in productivity account. 
When counting oil and gas in the RGDP, the productivity sign is positive in relation to 
the CPI. This means, increased productivity can increase inflation. However, when 
productivity is derived from the RGDP without oil and gas, it shows the expected 
negative sign. That is, increased productivity will likely ease the pressure of inflation. 
This might be due to limited trickle effect of oil and gas sector contribution to Aceh 
economy. 
If variable WAGE, which has the unexpected positive sign, is dropped, and 
then a backward selection process is followed, Model (3) becomes Model (4).  In the 
process, variables productivity with oil and gas, as well as rice production rate were 
also dropped as they are no longer significant in the model. 
 
2.5.1   Model Diagnostic 
 Statistically, Model (3) seems to be the ―best‖ model, at least based on Durbin-
Watson, AIC, and SBC statistics. But given the relatively similar high Adjusted R-
Square, and most importantly, the unexpected sign of the WAGE in Model (3), we opt 
for Model (4) for further analysis.  
After fitting the model, we proceed with diagnostic check of the residual. It is 
done by residual plot and, formally, by Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The plot 
of residual for Model (4) over time shows a quite pattern around zero, except for 
several outliers. Overall, the pattern indicates a fairly good fit of the model and the 
existence of long term equilibrium (Figure 2.9). Residual plots for other models show 
similar patterns, as shown in Appendix 2.C. 
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A more formal test on the residuals using ADF confirms the appearance of the 
plot to be acceptable.  The OLS τ statistics for Model (4) is –3.56, which is more 
negative than -2.93 (using case 2) or –3.50 (using case 4) of Table B.6 (Hamilton, 
1994), assuming n = 50 (more conservative) and probability that  ˆˆ/)1ˆ(   is less 
than 0.05. Since it is more negative, we would reject the null hypothesis of unit root 
(non-stationarity). 
 
 
Figure 2.9 
Residual Plot of inflation model (4) for Banda Aceh, January 2002-December 2007 
 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics for the residuals of Model (4) is 1.94, 
which is relatively close to 2. Therefore we conclude that residuals of the model are 
stationary. This means, the regression in Model (4) is a cointegrating regression. The 
same test applied to the other three models also suggests similar results. The estimated 
OLS τ statistics and D-W statistics for ADF tests of all four models are given in Table 
2.5.  
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Table 2.5 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test  
Model τ statistics D-W statistics 
Model (1) -4.51 2.050 
Model (2) -3.45 1.937 
Model (3) -4.39 2.039 
Model (4) -3.56 1.940 
 
Next, causality tests were performed on variables in Model (4). Using Granger-
Causality Wald tests
36
, the causality relations as shown in Table 2.6 were found. The 
null hypothesis for the Granger causality test is that Group 1 is influenced only by 
itself, and not by Group 2. Decision is made based on  = 0.05. The tests were 
performed at two and four lags of the designated variables.                         
 
 
Table 2.6 Causality test among variables in Banda Aceh‘s Inflation Model 
Group 1 Group 2 
Number 
of lags 
Chi-
Square 
p-value Decision 
DCPI  DEXC 2 11.08 0.0039 Reject 
DEXC DCPI 2 7.01 0.0301 Reject* 
DCPI  DEXC 4 11.14 0.0250 Reject 
DEXC DCPI 4 12.29 0.0153 Reject 
DCPI DPWO 2 9.43 0.0090 Reject 
DPWO DCPI 2 2.94 0.2298 Do not reject 
DCPI DPWO 4 11.55 0.0211 Reject 
DPWO DCPI 4 12.52 0.0139 Reject 
DCPI DCEMENT 2 13.55 0.0011 Reject 
DCEMENT DCPI 2 3.11 0.2115 Do not reject 
DCPI DCEMENT 4 16.36 0.0026 Reject 
DCEMENT DCPI 4 8.21 0.0842 Do not reject 
DCPI DEXC  DPWO 
DCEMENT 
2 37.91 <0.0001 Reject 
DEXC  DPWO 
DCEMENT 
DCPI 2 13.77 0.0323 Reject* 
DCPI DPWO 
DCEMENT 
2 20.61 0.0004 Reject 
DPWO 
DCEMENT 
DCPI 2 7.91 0.0949 Do not reject 
 *Do not reject at  = 0.01 
                                                 
36
 http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/60372/HTML/default/etsug_varmax_sect009.htm 
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Based on findings in Table 2.6, the assumption of weak exogeneity of regressor 
variables on CPI seems to be reasonable. In the case of cement price (DCEMENT), we 
can even make the assumption of strong exogeneity of cement price to inflation.  In 
addition, the causality test was also performed between CPI of Banda Aceh and 
Lhokseumawe and between CPI of Banda Aceh and of those from the national level. 
The result is shown in Table 2.7. 
The findings in Table 2.7 indicates that inflation rate in Lhokseumawe of 
North Aceh is influenced by the inflation rate in Banda Aceh, but not the other way 
around. On the other hand, no directional causality can be established between Banda 
Aceh and national level inflation. 
 
Table 2.7 Causality of inflation in Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, and National level 
Group 1 Group 2 
Number 
of lags 
Chi-
Square 
p-value Decision 
DCPI Bna DCPI Lsm 2 4.62 0.0991 Do not reject 
DCPI Lsm DCPI Bna 2 9.22 0.0100 Reject 
DCPI Bna DCPI Nat‘l 2 9.89 0.0071 Reject 
DCPI Nat‘l DCPI Bna 2 9.82 0.0074 Reject 
 
 
2.5.2  Model Interpretation 
Based on Model (4), the estimated model can be written as 
 
ttttt DCEMENTDPWODEXCDCPIDCPI 14.060.015.063.082.7 1    (2.3) 
This model indicates that inflation expectation (persistency) is the main 
determinant of inflation in Aceh with p-value of <0.001. Exchange rate is also 
significant at p-value <0.05. This finding is similar to previous empirical studies on 
regional and national inflation in Indonesia in which persistency and exchange rate 
have been found to be consistently influential (e.g. Wimanda, 2006; Ramakrishnan 
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and Vamvakidis, 2002). Based on this model, for every percentage increase of 
inflation expectation people perceived, it can be expected that there would an increase 
of inflation in Banda Aceh as much as 0.63 percent. Meanwhile, a percentage point 
depreciation of rupiah increases the inflation by 0.15 percent on a year to year basis. 
The plot of Banda Aceh‘s inflation and its predicted value based on Model (4) is 
shown in Figure 2.10.   
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Source: author calculation 
Figure 2.10 
Inflation and predicated inflation, Banda Aceh, January 2003-December 2007 
 
Productivity growth, without oil and gas, indicates significant negative relation 
to inflation at p-value < 0.05. An increase in one percentage growth of productivity 
will reduce the inflation by 0.60 percent. Model (3), however, interestingly indicates 
contradicting signs of the coefficients of productivity. While the expected sign for 
productivity is negative, total productivity which includes the mining sector is 
positive. That is, a percentage increase of growth in productivity in all sectors, 
including the mining sector, instead of reducing the inflation, it increases it by 0.28 
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percent in a year. In contrast, when productivity growth of the non-mining sector 
increases by one percent, it decreases the inflation by 1.5 percent in a year. This might 
be the case for Aceh which once has a very significant contribution of oil and gas in its 
RGDP, despite its depletion since 2003 as shown in Figure 2.11. It is an indication that 
the non-mining sector has been expanding since then, and especially after the tsunami; 
notably in agriculture, as well as trade, hotel and restaurant, transportation and 
services. 
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Source: Aceh Economic Update, April 2008, World Bank 
Figure 2.11  
Aceh‘s Economy Structure, 2003-2007 
 
The F-statistics for Model (4) is 154.58 with D-W statistics of 2.24, which 
indicates a fairly good fit of the model. The adjusted R-square is relatively high—
more than 0.92—suggesting a high explanatory power of the model. 
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2.5.3  Structural Change 
The tsunami disaster and oil price increases are two shocks that are apparent 
from the plot in Figure 2.1. It is therefore essential to formally test whether one or 
both of these shocks has changed the structure of Aceh‘s economic outlook, especially 
in relation to inflation. To do so, a Chow test for structural breaks
37
 was used to test 
for any structural breaks in Banda Aceh‘s inflation model based on Model (1) – (4). 
The result for each test is shown in Appendix 2.C. 
In general, Model (1) and Model (3) did not detect any structural breaks. 
However, Model (2) and Model (4) show clear structural breaks in the inflation model. 
Interestingly, none of the models captured any structural change due to the tsunami of 
December 2004. Both models (2) and (4) only captured the shock due to oil price 
increase. Model (2) indicates breaks at observation 34 (October 2005) when the 
government revoked the subsidies causing the oil and gas price to increase (with p-
value < 0.05). The breaks continue to observation 35, a month after, but with p-value 
< 0.10. Then, there are significant breaks again (p-values < 0.05) at observations 42-
44, which is June-August 2006, when the shock seems to die down.  
Model (4) indicates breaks at observations 42-45, at about similar periods 
shown by Model (2) with p-value < 0.05. But Model (4) also indicates break, albeit a 
softer break, at observations 34 (p-value < 0.20) and at observations 48-50 (p-value < 
0.10). The results of structural change tests based on Model (2) and Model (4) is 
summarized into a graph as shown in Figure 2.12. 
Although Figure 2.12 shows there is a hike of inflation rate after the tsunami, 
the formal test indicates no structural break due to the tsunami. The first structural 
change took place almost immediately after the government announced the fuel price 
in October 2005, causing a ―shock‖ to the inflation structure. The high inflation did 
                                                 
37
 http://support.sas.com/rnd/app/examples/ets/chow/index.htm (accessed July 20, 2008) 
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not immediately fall down to its ―normal‖ rate after the shock, but remained on its 
―medium‖ rate between May and September 2006. It closed the gap and fell back to its 
normal rate at the end of 2006. 
 
 
Inflation and predicted inflation, Banda Aceh, January 2003-December 2007
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Ja
n-
03
Ap
r-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
Oc
t-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ap
r-0
4
Ju
l-0
4
Oc
t-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ap
r-0
5
Ju
l-0
5
Oc
t-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ap
r-0
6
Ju
l-0
6
Oc
t-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ap
r-0
7
Ju
l-0
7
Oc
t-0
7
Inflation predicted
Shock Med "Normal""Normal""Normal"
Ts
u
n
am
i
Fu
el
 in
cr
ea
se
 
Figure 2.12 
Banda Aceh‘s inflation structural breaks 
 
 
2.5.4  AS-AD Curves 
 While models in the previous section are useful in understanding the inflation 
mechanism in Aceh descriptively, policy makers do need to come up with certain kind 
of ―prescription‖ as the basis for future actions. For this, understanding the output-
price relation is very helpful to enable policy makers to choose an appropriate 
approach to tame inflation while maintaining growth.  
Plots of AS-AD curves based on Aceh‘s total GDP (including oil and gas) 
produce anomaly results, i.e. the AS curve is always negative instead of positive as the 
theory predicts. On the other hand, Aceh‘s GDP without oil and gas provides evidence 
as the theory predicts, that is, negative AD slope and positive AS slope. Thus, I focus 
on decompositing the series without oil and gas. 
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The ADF test suggests that when first-differences of log GDP and GDP 
deflator are used, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 1 percent level (see 
Appendix 2.G). Then, following the selection process in Gamber (1996), Azis (2008) 
and Azis and Putanapong (2009), the Ljung-Box test indicates that by using the lag of 
5, all residuals are no longer serially correlated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 
AS curve and AD curve in Aceh, 2000-2008. 
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The AS-AD curves, depicted in Figure 2.13, show that the slopes of AS and 
AD are according to what the theory predicts, i.e. positive for AS and negative for AD. 
With the known slopes, it can be deduced that along the AS-Curve, a positive inflation 
innovation of 1 percent corresponds to a positive output growth of 5.32 percent. Using 
the same slope, it can also be said that along the AS-Curve, a positive growth 
innovation of 1 percent corresponds to a positive inflation innovation of 0.19 percent.  
The AD curve has a much steeper slope, indicating growth is more sensitive to 
inflation innovation. Along the AD-Curve, a positive inflation innovation of 1 percent 
corresponds to a negative output growth of -0.66 percent. According Azis and 
Putanapong (2009) ―to the extent that monetary authority focuses its policy on 
inflation control, a steep AD curve indicates that AS shock rather than AD policy to 
lower the price level would have been more effective.‖  
In Aceh case, it is also necessary to see how the shock caused by the December 
2004 Tsunami influences the output-price relationship. Broken into prior to and after 
the Tsunami, the AS and AD curves, again, indicate similar behavior as predicted by 
the theory, except that the post-Tsunami AS curve is flatter than that of pre-tsunami 
and overall series (Table 2.8). But, as the AD curve after Tsunami also becomes 
flatter, policy based on AS rather than AD shocks to increase growth while keeping 
price in control would still have been more effective. Based on the slope after the 
Tsunami, 1 percent innovation in growth corresponds to 0.14 percent inflation along 
AS curve compared to -1.20 percent along AD curve. On the other hand, for 1 percent 
innovation in inflation generates as much as 7.31 percent growth along AS curve, 
while AD shocks would still create growth in the negative, that is -0.84 percent.    
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Table 2.8 Slopes of AS and AD curves before and after the 2004 Tsunami 
 AS curve slopes AD curve slopes 
Overall (Q1 2000-Q3 2008) 0.188 -1.519 
Pre-Tsunami 0.274 -1.704 
Post-Tsunami 0.137 -1.199 
 
 
2.6  Concluding Remarks 
 Based on the estimated model, inflation expectation (persistency) and 
exchange rate appear to be the most significant determinants of inflation in Aceh. This 
finding is similar to previous empirical studies of regional and national inflation in 
Indonesia in which persistency and exchange rate have been found to be consistently 
influential. Productivity also indicates significance but with contradictory sign when 
divided into productivity based on oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas GDP. Productivity 
involving mining pushes the inflation up; while it eases inflation when considered 
without mining. Although the theory suggests that productivity lowers inflation, the 
finding might be reasonable for the case in Aceh where point (oil and gas) rather than 
diffused (agriculture, fishery) resource economy makes up the biggest contribution.   
Contrary to what some people assume, the structural change test indicates that 
it was the oil price increase, rather than tsunami-driven factors, that changed the 
structure of Aceh‘s inflation. Thus, while the Tsunami might have exacerbated the 
pressure on Aceh‘s inflation, the inflation process itself should also be seen in 
relationship to the energy policy taken by the government prior to the disaster.  
In post-tsunami Aceh, AS and AD curves indicate that AS shock rather than 
AD policy to stimulate growth while keeping inflation in control would have been 
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more effective. This is in line with what has been observed by analysts in Aceh after 
the disaster.  
 
 
2.7 Limitation and Further Research Direction 
 Research at the sub-national level in Indonesia such as this study bear the 
burden of data availability and quality.  Findings in this study, therefore, should be 
seen as preliminary until they can be confirmed empirically with better and longer 
series of data. This should be the case even when they agree with the body of theories 
available at such a level. Alas, the theory, at least in the case of Indonesia, was not 
generated until late 90s when Indonesia adopted a decentralization policy. 
 That said, there is an urgent need in the vast archipelago for studies at the 
regional level. Especially for Aceh with its special autonomy, regional-based 
empirical studies have never been more imperative. This preliminary study is expected 
to encourage the regional government to take regional-based policies based on 
regional-based studies. In the end, it is expected that the government will see the 
incentive to have a better availability and quality of data.       
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APPENDIX 2.A 
Table 2.9 The demographic and economic impact in the disaster-affected region: cross 
country comparisons 
 
(Table from “Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, December 26, 2004 Natural 
Disaster: A Technical Report prepared by Bappenas  and the International Donor Community, 2004”) 
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APPENDIX 2.B 
Poverty Headcount Before and After the Disaster, % 
 
Figure 2.14 
Poverty headcount before the disaster 
 
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates (in World Bank, 2008) 
Figure 2.15  
Poverty headcount after the disaster 
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APPENDIX 2.C 
 
Computer output for model development and structural change tests 
 
Model 1 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         59 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                   10    5927.08251     592.70825     74.68   <.0001 
 Error                   48     380.98247       7.93713 
 Corrected Total         58    6308.06498 
 
           Root MSE              2.81729    R-Square     0.9396 
           Dependent Mean       14.34701    Adj R-Sq     0.9270 
           Coeff Var            19.63679 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1       44.73790       21.26113       2.10      0.0406 
   L1BNA         1        0.43940        0.11687       3.76      0.0005 
   DSPEXC        1        0.26912        0.10620       2.53      0.0146 
   DWAGE         1       -0.61554        0.38703      -1.59      0.1183 
   DTPROD        1        1.64695        1.05193       1.57      0.1240 
   DPRODWO       1       -4.39978        2.15052      -2.05      0.0463 
   DRICEPRO      1       -1.31390        0.72380      -1.82      0.0757 
   DCHIPROD      1       -0.00210        0.07217      -0.03      0.9769 
   DCEMENTP      1        0.15815        0.06926       2.28      0.0269 
   DSUGARP       1        0.04775        0.02794       1.71      0.0939 
   DM            1       -1.43492        2.74671      -0.52      0.6038 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.221 
                   Number of Observations            59 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.113 
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                              The SAS System 
 
                           The AUTOREG Procedure 
 
                         Dependent Variable    BNA 
 
 
                     Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
 
      SSE                 380.982468    DFE                       48 
      MSE                    7.93713    Root MSE             2.81729 
      SBC                 322.335398    AIC               299.482486 
      Regress R-Square        0.9396    Total R-Square        0.9396 
      Durbin-Watson           2.2211 
 
 
                          Structural Change Test 
 
                         Break 
   Test                  Point    Num DF    Den DF    F Value    Pr > F 
 
   Chow                     21        11        37       0.73    0.7003 
   Chow                     22        11        37       0.74    0.6906 
   Chow                     23        11        37       0.77    0.6677 
   Chow                     24        11        37       0.75    0.6826 
   Chow                     25        11        37       1.03    0.4416 
   Chow                     26        11        37       1.38    0.2241 
   Chow                     27        11        37       1.53    0.1627 
   Chow                     34        11        37       1.22    0.3104 
   Chow                     35        11        37       1.45    0.1920 
   Chow                     36        11        37       1.51    0.1686 
   Chow                     42        11        37       0.89    0.5603 
   Chow                     43        11        37       0.93    0.5223 
   Chow                     44        11        37       0.94    0.5166 
   Chow                     45        11        37       0.94    0.5136 
   Chow                     46        11        37       0.46    0.9159 
   Chow                     47        11        37       0.43    0.9322 
   Chow                     48        11        37       0.46    0.9159 
   Chow                     49        11        37       0.59    0.8275 
 
 
                                        Standard                 Approx 
    Variable        DF     Estimate        Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
    Intercept        1      44.7379      21.2611       2.10      0.0406 
    L1BNA            1       0.4394       0.1169       3.76      0.0005 
    DSPEXC           1       0.2691       0.1062       2.53      0.0146 
    DWAGE            1      -0.6155       0.3870      -1.59      0.1183 
    DTPROD           1       1.6470       1.0519       1.57      0.1240 
    DPRODWO          1      -4.3998       2.1505      -2.05      0.0463 
    DRICEPRO         1      -1.3139       0.7238      -1.82      0.0757 
    DCHIPROD         1    -0.002097       0.0722      -0.03      0.9769 
    DCEMENTP         1       0.1582       0.0693       2.28      0.0269 
    DSUGARP          1       0.0477       0.0279       1.71      0.0939 
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Model 2 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         59 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    6    5840.34815     973.39136    108.22   <.0001 
 Error                   52     467.71682       8.99455 
 Corrected Total         58    6308.06498 
 
           Root MSE              2.99909    R-Square     0.9259 
           Dependent Mean       14.34701    Adj R-Sq     0.9173 
           Coeff Var            20.90396 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        8.16723        3.37383       2.42      0.0190 
   L1BNA         1        0.62934        0.10656       5.91      <.0001 
   DSPEXC        1        0.12424        0.08460       1.47      0.1480 
   DPRODWO       1       -0.69363        0.28463      -2.44      0.0183 
   DRICEPRO      1       -0.06946        0.11894      -0.58      0.5617 
   DCEMENTP      1        0.07629        0.06094       1.25      0.2162 
   DSUGARP       1        0.04206        0.02383       1.77      0.0834 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.219 
                   Number of Observations            59 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.114 
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                                 The SAS System 
 
                           The AUTOREG Procedure 
 
                         Dependent Variable    BNA 
 
 
                     Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
 
      SSE                 467.716825    DFE                       52 
      MSE                    8.99455    Root MSE             2.99909 
      SBC                 318.126719    AIC               303.583957 
      Regress R-Square        0.9259    Total R-Square        0.9259 
      Durbin-Watson           2.2189 
 
 
 
                          Structural Change Test 
 
                         Break 
   Test                  Point    Num DF    Den DF    F Value    Pr > F 
 
   Chow                     21         7        45       0.69    0.6788 
   Chow                     22         7        45       0.71    0.6600 
   Chow                     23         7        45       0.77    0.6115 
   Chow                     24         7        45       0.77    0.6149 
   Chow                     25         7        45       0.63    0.7263 
   Chow                     26         7        45       1.17    0.3412 
   Chow                     27         7        45       1.14    0.3534 
   Chow                     34         7        45       2.36    0.0386 
   Chow                     35         7        45       1.89    0.0932 
   Chow                     36         7        45       1.60    0.1606 
   Chow                     42         7        45       2.73    0.0190 
   Chow                     43         7        45       2.42    0.0340 
   Chow                     44         7        45       2.30    0.0429 
   Chow                     45         7        45       1.77    0.1166 
   Chow                     46         7        45       1.27    0.2850 
   Chow                     47         7        45       1.26    0.2920 
   Chow                     48         7        45       1.36    0.2470 
   Chow                     49         7        45       1.35    0.2497 
   Chow                     50         7        45       1.44    0.2122 
   Chow                     51         7        45       0.92    0.4981 
   Chow                     52         7        45       0.70    0.6716 
 
 
                                        Standard                 Approx 
    Variable        DF     Estimate        Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
    Intercept        1       8.1672       3.3738       2.42      0.0190 
    L1BNA            1       0.6293       0.1066       5.91      <.0001 
    DSPEXC           1       0.1242       0.0846       1.47      0.1480 
    DPRODWO          1      -0.6936       0.2846      -2.44      0.0183 
    DRICEPRO         1      -0.0695       0.1189      -0.58      0.5617 
    DCEMENTP         1       0.0763       0.0609       1.25      0.2162 
    DSUGARP          1       0.0421       0.0238       1.77      0.0834 
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Model 3 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         59 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    7    5903.26614     843.32373    106.25   <.0001 
 Error                   51     404.79884       7.93723 
 Corrected Total         58    6308.06498 
 
 
           Root MSE              2.81731    R-Square     0.9358 
           Dependent Mean       14.34701    Adj R-Sq     0.9270 
           Coeff Var            19.63691 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1       46.60649       11.40998       4.08      0.0002 
   L1BNA         1        0.38876        0.11235       3.46      0.0011 
   DSPEXC        1        0.30430        0.10204       2.98      0.0044 
   DWAGE         1       -0.59139        0.17538      -3.37      0.0014 
   DTPROD        1        1.83013        0.54610       3.35      0.0015 
   DPRODWO       1       -4.71435        1.21482      -3.88      0.0003 
   DRICEPRO      1       -1.48735        0.43488      -3.42      0.0012 
   DCEMENTP      1        0.17188        0.06112       2.81      0.0070 
 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.211 
                   Number of Observations            59 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.109 
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                              The SAS System 
 
                           The AUTOREG Procedure 
 
                         Dependent Variable    BNA 
 
                     Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
 
      SSE                 404.798843    DFE                       51 
      MSE                    7.93723    Root MSE             2.81731 
      SBC                 313.680363    AIC               297.060063 
      Regress R-Square        0.9358    Total R-Square        0.9358 
      Durbin-Watson           2.2108 
 
                          Structural Change Test 
 
                         Break 
   Test                  Point    Num DF    Den DF    F Value    Pr > F 
 
   Chow                     21         8        43       0.59    0.7787 
   Chow                     22         8        43       0.59    0.7816 
   Chow                     23         8        43       0.57    0.7925 
   Chow                     24         8        43       0.58    0.7924 
   Chow                     25         8        43       1.22    0.3116 
   Chow                     26         8        43       1.39    0.2271 
   Chow                     27         8        43       1.39    0.2275 
   Chow                     34         8        43       1.51    0.1825 
   Chow                     35         8        43       0.83    0.5844 
   Chow                     36         8        43       0.84    0.5699 
   Chow                     42         8        43       1.30    0.2698 
   Chow                     43         8        43       1.17    0.3415 
   Chow                     44         8        43       1.20    0.3215 
   Chow                     45         8        43       1.29    0.2745 
   Chow                     46         8        43       0.66    0.7246 
   Chow                     47         8        43       0.46    0.8789 
   Chow                     48         8        43       0.43    0.8942 
   Chow                     49         8        43       0.55    0.8112 
   Chow                     50         8        43       0.56    0.8041 
   Chow                     51         8        43       0.34    0.9442 
   Chow                     52         8        43       0.24    0.9803 
 
                                        Standard                 Approx 
    Variable        DF     Estimate        Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
    Intercept        1      46.6065      11.4100       4.08      0.0002 
    L1BNA            1       0.3888       0.1123       3.46      0.0011 
    DSPEXC           1       0.3043       0.1020       2.98      0.0044 
    DWAGE            1      -0.5914       0.1754      -3.37      0.0014 
    DTPROD           1       1.8301       0.5461       3.35      0.0015 
    DPRODWO          1      -4.7143       1.2148      -3.88      0.0003 
    DRICEPRO         1      -1.4873       0.4349      -3.42      0.0012 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                           The AUTOREG Procedure 
 
                                        Standard                 Approx 
    Variable        DF     Estimate        Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
    DCEMENTP         1       0.1719       0.0611       2.81      0.0070 
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Model 4 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         59 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           1 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    4    5807.06732    1451.76683    156.48   <.0001 
 Error                   54     500.99766       9.27773 
 Corrected Total         58    6308.06498 
 
 
           Root MSE              3.04594    R-Square     0.9206 
           Dependent Mean       14.34701    Adj R-Sq     0.9147 
           Coeff Var            21.23047 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        7.82335        2.44542       3.20      0.0023 
   L1BNA         1        0.62752        0.08302       7.56      <.0001 
   DSPEXC        1        0.14698        0.06994       2.10      0.0403 
   DPRODWO       1       -0.60329        0.21988      -2.74      0.0082 
   DCEMENTP      1        0.13667        0.05283       2.59      0.0124 
 
 
 
                              The SAS System 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                         Dependent Variable: BNA 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.239 
                   Number of Observations            59 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.132 
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                             The SAS System 
                           The AUTOREG Procedure 
                         Dependent Variable    BNA 
 
 
                     Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
 
      SSE                 500.997656    DFE                       54 
      MSE                    9.27773    Root MSE             3.04594 
      SBC                 314.027209    AIC               303.639522 
      Regress R-Square        0.9206    Total R-Square        0.9206 
      Durbin-Watson           2.2390 
 
                          Structural Change Test 
 
                         Break 
   Test                  Point    Num DF    Den DF    F Value    Pr > F 
 
   Chow                     21         5        49       0.31    0.9048 
   Chow                     22         5        49       0.31    0.9048 
   Chow                     23         5        49       0.30    0.9109 
   Chow                     24         5        49       0.32    0.8985 
   Chow                     25         5        49       0.25    0.9379 
   Chow                     26         5        49       0.73    0.6026 
   Chow                     27         5        49       0.62    0.6867 
   Chow                     34         5        49       1.54    0.1939 
   Chow                     35         5        49       0.71    0.6168 
   Chow                     36         5        49       0.42    0.8303 
   Chow                     42         5        49       3.38    0.0105 
   Chow                     43         5        49       2.99    0.0195 
   Chow                     44         5        49       2.74    0.0293 
   Chow                     45         5        49       2.44    0.0473 
   Chow                     46         5        49       1.73    0.1464 
   Chow                     47         5        49       1.78    0.1337 
   Chow                     48         5        49       1.97    0.0996 
   Chow                     49         5        49       1.96    0.1008 
   Chow                     50         5        49       2.06    0.0860 
   Chow                     51         5        49       1.54    0.1944 
   Chow                     52         5        49       1.30    0.2804 
 
                                        Standard                 Approx 
    Variable        DF     Estimate        Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
    Intercept        1       7.8234       2.4454       3.20      0.0023 
    L1BNA            1       0.6275       0.0830       7.56      <.0001 
    DSPEXC           1       0.1470       0.0699       2.10      0.0403 
    DPRODWO          1      -0.6033       0.2199      -2.74      0.0082 
    DCEMENTP         1       0.1367       0.0528       2.59      0.0124 
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APPENDIX 2.D 
Residual Plots 
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APPENDIX 2.E 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Model 1 to Model 4 
 
Residual Test for Model 1 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         55 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           5 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    4     485.29344     121.32336     16.97   <.0001 
 Error                   50     357.35947       7.14719 
 Corrected Total         54     842.65291 
 
 
           Root MSE              2.67342    R-Square     0.5759 
           Dependent Mean       -0.00657    Adj R-Sq     0.5420 
           Coeff Var              -40716 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        0.04248        0.36075       0.12      0.9067 
   lagres        1       -1.49754        0.33210      -4.51      <.0001 
   dlagres1      1        0.35344        0.27143       1.30      0.1988 
   dlagres2      1        0.25828        0.21260       1.21      0.2301 
   dlagres3      1        0.05596        0.14220       0.39      0.6956 
 
 
 
              
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.050 
                   Number of Observations            55 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.025 
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Residual Test for Model 2 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         55 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           5 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    4     580.61335     145.15334     15.99   <.0001 
 Error                   50     453.75207       9.07504 
 Corrected Total         54    1034.36542 
 
 
           Root MSE              3.01248    R-Square     0.5613 
           Dependent Mean       -0.03037    Adj R-Sq     0.5262 
           Coeff Var         -9919.89126 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        0.00898        0.40767       0.02      0.9825 
   lagres        1       -1.13281        0.32805      -3.45      0.0011 
   dlagres1      1        0.02338        0.27727       0.08      0.9331 
   dlagres2      1        0.01390        0.22069       0.06      0.9500 
   dlagres3      1       -0.07341        0.14521      -0.51      0.6154 
 
 
 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                1.937 
                   Number of Observations            55 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation      0.025 
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Residual Test for Model 3 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         55 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           5 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    4     507.96433     126.99108     16.53   <.0001 
 Error                   50     384.01660       7.68033 
 Corrected Total         54     891.98092 
 
 
           Root MSE              2.77134    R-Square     0.5695 
           Dependent Mean       -0.01443    Adj R-Sq     0.5350 
           Coeff Var              -19199 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        0.04510        0.37397       0.12      0.9045 
   lagres        1       -1.43365        0.32652      -4.39      <.0001 
   dlagres1      1        0.30288        0.26848       1.13      0.2647 
   dlagres2      1        0.23330        0.21169       1.10      0.2757 
   dlagres3      1        0.04923        0.14236       0.35      0.7309 
 
 
   
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                2.039 
                   Number of Observations            55 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation     -0.021 
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Residual Test for Model 4 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
          Number of Observations Read                         60 
          Number of Observations Used                         55 
          Number of Observations with Missing Values           5 
 
 
                           Analysis of Variance 
 
                                   Sum of          Mean 
 Source                  DF       Squares        Square   F Value   Pr > F 
 
 Model                    4     635.04245     158.76061     16.48   <.0001 
 Error                   50     481.69968       9.63399 
 Corrected Total         54    1116.74213 
 
 
           Root MSE              3.10387    R-Square     0.5687 
           Dependent Mean       -0.04749    Adj R-Sq     0.5341 
           Coeff Var         -6536.52014 
 
 
                           Parameter Estimates 
 
                        Parameter       Standard 
   Variable     DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
   Intercept     1        0.06483        0.42161       0.15      0.8784 
   lagres        1       -1.23714        0.34755      -3.56      0.0008 
   dlagres1      1        0.09871        0.29165       0.34      0.7364 
   dlagres2      1        0.06101        0.22852       0.27      0.7906 
   dlagres3      1       -0.04778        0.14703      -0.32      0.7466 
 
 
                             The REG Procedure 
                               Model: MODEL1 
                       Dependent Variable: dlagres 
 
                   Durbin-Watson D                1.940 
                   Number of Observations            55 
                   1st Order Autocorrelation      0.015 
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APPENDIX 2.F 
ADF Test for Unit Root 
 
 
Table 1. Null Hypothesis: Ln(GDP) or its difference has a unit root 
 T-Statistics, Z(t) P-value* 
Ln(GDP) -0.955 0.7694 
ΔLn(GDP) -6.440 0.0000 
Δ2 Ln(GDP) -7.272 0.0000 
*MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 
 
Table 2. Null Hypothesis: Ln(GDP Deflator) or its difference has a unit root 
 T-Statistics, Z(t) P-value* 
Ln(GDPDef) 0.428 0.9825 
ΔLn(GDPDef) -6.392 0.0000 
Δ2 Ln(GDPDef) -9.468 0.0000 
*MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 
 
Based on results from Tables 1 and 2, when first difference of log is used, the null 
hypothesis of unit-root is rejected at 1 percent level 
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APPENDIX 2.G 
 
Ljung-Box Test 
 
Ljung-Box Test: Testing null hypothesis that is no 
autocorrelation after lag k   
 εt
Δy εt
Δp 
Lag ACF T-Stat Q-Stat ACF T-Stat Q-Stat 
1 -0.10131 -0.59071 0.380665 -0.14174 -0.82646 0.745137 
2 -0.58586 -3.38157 13.50909 -0.15137 -0.86544 1.621605 
3 -0.12465 -0.55630 14.12255 -0.13526 -0.75682 2.343972 
4 0.74751 3.30617 36.92043 0.14889 0.81941 3.248474 
5 -0.04307 -0.14863 36.99873 -0.05390 -0.29094 3.371092 
6 -0.51645 -1.78089 48.65823 0.08563 0.46104 3.691595 
7 -0.07376 -0.23349 48.90485 -0.17733 -0.94889 5.117095 
8 0.52447 1.65764 61.85429 -0.04671 -0.24356 5.219790 
9 -0.10322 -0.30269 62.37594 0.01783 0.09282 5.235355 
10 -0.37741 -1.10377 69.64031 0.21152 1.10082 7.517111 
11 -0.02099 -0.05929 69.66375 -0.00150 -0.00752 7.517230 
       
Since there is none of the absolute value of Q-Stat is greater than 2 after lag 
4, we can assume that there is no autocorrelation beyond k=5. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS DETERMINANTS TO RETURN AMONG 
WOMEN IDPs OF 2004 TSUNAMI IN ACEH 
 
Abstract  
 While moving out from affected areas is a common survival strategy, many, if 
not all displaced persons of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh returned to their 
original settlement (village) sooner or later. Women made-up about 42-46 percent of 
the total tsunami internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the province. This paper 
investigates whether and, if so, how women IDPs in Aceh use social capital as 
determinants in their decision to-return or not-to-return to their original settlement. 
Slightly different from the growing literature on migration, this study investigates pull 
factors for migration from the source instead of host region. Data from the UNIFEM 
woman situation survey in post-tsunami Aceh was used. With logistic regression 
analysis, it is found that women IDPs with strong association to friendships in 
temporary settlements and acquaintances from original villages are more likely to 
return than those with less or without such associations. Indirect associations to 
community through shelter type, shelter size and land ownership are also found to be 
significant factors in the decision to return.  Understanding determinants in the 
decision to leave temporary shelters among women IDPs is expected to help refine 
post-disaster shelter management so it can be more gendered and culturally sensitive. 
Women IDPs in Aceh, for example, see shelter types as being the most important 
factor in their decision to return to their original settlements, and underline the 
unfavorable barrack type provided by the government. 
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3.1   Introduction 
The tsunami of 26 December 2004 caused major displacement problems in 
Aceh. More than half a million people were displaced from their homes and villages; 
most lost their livelihood and properties. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have 
to live in tents, government-provided barracks, and host families/communities 
throughout Aceh.
38
 As the tsunami devastated coastal, mostly urbanized areas in Aceh 
like Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and West Aceh, the IDPs generally moved 
to the interior districts (Kabupaten/Kota) or across districts in the province.  Many 
who still had social relationships to communities in the interior went back to villages 
in the rural areas. About 42-46 percent of these IDPs are women while 8-10 percent of 
them are children under five years old who traditionally fall under the care of women. 
History has shown that women in Aceh have always been at the forefront of 
many facets of life. During the thirty year long conflict before the tsunami, women 
were at the core of survival strategies that sustained the family and community despite 
war and division. After the tsunami, women of Aceh again showed their pivotal role in 
re-organizing communities both during the emergency period and during the post 
tsunami relief and rehabilitation period. Many national and international humanitarian 
workers working on the ground in Aceh were amazed at the resilience shown by many 
women survivors amidst unimaginable horror and loss caused by the tsunami.   
Being a place where the seed that spread Islam throughout Southeast Asia was 
first sown, the culture of the people continues to be steeply influenced by Islam, 
including social relationships and structures. Women in Aceh have excelled in every 
field and they often work hand-in-hand with men in every sphere of activity. For 
example, the province‘s many well-known warriors who led the fight alongside men to 
                                                 
38
 Hedman (2005) and Age (2005) provide early observations on displacement in Aceh after the quake 
and tsunami, especially on barracks issues. 
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defeat the Dutch and Portuguese in Sumatra and the Malacca Straits during colonial 
wars were women such as Tjut Njak Dhien, widows‘ battalion (inong balee) leaders 
like Admiral Keumalahayati, Tjut Meutia and Pocut Meurah Inseun.  Much earlier, 
four sulthanah (female monarchs) in succession ruled Aceh, which was then a Muslim 
kingdom, for half a century (1641-1699) as chronicled by Khan (2007). 
During the conflict of 1989-2004, many husbands had to flee their homes and 
villages escaping military operations, leaving their wives and children behind. Many 
young males, often suspected as guerilla sympathizers, also left their villages.  When 
the situation deteriorated, the wives, the elderly, and children sometimes had to move 
to safer places, living in displacement for months or years. They took refuge in IDP 
camps, public buildings, and host families within or outside their districts (Hugo 2002 
and Aulia 2005).
39
  
In the wake of the tsunami, many survivors returned to their original villages in 
the interior as their first sanctuary (Mahdi 2006). Considered vulnerable, children, the 
elderly, and women were often left behind with host families while men returned to 
the coastal areas—living under tents, barracks or the remnants of their houses, to 
assure access to relief supplies and gain permanent housing. Later, some families were 
reunited when they secured better living conditions. Again, women determined how a 
family and a community survived after such a tragedy followed by grim displacement 
situations. That said, to understand how women in Aceh cope with the catastrophe is 
to understand community survival strategy. Many women, who lost their family or 
otherwise, survived by utilizing their associations with their communities including 
                                                 
39
 See also: Towards a mapping of 'at risk' ethnic, religious and political groups in Indonesia. Inside 
Indonesia, 1999: 86 [cited 10 April 2006].  
Available from: http://www.serve.com/inside/digest/dig86.htm. and in Global IDPS Project, Internal 
Displacement: A Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2003. Geneva, February 2004. In this 
report, the entry is specifically written ―Indonesia (Aceh)‖ which I assume based on IDPS situation in 
Aceh rather than a combined number throughout Indonesia. 
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kinship, acquaintances, friends, family ties and other social networks and structures, 
especially village structures. Their decisions in regard to steps to take in the future 
seem to be influenced by these associations. 
This paper explores the relationship between women IDPs association with 
their communities, ―the social capital‖, and decision making from the temporary 
shelters setting in Aceh. Using logistic regression, a decision to return or not to return 
to the original settlement is assessed by demographics and several ―social capital‖ or 
its proxy explanatory variables such as age, age group, pre- and post-tsunami marital 
status, shelter type, shelter size, and the number of acquaintances and friends in the 
shelter. Similarly, the decision is also explored with a number of dichotomous 
explanatory variables: whether a woman IDP is head of household, whether she lost a 
family member to the tsunami, involvement in community activities, whether a 
woman IDP has land, and whether they have friend(s) in the shelters they were 
staying. Probit with sample selection model and multinomial logistic regression were 
used to test for the robustness of the logit model found. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly chronicles 
displacement in Aceh and its impact on women.  A literature review and empirical 
observations on migration and social capital follows in Section 3.3. After concisely 
describing data and methodology used in this paper in Section 3.4, I explain how an 
empirical model is developed in this study. Section 3.5 discusses the result of model 
estimation and selection, including univariate and multivariate analysis, as well as a 
model‘s diagnostic and robustness. Section 3.6 concludes and is followed by a note on 
the study limitation in Section 3.7.  
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3.2   Women and Displacement in Aceh 
Aceh has witnessed human migration and displacement due to both man-made 
and natural disasters. The civil war during DI/TII (Darul Islam) in late 40s to early 50s 
and three decades of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) struggle for independence since 
1976 has caused IDPs and a refugee crisis along the fragile history of Aceh within 
Indonesia. The great quake and tsunami devastated Aceh on 26 December 2004 and 
caused a major IDPs crisis with half a million people displaced and homeless.
40
    
The prolonged conflict attested to the Acehnese ability to survive with almost 
no outside intervention
41
. During the war, most of the clashes between the rebel 
groups and the government troops took place in the rural-interior areas of Aceh, 
forcing people to leave, take refuge and settle in urban-coastal regions. The 26 
December 2004 great quake and tsunami hit most of Aceh‘s populous urban-coastal 
regions. Survivors, who still have connections with the rural-interior regions, their 
gampöng, returned back, took refuge temporarily or even re-settled, thus reversed the 
direction of mobility among the Acehnese IDPs of those during the war. Resettling in 
the rural areas after the tsunami was made easier by the historic Helsinki peace accord 
on 15 August 2005. However, the humanitarian relief services centered in Banda Aceh 
and other urban areas caused indecisiveness among IDPs about where to temporarily 
resettle during the first months following the catastrophe. Resettling in the rural 
interior regions, temporarily or otherwise, meant the possibility of foregoing most of 
the relief aid provided by national and international organizations. 
                                                 
40
 Two year after the tsunami, Oxfam reported that about 70,000 are still living in military-style 
temporary shelters called ―barracks‖ in Aceh, while more are still living with host communities 
throughout the region. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs/pressoffice/2006/11/oxfam_calls_to_step_up_respons.html 
(accessed January 10, 2007) 
41
 There was only a limited presence of reporting office of IOM and UN-OCHA working with 
Indonesia‘s Government Disaster Mitigation (Satkorlak) to report and monitor IDPS situation. 
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Migration within and across Aceh‘s geographical border has been one of the 
most important modes of survival for the Acehnese during the conflict and aftermath 
of the tsunami. This migration has been supported by certain structures, notably a 
structure of social relationships and networks among the Acehnese (Mahdi 2007). The 
networks involve individual(s) who want to move from one place and individual(s) or 
contacts from another, considered-better or safer, place. The latter are usually 
individuals that the former already knew through different relationships like family 
ties, and kinship. 
Nearly thirty years ago, after three decades of perceived ill-treatment by the 
Indonesian government, the move to gain sovereignty for Aceh gathered momentum 
and exploded into a guerilla war which resulted in the province being forced into 
isolation from the world.  The conflict claimed the lives of nearly 15,000 people and 
caused psychological trauma to nearly 7,000 women. Women in many part of Aceh 
have experienced multiple and repeated displacement—many as heads of households 
caring for children and the elderly. 
As of 2003, out of about 2 million female population in the province, nearly 
460,000 (23% of total women, around 11% of total population) were forced to be 
heads of household after the deaths of their husbands of which the majority were due 
to the conflict. From these female heads of households, 60% never attended school, 
31% finished elementary school, 3% completed middle-school, and only 1% 
graduated from high school.
42
 The fact that one out of five women was household-
head indicates that women have been at the core of their family and community 
survival strategy. With the tsunami, Acehnese women are again at the forefront of the 
survival of their communities – at homes, in tents, barracks, and within host 
communities and devastated villages.  
                                                 
42
 Aceh NGO Forum reports in 2003, consolidated by author. 
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The tsunami caused huge destruction both in physical and non-physical terms. 
Latest available figures of casualties from official sources cited 129,498 deaths and 
37,066 missing in Aceh alone
43
. Although no gender-disaggregated data are available, 
most of the victims are believed to be women.  Oxfam reported that there were several 
villages that lost up to 80% of their female residents
44
. Oxfam also noted that there is a 
strong indication of gender imbalance after the tsunami. That is, there are more male 
survivors compared to female survivors and that both male and female survivors are 
mostly in their active reproductive ages.
45
 It is also important to note that the Aceh 
pre-tsunami population consisted of approximately a 51-49 female-male ratio. 
There are three main resources for data on IDPs in Aceh after the tsunami: (1) 
Satkorlak, the provincial government agency for disaster management, which 
produced IDP estimates in the first weeks after tsunami.
46
 Satkorlak, in collaboration 
with Aceh‘s Dinsos (Social Affairs Office) derived the numbers ―from a combination 
of general estimates of population figures and data collected from the sub-district 
heads (Camats)‖47; (2) Aceh‘s Electronic Data Management Agency (BPDE) with its 
field surveyors from Garansi, an Indonesian NGO. ―Garansi was contracted to register 
IDPs throughout the province and adopted an approach of finger printing IDPs to 
prevent double counting‖48; (3) Population Census for Aceh and Nias (Sensus 
                                                 
43
  http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/products/statistics/docs/DeathStatisticMay2005.pdf 
(accessed 17 November 2005). As in many catastrophes, single agreed accurate number is difficult to 
get. It seems that reports on earthquake and tsunami victims often confused, for example, between total 
and death-missing numbers, total in Aceh only versus total with other countries.  
44
 Oxfam Briefing Note ―The tsunami‘s impact on women‖ (March 2005)   
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_tsunami_women.pdf 
(accessed 20 August 2007) 
45
 ―Two major changes after the tsunami‖, slides presentation by Sinta Dewi of Oxfam Banda Aceh at 
UNESCAP‘s Workshop on The Impact of the Tsunami on Vulnerable Groups and Women, Jakarta 13-
15 September 2005. 
46
 Satkorlak in cooperation with IOM and OCHA had also previously published some conflict IDPs data 
before the tsunami. 
47
 In a letter from United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC) to the Head of 
Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) on IDPs definition. 
48
 Ibid. 
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Penduduk Aceh dan Nias, SPAN) by Aceh Office for Statistics (BPS) which launched 
its partial results on 29 November 2005. The foreign-donors-funded SPAN reported 
somewhat lower figures of IDPs compared to the first two. But Cibulskis
49
 concluded 
that ―there is some comparability between SPAN and other sources of data, though not 
perfect partly because of different definitions and timing.‖   
Garansi, the contractor for local government‘s BPDE defined IDPs as 
person(s) ―being affected by the disaster and displaced from their residence and living 
in temporary accommodation‖50. There are reports that the Garansi survey at some 
places counted host families among IDPs. SPAN census, on the other hand, defined 
IDPs based on whether respondents at the time of interview identified themselves as 
an IDP.  Respondent, a household head, was asked ―Apakah saat ini Anda sebagai 
pengungsi?‖ (Are you an internally displaced person at this time?). This subjective 
and self-identified question, culturally insensitive to proud Acehnese, might have 
attributed to far lower count of IDPs than the numbers previously produced by 
Satkorlak and Dinsos. SPAN reported 192,055 IDPs during August-September 2005 
while BPDE/Dinsos reported 436,820 IDPs per 8 September 2005 (not including 
Nias). 
BPDE/Dinsos reported that IDPs live in temporary living centers (TLC) or 
shelters—including government-built barracks (17.3%), self set-up tents (15.5%) and 
host communities (67.2%). From the total IDPs, some 181,516 (42%) are women, and 
36,397 (8%) are babies and children under 5 years old, who traditionally fall under 
women‘s responsibility. 
                                                 
49 Available on UNORC website 
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/reliefrecovery/livelihood/docs/doc/ inforesources/ 
IDPSSituationbyRichardCibulskisWB.ppt   (18 July 2006), accessed 15 January 2007 
50
 Op. cit. In a letter…. 
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Based on 2005 SPAN
51, there were 508,671 out of 4,031,589 Aceh‘s 
population  IDPs or used to be IDPs (ex-IDPs) after the tsunami and the earthquake. 
When the census was complete, of 209,882 IDPs, some 71,628 (34.14%) live with 
host families, 108,074 (51.51%) live in barracks, 22,695 (10.82%) live in tents (house 
destroyed) and some 7,425 (3.53%) live in tents but with parts of a house still intact. 
In addition, SPAN also reported that women constitute 46% (93,821) of total IDPs. 
Some 298,849 ex-IDPs did not consider themselves IDPs anymore as they 
already returned to their original settlements; albeit the fact that they might still live in 
TLC in their villages. From those ex-IDPs, 46% lived with host families and 32% in 
tents when they were in displacement. Hatmadji (2006), doing Gender Analysis for 
UNDP, also concluded that Ex-IDPs phenomenon ―might be caused by the availability 
of places in other areas which are not (not much) suffered from the disaster where they 
can live‖52. In fact, many families with surviving mothers, women in general, the 
elderly, and children decided to place their loved ones in their original village or with 
relatives outside the affected areas. Table 3.1 shows number of IDPs from the three 
main sources which indicate that host-families are essential in helping IDPs in Aceh.  
  
 
Table 3.1 Number of IDPs: comparison of three sources 
    Data Sources 
  
Temporary 
shelter SPAN Satkorlak Dinsos/BPDE 
IDPs Tent  130,836   61,169 
 Barrack     72,756   69,615 
 Tent/Barrack 133,514 191,198 129,451 
 Host families   70,303 306,188 259,871 
 Total 203,817 565,384 425,434 
Ex-IDPs   298,849     
Source: Richard Cibulskis of World Bank presentation
53
    
                                                 
51
 Aceh Office of Statistics, BPS Aceh, with support from multi-donor agencies, ran the first census 
after tsunami on 15 August – 15 September 2005. Report of this census was available to public in 2006.   
52
 UNDP Gender Analysis SPAN Report by Hatmadji, S.H. (18 July 2006) available at 
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/reliefrecovery/livelihood/ (accessed 10 January 2007) 
53
 Op. cit. Available on UNORC…. 
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Based on Dinsos/BPDE data, host families used to constitute the biggest 
―shelter‖ (67.2%) for the tsunami IDPs in Aceh. Host families could mean family 
members, relatives, friends, or merely a social relationship based on gampöng 
(village) relations as reported in Mahdi (2007). The role of host families also mean 
that IDPs highly rely on the roles of women in the houses used as temporary shelters. 
In Aceh, wives are called ―po rumoh‖, the ―owner of the house‖ which does not only 
mean that women run the house, but, in many cases, also literally own the house from 
their parents
54
. At the very least, the po rumoh are the sole owner and decision maker 
in a kitchen of a house. The po rumoh in Aceh usually use the kitchen in the house to 
do much of daily activities, not only to cook but also to accept her friends and guests. 
That is why, Acehnese usually prefer houses with an ample size kitchen (Nursaniah et 
al 2007). A too small kitchen can cause a comfort problem, especially when there is 
more than one family in the house sharing a kitchen.  
The SPAN report noted that 24% of the IDPs are heads of household and 15% 
are partners of the head of household.  As a wife is usually considered the ―partner‖ to 
a husband in Acehnese (and Indonesian) patriarchal society, this means that at least 
15% of the IDPs are women heads of household, higher than the situation before 
tsunami and during the conflict which was around 11% as discussed before.  Among 
the IDPs, the number of women separated from their spouses is also higher compared 
to men. After the tsunami, from 12,177 IDPs separated from their spouse by death, 
some 7,112 (58.4%) are women. Additionally, women were affected by the quake and 
tsunami as much as men. Some 90% of the IDPs said that they were personally 
affected, 40.9% of which are women. As a matter of fact, if the number of women 
                                                 
54
 Parents in Aceh usually built and give a house to their daughter upon their marriage while a son 
usually gets farm, cattle, and other heritage other than house.   
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who had to bear responsibility in hosting IDPs in their houses combined with the 
number of women IDPs themselves, one can arguably say that women in Aceh bear 
the most responsibility for their community‘s resilience in coping with the catastrophe 
and hardship that followed. 
In terms of planning for future settlements, SPAN data reported that 49% of 
the IDPs wanted to stay where they were when the census was done, 33% wanted to 
return to their original settlements (villages) before tsunami, and 12% said they did not 
know where to re-settle. Unfortunately, the SPAN report did not specify this future-
settlement-plan based on sex, as the survey was based on household. Therefore, it is 
not known the degree of women involvement in, and factors that contribute to, 
decision making for future settlement.  This paper is intended to fill the gap by 
providing insights on women IDPs‘ decision to return or not to return to their original 
settlement using data from a survey organized by the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on the condition of women tsunami IDPs in Aceh.       
 
3.3   Literature Review and Empirical Observations 
Traditionally, the reasons encouraging an individual or a group of individuals 
to migrate were categorized as "push" or "pull" factors. People who were pushed out 
from their original settlement by civil unrest and natural disaster resulted in ―forced 
migration,‖ while people who migrate to find a better life in a more developed 
region—pulled by economic factors, are said, arguably, to engage in ―voluntary 
migration‖.  The distinction is, of course, not clear cut. Therefore, there are also terms 
like ―involuntary migration‖ and ―encouraged migration‖ (Gardner 1981). The 
distinction, nevertheless, is much clearer in defining ―source‖ versus ―host‖ 
region/country. Much of the growing migration literature seems to concentrate on the 
―host‖ or ―destination‖ country/region.  
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Human movement studies introduced to our lexicon the terms such as migrant, 
refugee, and more recently IDPs. The concept of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
often only refers to displaced people caused by conflict, violence and persecution 
(Mooney 2005). But the global awareness of the problems of IDPs in the last 15 years 
has included IDPs caused by a natural disaster. In its Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, the United Nations in 1998 defined IDPs as:  
 
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee 
or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as 
a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized State border. (Introduction, para. 2) 
 
In Indonesia, however, the term IDPs is still often confused with ―refugees,‖ a 
term used for state-border-crossing migration. The word pengungsi is used for people 
who move both because of conflict and natural disaster; and both for those who move 
within or across state border. Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) actually knows 
only one word pengungsi to describe both IDPs and refugees. The problems of 
displaced people after the tsunami have introduced the term IDPs more widely in Aceh 
and Indonesia. 
When catastrophe strikes a community, many individuals choose to move out 
from affected areas. ―Migration from an area afflicted by a major disaster to an 
unaffected area would seem to be one of the most common responses to disaster and 
an important survival strategy‖ (Curson 1989:16). A man-made disaster like a war or a 
conflict had caused major permanent and temporary migration in the history of Asia 
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and Europe. Natural disasters often generate both large- and small-scale migrations of 
people away from affected areas. See for example Blaikie et al. 1994, Brook and Paul 
2003, Cannon 1994, Lavell 1994, Parker et al. 1997, and Smith and Ward, 1998.  
Paul (2005), however, argued that not all affected communities out-migrate 
permanently after a disaster when there is a ―constant flow of disaster aid and its 
proper distribution by the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)‖. 
This is also the case in post-tsunami Aceh. But, as the rest of this paper will elaborate, 
IDPs, in Aceh at least, return not only for the disaster aid, but also for other personal 
and communal reasons such as property ownership, family and community ties, all the 
social structure and networks which might ―pull‖ the IDPs back to return to their 
original settlement prior to tsunami. Thus, this paper pays more attention to the 
―source‖ region where the IDPs might return to. 
That is, this paper focuses on the social networks in the source ―region‖ while 
the growing literature on the nexus between migration and social networks, when it 
matters, usually focuses on the ‖region‖ hosting the migrant. The latter usually builds 
on the question ―How many people do I know where I am migrating to and how can 
they can facilitate my decision to migrate?‖ Hence, typically, the expected sign of 
network effects as push factor of out-migration is positive. This paper, however, builds 
on a very different question, such as ―How many people do I know from my own 
village where I am now and how will they facilitate/hinder my decision to migrate 
back?‖ 
At the wake of an increasing number of major disasters taking place in the last 
decade, the literature studying migration and disaster is also growing. However, not 
many studies focus on natural disaster IDPs issues and most literature either combines 
analysis of refugees and IDPs or focuses on the conflict IDP issues (Irhamni, 2006). 
Toole and Waldman (1993), for example, examine the health issues of refugees and 
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IDPs caused by war and epidemic, while Amowitz et al (2002) examine the human 
rights and sexual abuse issues among IDPs in Sierra Leone. 
The focus on natural disaster IDPs is more noticeable after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami. Nishikiori et al (2006) investigate risk factors of mortality among IDPs in 
Sri Lanka using a retrospective cohort analysis. They observe a significantly high 
mortality in women and children among the displaced population in the eastern coastal 
district of Sri Lanka. They suggest that reconstruction activities should take into 
consideration these changes in population structure as also found and suggested by an 
Oxfam survey in Aceh.
55
 Chandra et al (2006) examine the impact of the disaster on 
mental health among the survivors in the impacted countries. 
Being worst hit by the Tsunami, the IDP situation in Aceh has also been the 
focus of some literature. Irhamni  (2006) studies the determinants to leave temporary 
leaving center (TLC) among IDPs in Aceh. Using SPAN household level data, she 
found that housing, household and village characteristics are important determinants 
for leaving temporary shelter decision. This study suggests that differences in 
characteristics among households need to be taken into account in policy for IDPs. 
Rofi et al (2006) report mortality rate among Aceh tsunami IDPs based on a survey of 
388 households. The report said ―Risk of death was greatest in the youngest and oldest 
age groups, and among females,‖ which is similar to the findings in Nishkiori et al in 
Sri Lanka. They also reported that 36 per cent of tsunami-displaced households 
indicate an intention to return to their original community. Additionally, ―displaced 
households residing in host communities were 2.2 times more likely to state an 
intention to return to their original village or another community as those residing in 
camps.‖ These are two studies on Aceh‘s tsunami IDPs which are fairly quantitative, 
while the rest are more qualitative in nature.  
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 Op. cit. “Two major changes…‖ 
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Siapno (2007) examines displacement, especially among Acehnese women, as 
a part of survival strategy and resilience. Hedman (2006) looks at the impact of the 
Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between The Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) and the Indonesian Government on the livelihood of IDPs.  Mahdi (2006) 
found a different pattern of mobility between the conflict IDPs and tsunami IDPs in 
Aceh. He observes that there was a strong correlation between the mobility of IDPs 
with livelihood options and relief services, while taking into account the role of social 
structure and network in the Acehnese community. Lee et al. (2005) reported how a 
team of medical relief workers faced challenges in providing medical relief at one of 
the tsunami IDPs camp in Meulaboh, West Aceh. This paper details the difficulties 
and lessons learnt, including the lack of important resources for healthcare delivery.  
Several studies on Aceh‘s tsunami IDPs are more policy-focused. Age (2005) 
identifies forced replacement as Aceh tsunami IDPs were confined to government-
built barracks while Kälin (2005) focuses on the human rights issue of tsunami's IDPs 
in Aceh. He lists specific issues to watch in regard to IDPs‘ rights at the wake of the 
2004 tsunami such as women and children rights and trafficking issues. Hudspeth 
(2005) found three main barriers facing the international NGOs and donors in 
accessing IDPs in Aceh: physical, informational and ‗social‘.  
Several studies look at program implementation and evaluation involving Aceh 
tsunami IDPs as direct or indirect beneficiaries.  Despite a general preference of the 
local community for reconstruction based on community development principles, 
Kenny (2007) finds that local people in Aceh have been marginalized in the 
reconstruction process.  He notes that the responses of the Acehnese for immediate 
international relief efforts have been favorable. Nevertheless, the Acehnese have been 
wary about the spending designated for the relief and reconstruction programs. 
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Oxfam‘s briefing note on 25 June 200556 warned of a possible discriminatory 
intervention due to pre-existing social structures and inequalities such as gender, age 
and income levels. 
Doocy (2006) et al. reports experiences and lessons learned from a cash for 
work (CFW) program and assesses some key recommendations for future 
implementation. They note that the program empowers the IDPs, giving them 
incentives to return to their original settlement. The program also has indirect benefits 
as it provides productive activities, hence creating opportunities for community 
cooperation. Although there is a popular discourse in Aceh that CFW has destroyed 
gotong royong (self-helped, community work-together),
57
 this study has shown that 
CFW is beneficial at least in the short term to help people access cash. Oxfam has also 
advocated and implemented CFW for immediate or pre-livelihood intervention 
claiming it is ―an appropriate approach to take after disasters such as the tsunami, 
where food by and large remained available, but where many people had lost their 
means of earning the money to buy it.‖58 
 
3.3.1  General Theory of Migration 
As mentioned earlier, while there is a recently growing qualitative literature on 
IDPs (IDPs of disaster in particular), only a small portion is devoted to a quantitative 
approach. To build the model to study decision making among women tsunami IDPs 
in Aceh, therefore, necessitates alternative threads of literature. Stecklov et al (2005) 
summarizes theories of migration pattern into two major views:  
                                                 
56
 Targeting Poor People: Rebuilding lives after the tsunami (25 June 2005) 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_tsunami_6months.pdf 
57
 Based on author field interviews 
58
 Back to work: How people are recovering their livelihoods 12 months after the tsunami (20 
December 2005) 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp84_tsunami_livelihoods.pdf  
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(1) Neoclassical models of migration based on individual maximizing utility as 
postulated by Harris and Todaro (1970), Sjaastad (1962) and Todaro (1969). 
These models consider the migration decision in a cost-benefit framework in 
which potential migrants compare expected utility of income at the point of 
origin to expected net income at possible destinations. Expected net income 
from any location would depend on characteristics of the individual such as 
age, skill level, and asset position.  
(2) ―New economics of migration‖ is based on the key insight that migration 
decisions are not made in isolation by individuals but by larger units of 
people
59
, particularly households as postulated by Connell et al (1976) and 
Massey et al (1993). These models of household maximizing utility consider 
the decision to migrate a result of a joint household decision, in which a 
household shares the costs and benefits of migration with the migrants through 
an explicit or implicit sharing rule.  
 
Stecklov et al (2005) found that migration networks strongly influence 
migration decisions. This is in line with the findings of prior studies showing the 
important role of social networks and economic incentives in migration decisions. 
Boyd (1989) highlighted the importance of network theory of migration in influencing 
decisions to migrate, either directly or indirectly.  Furthermore, Massey, Goldring, and 
Durand (1994) stated that migrant networks can be viewed as a migration-specific 
form of social capital
60
 that influences a decision to migrate in two ways: by 
providing direct assistance such as food, housing, transportation, or cash; and by 
providing indirect assistance such as information about jobs.  
                                                 
59
 Emphasized by author 
60
 Emphasized by author 
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Bigsten (1996) and Agesa and Kim (2001) noted that households might follow 
two alternative patterns of migration: family migration and split migration. In the 
family migration, the entire household will move to the urban area while in the split 
migration one of the household members will first move to the urban area, usually the 
household head, while the rest of the household members will stay behind but might 
reunite later.  The decision to migrate might be influenced by various household 
characteristics such as age and work experience of the household head (Goss and Paul 
1986) and family size (Odland and Ellis 1988).  Furthermore, Root and de Jong (1991) 
use various measures for social structures and socioeconomic resources and show that 
family size, family ties, family pressure and family mobility experiences constitute a 
significant impact on the decision to migrate.  
 
  
Figure 3.1  
General model of migration decision making (de Jong 2000) 
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De Jong (2000), Pedraza (1991) and Sandell (1977) look at the role of women 
in migration. De Jong examines the role of expectations, gender and norms on the 
intention to migrate in Thailand. De Jong includes individual, household and 
community characteristics in determining migration intentions and behavior, whether 
directly or not. In general, he postulates a ―general model for migration decision 
making‖ as shown by Figure 1 
Disparities, usually economic, between two locations might induce rural-urban 
migration (Agesa and Kim, 2001). Lower rural wages, frequently close to subsistence 
levels, induce rural households to migrate to urban areas which provide a higher wage 
(Williamson, 1988).  
Additionally, the leaving-parental-home literature provides some empirical 
studies analyzing individual characteristics in the decision to leave the parental house. 
Aassve et al. (2001) examine the relationship between income and employment status 
and the decision to leave home for Italian young adults while Aassve et al. (2002) 
examine how marriage probability determines the leaving home decision for young 
Americans. 
Whittington and Peter (1996) research the impact of children's and parents' 
economic variables on the decision to leave the parental house. Avery et al. (1992) 
investigate the impact of parental income on the probability of making an independent 
living, while de Jong et al. (1991) examine parents' material resources impact on the 
decision to leave parental houses. 
Chau (1997) examines the role of migrant networks in determining patterns of 
out migration from sending region to receiving region.  She finds that migration cost 
varies inversely with the number of previous migrants.  The relation of migration 
networks and education at a host country is studied by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) 
and Miranda (2007).  The first finds that the probability of migration from Mexico to 
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the US is increasing with education in communities with low migrant networks, but 
decreasing with education in communities with high migrant networks. The later 
examines how family and community migration experience affect the probability of 
high school graduation in urban Mexico.  
 
3.3.2  Social Capital and IDPs Movement in Aceh 
Bourdieu notes that ―social capital is the sum of resources, actual or virtual, 
that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.‖ 
Coleman defined ―social capital‖ as ―a useful resource available to an actor through 
his or her social relationship.‖ Putnam (1993a) linked ―the civic community‖ to the 
tradition of ―civic humanism‖ which he specifies through four theoretical dimensions: 
(1) civic engagement, (2) political equality, (3) solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and (4) 
the social structure of cooperation.  Putnam found in his study that northern regions in 
Italy performed better than southern ones as ―social capital‖ was flourishing in the 
former. 
 
Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and even 
trust…were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief 
virtue in the South, by contrast, was imposition of hierarchy and 
order on latent anarchy. (p. 130) 
 
Fatimah Castillo (2003, in Siapno, 2007)
61
 examines cultural adaptation and social 
capital aspects of resilience. Castillo argues that, in many cases, the fabric of social 
life and social capital (friendship, kinship, trust, religious beliefs, indigenous belief 
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systems) are more resilient. Therefore, ―just because many have died, or that physical 
infrastructure is destroyed‖ does not always mean ―that the fabric of social life is also 
destroyed‖.  In this regard, Adger et al (2005), for example, finds that there are 
resilient societies in post-tsunami coastal regions. And these resilient societies possess 
a robust network of information sharing utilizing their social capital.  
Reports on the situation of IDPs have been provided mostly by government 
agencies and human rights groups.
62
 Emphasizing agency, Siapno (2007) concludes 
that displacement is indeed a mode for resilience and resistance for the Acehnese 
when seen with subjectivity beyond notions of ―the victims,‖ ―the oppressed‖ or 
merely uninformed ―displaced-masses‖.  
When put in subjectivity as the question used by SPAN census, it might be 
surprising for some that ―312,46363 tsunami/earthquake survivors who once identified 
themselves as IDPs no longer do‖.  This number is the result of a question ―Apakah 
Anda pernah mengungsi setelah gempa/tsunami?‖ (Have you ever been displaced as a 
result of the earthquake/tsunami?). But this should not be surprising because many 
communities decided to return to their original settlements as early as two to three 
months after the disaster and did so with or without outside help. Many of these 
returnees, whether early or later, are not recorded while they are actually ―still living 
in tents or ad-hoc structures on their own land.‖ Chris Morris, United Nations 
Recovery Coordinator for Aceh & Nias, sketched an explanation for these ―ex-IDPs‖: 
 
There may also be cultural, psychological or linguistic reasons why 
such a large number of people who once considered themselves 
IDPs no longer want to identify themselves as such. Two possible 
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 Hedman and Siapno are the only two scholars the author knows to have been working on this issue. 
Nah and Hyndman have reported on Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia and North America. 
63
 When the SPAN is completed, the number of ―Ex-IDPs‖ is somehow lower as seen in Table 1. 
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explanations stand out. Firstly, many tsunami/earthquake survivors 
have gone back to their own lands and now consider themselves as 
having returned home and therefore no longer IDPs regardless of 
the living conditions they experience. Secondly, being labeled a 
―pengungsi‖ or IDPs in Aceh may carry a negative connotation 
which many tsunami survivors probably want to avoid. 
 
Going back to one‘s own land, nevertheless, is not an individual choice for 
many survivors in Aceh. Even when a survivor has been provided with a house, the 
decision to return might not be made until at least a number of people from the same 
original settlement return. Re-organized communities in turn might decide whether to 
return or not, and if so when, based on other supporting variables like infrastructure 
(electricity, water and sanitation), livelihood, and social life. Women and children 
might not feel safe to return when inhabitants are still sparse. Vebry (2006)
64
 reported 
this situation in several places around Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar.  In one case, a 
survivor from Leupung of Aceh Besar admitted that it is difficult for some male 
survivors to return to their village as there are only four women left for possible re-
marriage in the future.
65
 For a settlement to be a settlement for Acehnese, a gampong 
both in physical and non-physical notions must be rebuilt; not just a collective or rows 
of houses, no matter how neat they are, without a thread to one another. People 
returned to their gampong, not merely to their houses. Therefore, if one is to 
understand determinants of decision to return among IDPs in Aceh, an understanding 
of social factors constituting a gampong is imperative. This can be done by 
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 Vebry, Muamar. (2006). Rumoh & Gampong (Housing and Gampong), published in ―Oase‖ at 
www.acehinstitute.org on 1 December 2006 (accessed 5 January 2007) 
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 In Aceh tradition, a man resides in his wife residence/gampong.  
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investigating and gauging the social relationship through its proxies such as 
acquaintances, friendship, and through property ownership.     
Displacement in Aceh is also very fluid, ―instead of the static-ness of camp life 
as is often represented‖ in official reports. Siapno (2007), therefore, goes ―beyond the 
way this term displacement is often used in particular in human rights reports, i.e. 
enforced physical and geographic displacement, mostly in repressive and negative 
sense, to open up possibilities including fluidity and resilience, and ways of dealing 
courageously with forced displacement.‖ 
IDPs‘ mobility and decisions, including or even more so those of women IDPs, 
can also be seen as the resultant of multiple group membership. Following the 
tsunami, an individual seemed to be concerned only with finding her or his own 
immediate family members. Fathers looked for their wives and children. Wives, 
although with more limitations, looked for their husbands and children too. Family or 
the part of it that was spared by the catastrophe, once reunited, tried to secure their 
family‘s safety first. Many adult males took their female counterparts, children and the 
elderly to a safer place, and then returned to affected areas to further search for 
missing family members or tried to secure relief supplies for the family. While or after 
securing their own family, many then started to get connected to other community 
members from the same or neighboring gampong with which they were familiar.  .  
Mahdi (2007) notes the importance of gampong (village) as the next social 
structure after family that IDPs rely on or look after. He documents IDPs mobility in 
Aceh based on gampöng networks, as proxy for social network made possible by 
better communication and transportation in Aceh. Although these network factors are 
not a direct cause of migration, they do facilitate it.
66
 Furthermore, the gampong 
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 Reasons encouraging an individual to migrate were traditionally categorized as "push" or "pull" 
factors. Free flow of information, improved communication and faster and lower cost transportation has 
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networks among Acehnese are built on ―trust‖ with specific ―norms‖ and ―values‖ 
regulating them, fitting a notion of ―social capital‖67 as described by Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992), and Coleman (1994), then popularized by Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 
1995, 2000). Islamic as well as cultural norms and values play important roles within 
Acehnese social structure and relations.  
Membership in a family and a gampong are most important for Acehnese in 
coping with hardship after the tsunami. Social structure beyond these two layers is 
likely to be secondary. Members of civil service institutions in Aceh, which collapsed 
during the war, did not indicate significant loyalties to their post at the wake of the 
quake and tsunami. This observation is in line with other observations on role conflict 
in critical situations. With few exceptions (those who are single and community 
oriented-individuals whose selfless acts made them community heroes), Killian (1952) 
documented that most people in disaster settings try to help their family first. In the 
case of 2005 Katrina in the Gulf region of southern regions in the US, ―Police officers 
simply walking away from their jobs, in many cases prioritizing the needs of their own 
families‖ (Hartman and Squires, 2006:16).  It is within this setting one should see how 
women IDPs in Aceh decide their future settlement plan, that is, women IDPs as 
individuals, as parts of a family, a community and, more so, a gampong in Aceh.  
   
3.4   Data and Methodology 
 This paper is based on data from a survey on women IDPs‘ situation which 
was conducted by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) with 
The Aceh Institute, a local research center as implementer. The survey was executed 
during 5-23 August 2005. It was geographically and thematically comprehensive in 
                                                                                                                                            
introduced another set of reason: ―networks‖, which are not a direct cause of migration but do help 
facilitate it. 
67
 See Field (2003), for example of ―key ideas‖ summary of on Social Capital 
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coverage. Some 6,468 women were included in the sample from more than 200,000 
women IDPs. The sample was first proportionally calculated based on the data of 
women IDPs in each district available then. The sample was also proportionally 
calculated based on shelter type to ensure it included the three main types of shelter: 
host families, barracks, and tents. 
Respondents were interviewed based on a questionnaire by 129 enumerators in 
17 districts throughout Aceh. The respondents were randomly selected based on 
snowball-sampling. Enumerators in each district visited host families, barracks, and 
tents based on available information, then randomly chose an IDP she/he first met. 
The enumerators collected 6,360 questioners (less 108 data unit than survey designed). 
After data cleaning, 6,111 entries were entered into a database for further analysis. 
The analysis in this paper, however, is based on 5,869 IDPs responses, dropping 
respondents under 15 years old.  
Data on distance from temporary shelter (TLC) are processed based on village 
potential statistics (PODES) published by BPS, a travel journal, and author estimates. 
The distance is calculated from sub-district of origin to sub-district where TLC is 
located. 
 
3.5   Empirical Models 
The decision to leave or not to leave one place is gauged by future costs and 
benefits in comparison to another place. Assuming that this decision involves a 
rational decision, agents follow utility maximization process based on which agents 
will choose an alternative that provides greater expected benefits between the two 
places. In this study of the decision to leave TLC among women IDPs in Aceh, the 
utility maximizing behavior is assumed to be conducted by individual women 
respondents of the survey. This assumption does not undermine the influence by 
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―larger units of people‖ on the decision to move as implied by de Jong‘s model. 
Moreover, some 21.6 percent of the total 5869 respondents are self-declared (women) 
―head of household‖. 
This paper investigates determinants associated with women IDPs‘ future plan, 
especially on the decision to return or not to return to their original settlement 
(village).  For that reason, the dependent variable is set to be a binary or dichotomous 
variable of ―to return‖ or ―not to return‖ to the original settlement.  Logistic regression 
analysis is then used to explore possible independent (explanatory) variables that 
might explain the dependent variable. According to Kleinbaum et al (1998:656) 
logistic regression analysis is the most popular regression technique available for 
modeling dichotomous dependent variable.  
The binary choice models essentially describe the probability that yi = 1 
directly, although they are often derived from an underlying latent variable model 
(Verbeek, 2004:191). In general, 
 
 P{yi = 1 ix } = G (xi ,  )      (3.1)  
 
for some function G(.) which means that the probability of having  yi = 1 (―to leave‖) 
depends on the vector xi  containing individual characteristics. The model for women 
IDP intention ―to leave‖ or ―not to leave‖ in this chapter is based on this general 
model without underlying behavioral assumptions. 
Although not necessary, it is possible to derive a binary choice model from 
underlying behavioral assumptions (Verbeek, 2004:192, Greene 1997:880). ―This 
leads to a latent variable representation of the model, which is in common use even 
when such behavioral assumptions are not made.‖  
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In the case of women tsunami IDPs in Aceh, there will be a utility difference 
between returning and not returning to original villages. Assuming these individual 
women are maximizing behavior, the utility can be written as 
 
iii xy  
'*
        (3.2) 
 
where 
*
iy  is unobservable, thus referred to as a latent variable (Verbeek 2004) or index 
function (Greene 1997). Hence, for each woman IDP i  the utility 
*
iy  is a function of 
observed characteristics xi  and unobserved characteristics  i . The i s are 
independent of all xi .  
As only the outcomes of the maximization behavior can be observed (the 
decision to return or to stay), the latent variable (
*
iy ) and the observed binary variable 
(yi) is linked through the following measurement equation: 
  
  yi = 1 if 
*
iy          (3.3) 
    = 0 if  *iy   
  
where  point (Long 1997). If  *iy  exceeds the threshold 
 then y = 1 while if *iy  ≤  , then y = 0. Since the latent variable is unobserved, this 
equation cannot be estimated using the ordinary least square method. This implies that 
the estimation technique should employ Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation which 
requires assumptions about the errors distribution. Assuming that the error ( i ) in 
equation (2) is normally distributed, the equation will result in a probit model. If i  
follows a standard logistic distribution, it becomes a logit model.  Major statistical 
software applications are equipped with features for the ML estimation.  
The analysis of the decision to leave TLC, however, is complicated by the 
presence of sample selection bias. There were some IDPs who never stayed in any 
TLC. Ignoring this fact ―will create a problem of left hand censoring in which 
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households who have never become IDPs are excluded in non-random fashion‖ 
(Irhamni 2006). An extension of Tobit II model known as Heckit procedure can help 
remedy the problem. The Heckit procedure involves a probit model for the selection 
equation and OLS regression in the selected sample for the main equation (Greene 
1997). However, one can also follow a procedure proposed by Van den Ven and Van 
den Praag (1981) which employs two probit for the sample selection model. In this 
chapter, the behavioral model based on this procedure is used to empirically test for 
the robustness of the general model above which is developed by logit model.   
Following Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), the variable selection process in 
logit model is started with a careful univariate analysis of each variable, modeling a 
single independent variable with the said dependent variable. Upon completion of the 
univariate analyses, variables for the multivariate are considered based on p-value < 
.25.  After fitting the multivariate model, the importance of each variable included in 
the model is verified by (a) Wald statistic for each variable, and, (b) a comparison of 
each estimated coefficient with the coefficient from the univariate model containing 
only that variable. The new model is then compared to the old model through the 
likelihood ratio test. 
 
3.6   Estimation Results and Model Selection 
The logit model will focus on explanatory variables that are related to, or 
otherwise, implying respondent association to other individuals (networks, proxy of 
social capital). That is, determining social capital as determinants to women IDPS‘ 
decision to return or not to return. Independent variables considered in this analysis 
include demographics (age, age group, marital status, and distance of TLC from 
original village) as well as TLC types, TLC size, number of acquaintances from the 
original village in TLC, whether a woman has a piece of land in the affected area, and 
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whether a woman has new friends in the shelter. The significance of approximate real 
distance (in km) from TLC to original village is also tested.  
As explained before, in a communal society in Aceh, besides ―acquaintance‖ 
and ―friends‖ as direct indicators of social network, ―marital status‖, ―TLC types‖, and  
―land ownership‖ might also be considered as proxy to the network. 
 
To test for robustness of the logit model, two probit models procedure is applied using 
―land ownership‖ as dependent variables in the sample selection model.  
 
 (1) Dependent variable: to-return or not-to-return 
When the women IDPs were asked where they ―think‖ they will be in 1-2 
years from the time of interview, some 2726 (46.4%) women said that they would still 
be in the same shelter they were staying. On the other hand, some 1,804 (30.7%) 
women said they would return to their original settlement. There were 18.27% who 
said they ―do not know‖ or ―not sure‖ where they would be. The remaining 4.5% said 
they would be in another settlement. The distribution of this ―future plan‖ for 
settlement is shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Where women IDPs in Aceh think they will be in 2-3 years after the tsunami
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Figure 3.2 
Distribution of where women IDPs in Aceh thought they would be in 2-3 years  
after the tsunami (processed) 
 
Interestingly enough, these figures are somewhat in a similar pattern with the 
census (SPAN) result where 49% of the IDPs (both men and women) wanted to stay 
where they were when the census was done and 33% wanted to return to their original 
settlement before tsunami. Both number of SPAN are only about 3% higher than the 
women survey. This result offers  great confidence for further analysis using this 
database.   
To make a dichotomous dependent variable, the last three responses were 
combined into a new variable ―not-to-returned‖ contrasting the first indicating the 
wish ―to-return‖ among women IDPs. That is, there were 4,065 (69.3%) women IDPs 
who can be categorized under ―No‖ and 1,804 (30.7%) under ―Yes‖ to return. This is 
of course somewhat conservative as IDPs under ―Will be in another settlement‖ and 
―Not sure‖ are not all going to end up not returning to their original village. 
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(2) Independent variables 
A univariate logistic regression analysis reveals that age, age group, post-
tsunami marital status, head of household status, all do not associate with the decision 
to-return or not to-return among the IDPs with all p-value > .25. On the other hand, 
distance, pre-tsunami marital status, shelter type, shelter size, family loss, land 
ownership, involvement in community activities, number of acquaintances from 
original village and whether a woman IDP has friends in the shelter do associate with 
the decision. Therefore, only those which are univariately significant are presented 
here (Table 3.2). A complete summary of all variables is provided in Appendix 3.A.  
 
Table 3.2 
Statistically significant independent variables in univariate logistics regression 
Variables Category Frequency Percent 
Distance between temporary shelter and 
original village (in km) 
up to 1 km 886 15.1 
between 1 to 5 664 11.3 
between 5 to 10 1844 31.4 
between 10  to 25 1123 19.1 
between 25  to 100 598 10.2 
between 100  to 250  471 8.0 
between 250 to 500 246 4.2 
more than 500 37 .6 
Pre-Tsunami Marital Status Single 1266 20.0 
Married 3777 58.5 
Widowed-by-death 722 19.3 
Widowed-by-divorce 104 2.2 
Whether any family member lost to 
tsunami (or conflict) 
No 3554 60.6 
Yes 2315 39.4 
Type of temporary shelter when 
interviewed 
Host Family 2658 45.3 
Barrack 2035 34.7 
Tent/makeshift structure 1176 20.0 
Temporary shelter size (397 missing) <20 m2 2032 34.6 
21-40 m2 1949 33.2 
41-80 m2 1109 18.9 
>80 m2 382 6.5 
Whether respondent own a land in tsunami 
affected area 
No 1918 32.7 
Yes 3951 67.3 
Number of acquaintances from original 
village in temporary shelter 
  
Very few  333 5.7 
Few 581 9.9 
Fair 706 12.0 
Many 2703 46.1 
Very many 1546 26.3 
Whether respondent has friend(s)  
in new settlement 
No 1142 19.5 
Yes 4727 80.5 
Whether respondent involve in community 
decision making after tsunami 
No 2387 40.7 
Yes 3482 59.3 
Whether respondent attend community 
meeting after tsunami 
No 2714 46.2 
Yes 3155 53.8 
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Intuitively, except for distance, all significant variables indeed indicate 
individual association of the women IDPs to their family and community. As a strong 
communal society, specifically by the fact that women in Aceh are the po rumoh, 
temporary shelter and land ownership are also both directly and indirectly related to 
IDPs decision to return. A thorough observation of each variable follows. 
Distance, is the approximate distance in kilometers between a shelter (TLC) 
and original village. Used as continuous data, this variable is not statistically 
significant in the univariate model. However, when considered as categorial data, 
distance does influence the decision to return made by the women IDP as shown in 
Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3  
Logistic regression of TLC‘s distance from original village and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh 
 
Distance (in km) B S.E (B) Exp(B) 
95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
P Lower Upper 
up to 1 km      .000 
Between 1 to 5 .630 .116 1.878 1.497 2.355 .000 
Between 5 to 10 .615 .095 1.849 1.534 2.228 .000 
Between 10  to 25 .562 .103 1.755 1.433 2.149 .000 
Between 25  to 100 .337 .122 1.401 1.102 1.780 .006 
Between 100  to 250  .384 .130 1.467 1.137 1.894 .003 
Between 250 to 500 .573 .158 1.774 1.301 2.420 .000 
more than 500 .292 .379 1.339 .637 2.814 .442 
Constant -1.285 .082 .277   .000 
-2 log-likelihood  = 7188.030 
  
The significance, nevertheless, is somehow not in the negative direction as 
expected. A farther distance does not deter women IDPs from returning. IDPs living in 
TLC at 1-5 kms from original village have 1.878 (87.8% higher) the odds of returning 
than those living in the distance up to 1 km. The odds decrease until the distance 
reaches 100-250 kms, but increase again for the distance of 250-500 kms before 
another decrease in the odds of 1.339. The type of TLC might explain this abrupt 
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behavior. There seems to be more TLC in the form of ―barracks‖ within 25 kms from 
original settlements, of which IDPs show higher intention to return. However, a cross-
tabulation between ―type of shelters‖ and ―distance‖ does not show significant support 
for such correlation.   
The unpredictable behavior might also be due to the eight classes of distance 
chosen in the above table and that other control variables are controlled for. 
Collapsing the classes into two, one for distance up to 25 kms and the other for 
distance above 25 kms, the model does fit with the expected negative sign. With p-
value=.147 , IDPs living more than 25 kms from original village are .906 less likely to 
return to their original village than those living less than 25 kms, as shown in Table 
3.4. But again, the lesser intention to return from those IDPs living more than 25 kms 
away might as well be influenced by the type of shelter. That is, IDPs taking refuge 
farther than 25 kms away from original settlements are more likely to stay with a ―host 
family,‖ to live a more secure life, hence, deterring from the intention to return.  
 
 
Table 3.4  
Logistic regression of TLC‘s distance from original village and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh (using 25 kms as cut-off) 
 
 B S.E (B) Exp(B) 
95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
p Lower Upper 
Distance more than 25 
kms 
-.098 .068 .906 .793 1.035 .147 
Constant -.790 .032 .454   .000 
   -2 log-likelihood  = 7240.071 
 
Model in Table 3.4, however, as indicated by its -2 log-likelihood, gives less 
information than the model in Table 3.3.   
Pre-tsunami marital status, is a categorial variable of marital status of the IDPs 
before tsunami: single, married, widowed-by-death, widowed-by-divorce. Using status 
‗single‘ as reference, all but ‗widowed-by-divorced‘ category of pre-tsunami marital 
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status is statistically significant in determining decision to return among women IDPs 
in Aceh. A univariate logistic regression analysis on this relation is shown in Table 
3.5.  
 
Table 3.5 
Logistic regression analysis between pre-tsunami marital status and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh 
        -2 log-likelihood = 7227.580 
The analysis demonstrated that women IDPs who were married before the 
tsunami have 1.154 odds in returning to their original settlement, 15.4% greater than 
those of single women. Women IDPs both with widowed-by-death and –by-divorce 
status indicate less determination to return, although the later is not statistically 
significant (p = 0.772). Women IDPs who are widowed-by-death before the tsunami 
are .840 times or 16% less likely to return than those of single IDPs. This might as 
well be a reasonable case as widows might have less personal attachment to their 
original settlement, directly or indirectly through association to other individuals like 
family member.    
Family lost, is a categorial variable indicating whether the respondent had lost 
any family member(s) to the tsunami and or conflict. Latest data from SPAN shows 
that 32.23% of 203,817 who are still in IDPs status lost one or more family member. 
The UNIFEM database used in this analysis, however, showed that some 2,315 
(39.4%) of the women IDPs surveyed had lost family members, while 3,554 (60.6%) 
had not (See Table 2). Unfortunately, there is no clear classification in the database to 
really differentiate between the loss to the tsunami and the conflict. It is believed, 
Pre-tsunami marital 
status 
B SE(B) Exp(B) 
95%CI 
P 
Lower Upper 
Single      .003 
Married .143 .071 1.154 1.004 1.326 .043 
Widowed-by-death -.174 .105 .840 .684 1.033 .098 
Widowed-by-divorce -.066 .227 .936 .600 1.462 .772 
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however, that most losses are due to the tsunami. Women IDPs who lost family 
member(s) to the tsunami and or conflict, interestingly, have 1.268 times (26.8% 
higher) the odds of returning to those who did not lose any family member. The 
coefficient for this variable is highly statistically significant at p-value < .001, with 
(1.133, 1.419) 95% confidence interval. The -2 log-likelihood is 7225.190, only 
slightly better than that of pre-tsunami marital status. 
Shelter type, is a categorial variable of temporary shelter type the IDPs staying 
in at the time of interview: host family, barrack, and tent/makeshift structure. The 
majority IDPs, including women IDPs, stayed or used to stay with host families. As 
Mahdi (2007) noted, the fact that most IDPs stayed with their family, relatives, or 
fellow villagers indicates the existence of social capital in communities in Aceh 
despite the prolonged war and unfathomable natural disaster. As shown in Table 3.6, 
all types of the shelter IDPs staying have highly significant association with decision 
to return. 
 
Table 3.6 
Logistic regression analysis between temporary shelter types and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh 
Shelter type B SE(B) Exp(B) 
95%CI 
p 
Lower Upper 
Host family       .000 
Barrack 1.284 .067 3.613 3.170 4.117 .000 
Tent/makeshift structure .721 .080 2.057 1.760 2.406 .000 
       -2 log-likelihood = 6850.254 
 
 
Host families must have provided more comfort to the IDPs than barracks and 
tents as temporary shelters.  Barracks are infamous for providing dismal living 
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condition without any gender sensitivity.
68
 Therefore, it is not surprising that women 
IDPs staying in barracks wanted to return at 3.613 times (261.3% higher) the 
aspiration of those staying with host families. Moreover, IDPs living in tents have 
2.057 times stronger wish to return than those living with host families. It might be the 
case that living conditions in the barracks were so bad that even people staying in the 
tents/makeshift structures had less determination to return than those staying in the 
barracks.  
Shelter size, is the size of temporary shelter the IDPs stayed in when 
interviewed, categorized into groups: less than 21 square meters, 21-40 m2 and so 
forth, as shown in Table 3.7. All size categories are highly significant in association 
with return decision with expected negative sign. That is, the bigger a shelter size 
relates to the less intention to return. 
 
 
Table 3.7 
Logistic regression analysis between temporary shelter size and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh 
 
Shelter Size 
B SE(B) Exp(B) 
95%CI 
p 
Lower Upper 
<21 m2       .000 
21-40 m2 -.489 .047 .613 .560 .672 .000 
41-80 m2 -1.484 .077 .227 .195 .264 .000 
>80 m2  -1.443 .130 .236 .183 .305 .000 
      -2 log-likelihood = 6840.224 
 
 
As expected, those IDPs staying in a smaller size temporary shelter were 
wishing to return more badly than those living in bigger size shelter, vice versa.  IDPs 
living in a TLC of about four times bigger than 20 square meters have .236 times 
smaller odd to return. IDPs living in 41-80 m2 shelters and 21-40 m2 shelters have 
                                                 
68
 Reports show that barracks were not SPHERE compliance. Reports from women advocacy groups 
are especially critical to daunting living condition in the barracks. See also Hedman (2005) and Lukman 
(2005) 
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respectively .227 and .613 less aspiration to return than those living in 21 m2 or 
smaller shelters.  
Land ownership is a dichotomous variable of whether a woman owns a piece 
of land in the tsunami affected area. With a coefficient .738 and standard error .065, 
women IDPs who own land have 2.092 times, 109.2% higher than, the odds of those 
who do not own land to return to original settlement. It is a highly significant variable 
(p-value < .001) with a 95% confidence interval of (1.841, 2.378). With -2 log 
likelihood of 7105.959, land ownership provides more information in the decision 
making than pre-tsunami marital status or family loss. This means than land ownership 
is very important within Acehnese society as it proved to be a determinant to decision 
to return among the IDPs.   
Number of acquaintances is an ordinal-categorial variable of number of 
acquaintances from original village a women IDP has in the shelter they were staying 
when interviewed. The five different levels are subjective to the IDPs in that they did 
not specify precisely how many is very few, few, fair, many or very many.  
 
 
Table 3.8 
Logistic regression analysis between number of acquaintances and decision to return 
among women IDPs in Aceh 
Number of 
acquaintances from 
original village B S.E. (B) Exp(B) 
95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
p Lower Upper 
Very few      .000 
Few .093 .145 1.097 .825 1.459 .524 
Fair .173 .140 1.189 .903 1.565 .217 
Many -.169 .124 .845 .663 1.077 .173 
Very many -.234 .130 .791 .614 1.020 .071 
Constant -.707 .117 .493   .000 
-2 log-likelihood = 7216.329 
 
Logistic regression analysis in Table 3.8 shows that, in general, fewer 
acquaintances IDPs knows within a temporary shelter tend to increase the aspiration to 
return. IDPs who know a fair or less number of acquaintances have a positive and 
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higher intention to return than those who have ―many‖ or ―very many‖ acquaintances. 
This might be due to the concept of personal safety and security in relation to 
community cohesiveness among the IDPs, where a certain number of acquaintances 
might form a comfort zone for staying or leaving the shelter. Women IDPs who are 
surrounding by family members or other relatives, for example, might feel safer to 
stay than to return to the original village at that time. However, having acquaintances 
from the original village, no matter how few, seems to increase the odds of returning 
as also shown by variable new ―friends‖ below. 
Friends, is a dichotomous variable depicting whether an IDP has new friend(s) 
in the temporary shelter or not. About 80% of the women IDPS surveyed said that 
they have new friend(s) in the temporary shelter. Logistic regression analysis shows 
that having friend(s) has high significant association to decision to return (p-value < 
.001).  A woman IDPs who has friend(s) in a temporary shelter is more than twice 
(2.243) as likely to return than those who does not. A 95% CI of (1.909, 2.635) 
indicates that those who have friends have odds to return as much as 2.64 times 
higher.   The -2 log-likelihood for this model is 7134.335.  
Although the questionnaire differentiates between ―acquaintances‖ and 
―friends‖, the former being ―acquaintances from original village‖ while ―friends‖ 
refers to ―new friends found in the TLC‖, there might have been confusion, hence, 
overlapped on these two terms. Therefore, a robustness test is performed to select 
whether both, or otherwise only one of the variables needed to be included in the 
multivariate model. 
Involvement is a dichotomous variable of whether a woman IDP is involved in 
community decision making after the tsunami. This variable is only statistically 
significant at p-value < .25 but not at < .20 with 95% CI of (.957, 1.200) which 
includes zero. Women who are involved in community decision making have only 
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1.071 times (7.1% higher) the odds of returning of those who did not. The upper 
bound, however, indicates that a woman IDP involved in community decision making 
can have odds of returning as much as 1.2 times (20% higher) those who did not.  
Attendance is a dichotomous variable of whether a woman IDP attends any 
community meeting hold while she is in a temporary shelter. This variable is only 
statistically significant at p-value < .20 with coefficient of 1.081 and 95% CI of (.967, 
1.209). This means that women who attended community meetings are 1.081 (8.1% 
higher) likely to return than those who did not attend any community meeting. 
  
(3) Multivariate logistic regression model 
Taking all the variables with p-value < .25 from the univariate analysis above, 
a multivariate model was then developed by simultaneously including the variables in 
the model.  The objective is to get the simplest model, i.e. fewest explanatory 
variables, that provides the most information to explain variability within the 
dependent variable. Wald statistics are used to decide which explanatory variables 
should be included in the model. That is, the bigger contribution of an explanatory 
variable, the more likely it will be included in the model. Table 3.9 shows a possible 
final result considered ―the best‖ model from this analysis.  
All variables in consideration are statistically significant at p-value < 0.05 
except two shelter size levels, 41-80 m2 and > 80 m2 and two acquaintances category 
of ―few‖ and ―fair‖. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that the overall model 
adequately fits the data (p-value = .369).  This model predicts at least 71.0% of data 
correctly into ―Yes‖ or ―No‖ of the plan to return among the IDPs based on observed 
and predicted classification table. Furthermore, ―shelter type‖ is the ―most important‖ 
explanatory variable in the model as it gives the highest contribution in explaining the 
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dependent variables. This is indicated by the relatively higher Wald statistics for 
―shelter type‖ compared to other variables.  
 
Table 3.9 
Logistic regression analysis of decision to return to original settlement (village) among 
women IDPS in Aceh based on ―social capital‖ explanatory variables 
 
  
B 
 
S.E. 
 
Wald 
 
df 
 
Sig. 
 
Exp(B) 
 
95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Shelter type: 
Host Family     180.843 2 .000       
Barrack 1.157 .087 178.302 1 .000 3.182 2.685 3.771 
Tents/makeshift structure .752 .107 49.137 1 .000 2.120 1.718 2.616 
Shelter size 
<21 m2    31.396 3 .000    
21-40 m2 .386 .077 25.475 1 .000 1.472 1.267 1.710 
41-80 m2 .059 .117 .256 1 .613 1.061 .844 1.334 
>80 m2  .029 .157 .034 1 .854 1.029 .757 1.399 
Number of acquaintances 
Very few     38.064 4 .000      
Few -.015 .159 .009 1 .926 .985 .722 1.345 
Fair -.119 .154 .592 1 .441 .888 .656 1.202 
Many -.382 .136 7.877 1 .005 .683 .523 .891 
Very many -.558 .143 15.262 1 .000 .572 .432 .757 
 
Land ownership (Yes) .596 .070 71.741 1 .000 1.816 1.582 2.084 
 
Having friend(s) (Yes) .617 .089 48.162 1 .000 1.854 1.557 2.206 
 
Constant -1.486 .148 101.110 1 .000 .226     
-2 log-likelihood = 6221.240 
 
 
In the model in Table 3.9, the reference is based on an IDP who lives in a ―host 
family‖ of the size ―less than 21 m2‖, having ―very few acquaintances‖, with ―no 
land‖ in the original settlement and ―no new friends‖ in the TLC. Thus, the following 
analysis is comparing possible alternative models to this reference model.  
Other variables held constant, women IDPs living in barrack and tents have 
consecutively 3.182 and 2.120 times the odds of those living with host families to 
aspire to return to their original settlement. This is consistent with the findings in the 
univariate analysis for shelter type as shown in Table 3.6. Higher aspiration to return 
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among IDPs living in barracks might well indicate grim living condition in the 
barracks. This aspiration is even higher than those of women IDPs living in tents or 
other makeshift structures. All in all, this can also mean that tsunami IDPs feel much 
more comfortable living with host families of relatives, kinship, or other fellow 
villagers based on gampong relation. It is, therefore, also indicative that Acehnese 
have and have utilized ―social capital‖ for survival after the catastrophe.     
Based on shelter size, the model somehow is inconsistent with the univariate 
analysis in that the signs are all positive instead of negative.  But the trend is similar, 
that is, the bigger the size of a TLC tends to decrease the intention to return. This 
model indicates that women IDPs living in a shelter of size 21-40 square meters are 
1.472 times more likely to return to the original settlement than those who live in a 
shelter of size 21 square meters or smaller. But, as the TLC size becomes bigger, the 
odd of returning become smaller, albeit not statistically significant.  This might relate 
to the shelter type where shelters of 21-40 square meters are most probably in the type 
of ―barracks‖, which indeed show aspiration to return higher than those living in both 
―tents‖ and ―host families‖.  Though it needs further investigation, in general ―host 
families‖ can be said to offer larger size for temporary shelters than those living in 
barracks or tents.  Even when the host families might not have a large size physical 
structure, the Acehnese are familiar with the saying that ―what is more important is to 
have ‗large heart‘, ―hati yang lapang‖ to accept their acquaintances in their residence 
during the hardship‖.  
The more acquaintances from the original village before tsunami a woman IDP 
has seems to decrease the odd of returning. Other variables held constant, the odd to 
return decreases as the number of acquaintances increase from ―few‖ to ―very many‖, 
that is, from .985 to .572 times the odd of those who has ―very few‖ acquaintances. 
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The negative direction is consistent with the expected outcome and the finding in the 
univariate analysis.  
Although the odds associated with land ownership in the multivariate model is 
less than the odds in univariate model, it is still a significant determinant in the 
multivariate model. The odds of returning for those who have land in the tsunami 
affected areas is 1.816 times (81.6% higher than) those who do not have land, other 
variables held constant. Land ownership can double (2.084) the aspiration to return 
compared to those without land ownership. In some cases of this study, the odds of 
returning based on land ownership can be as much as twice the of those who do not 
own land. Lastly, a woman IDP who has new friend(s) in the temporary shelter is 
1.854 more likely (85.4% higher) to return to their original settlements.  
To test for whether ―friends‖ and ―acquaintances‖ are correlated, variable 
―friends‖ was first dropped from the model.  The result is a model that poorly fits the 
data. Based of the Hosmer  and Lemeshow test, the Chi-square statistics is 38.855 and 
p-value < 0.05. Similarly, if we drop ―acquaintances‖ from the model, we also find a 
poorly fit model with Chi-square statistics of 16.698 and p-value < 0.05. Therefore, 
the model in Table 3.9 seems to be the ―best‖ model to fit the data available in this 
analysis.  
 
 
(4) Robustness of the model 
For two probit model, the selection model is developed using ―having land‖ as 
the dependent variable as presented in Appendix 3.B. The independent variables 
chosen for the selection model are age category, pre-tsunami marital status, whether 
the IDP is a head of household, and whether the respondent lost any family member. 
All coefficients in the selection model are statistically significant. Similarly, the 
second probit model which is based on censored samples screened by the first model 
 155 
 
(the selection model) indicates the robustness of the logit model in Table 3.9. All the 
coefficients included in logit model are also statistically significant in the probit 
model. 
The same data are used to estimate a multinomial logit model with four 
original categories of ―where the IDPs think they would be in two years after the 
tsunami‖, using ―will still be here‖ as reference, as shown in Appendix 3.C. Again, the 
coefficients of the variables confirm the significance found in the logit model on Table 
3.9.  That said, however, logit models are preferable as they enable straight forward 
interpretations. 
 
3.7   Concluding Remarks 
There is a strong indication that women IDPs in Aceh use social capital in 
determining their decision to return or not to return to their original settlement prior to 
the quake and tsunami. In general, women IDPs with more social capital are more 
likely to return than those who have no or limited social capital. Association to 
friendship and acquaintances, for instance, are important determinants in decision 
making among IDPs. IDPs with friend(s) in a temporary settlement are 1.854 times 
(85.4%) more likely to return than those who do not have one(s). Having 
acquaintances from the original village on the other hand, has a significant but 
negative relation to the immediate aspiration to return.  The more acquaintances from 
an original village a woman IDP has at a TLC, the more likely she will be staying at 
the TLC. In contrast, the fewer the acquaintances, the more likely a woman IDP wants 
to return to her original settlement. This phenomenon is understandable as one might 
choose to stay wherever one feels more secure with the presence of acquaintances.   
IDPs‘ temporary shelter type and size somewhat mirror social relationships 
within communities in Aceh. The fact most IDPs, almost 70% at one point, live in 
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with ―host families‖ indicates the existence of social capital in Acehnese society. 
Somehow confirming previous reports on the grim living situation in government-
provided ―barracks‖, IDPs have stronger aspirations to leave barracks, three times 
higher than host families, to return to their original settlement. Their aspiration is even 
higher compared to IDPs living in tents/makeshift structures. IDPs living under 
tents/makeshift structures are more than twice as likely to return than those living in 
host families. This might be also a good indication of independent-minded or resilient 
communities within Acehnese society. That is, people prefer living free under  
tent/makeshift structures than living in confined barracks. Indeed, many IDPs soon 
returned to their land and erected a tent or put up a makeshift structure on the land 
after being granted permission by the government to return.  
IDPs association to community and its behavior is also evidenced through 
shelter size and land ownership. IDPs living in smaller temporary shelters are more 
likely to return to original villages than those who live in bigger ones. In some cases, 
the likelihood can be as much as twice higher.  
Although further investigation is needed, the findings from this survey are as 
expected. Acehnese, for example, are culturally sensitive to the matter of residence 
size. Women are specifically sensitive to kitchen size in which women not only cook 
but also socialize (Nurasiah et al. 2007). Multiple families living in the same house or 
other type of shelter can cause reasonable discomfort. Women in Aceh who usually 
socialize from their kitchens are especially sensitive to sharing their ―territory.‖ In 
many cases, when multiple families share a kitchen, Acehnese tend to take turns rather 
than using it simultaneously. Therefore, no matter how welcoming a host family is, for 
example, in accepting IDPs, people usually have a sense of limit due to their pride and 
independent-minded behavior. Additionally, as land is culturally and socially very 
important to families in Aceh, it is very reasonable that women also decide to return or 
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not based on land ownership. Women IDPs with land ownership in the affected areas 
are 1.816 times (81.6% higher) more likely to return than those without land 
ownership.   
If anything can be learned from the women IDPs and the displacement 
condition they have to endure, at least two lessons stand out: (1) amid the catastrophe, 
women in Aceh did find ways to survive utilizing social capital within their 
communities. In general, one can expect to see strong individual women survivors 
and, more so, collective communities in Aceh; (2) humanitarian and relief aid, unless 
culturally sensitive, can undermine the social relationships within communities in 
Aceh. Worse, culturally insensitive interventions can limit the achievement of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction processes in post-tsunami Aceh. Imposition of 
barrack provision by the government, for instance, has wasted resources otherwise 
more useful for speedy return of the IDPs to their original settlement. Barracks have 
been seen as the worst shelter by women IDPs in Aceh.     
 
3.8  Limitation 
The UNIFEM survey result lacks several variables traditionally related to 
migration decision. Although the questionnaires asked to list the family member 
residing in the TLC of an interviewee, including age and education, the data failed to 
include these important demographic indicators. The income and occupation data were 
also not included because there was no sufficient information in the survey that 
covered these aspects.  
 
 
 
 
 158 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3.A 
 
Summary statistics of women IDPs response in UNIFEM survey 
 
A. Continuous Variable  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of age and total distance 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Respondent Age 5869 15 92 35.51 13.68 
Distance from TLC to original 
village (in km) 
5869 1 969 42.76 97.38 
Valid N (listwise) 5869     
 
B. Categorical Variable  
 
Table 2 Respondent Age category 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Under 18 377 6.4 6.4 
18-25 1315 22.4 28.8 
26-30 846 14.4 43.2 
31-40 1276 21.7 65.0 
41-50 1295 22.1 87.1 
51-60 541 9.2 96.3 
Above 60 219 3.7 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 3 Grouped distance of TLC from original village (in km) 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
up to 1 km 886 15.1 15.1 
between 1 to 5 kms 664 11.3 26.4 
between 5 to 10 kms 1844 31.4 57.8 
between 10  to 25  kms 1123 19.1 77.0 
between 25  to 100  kms 598 10.2 87.2 
between 100  to 250  kms 471 8.0 95.2 
between 250 to 500 kms 246 4.2 99.4 
more than 500 kms 37 .6 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
Table 4 Grouped distance of TLC from original village (in km) 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Distance up to 25 kms 4517 77.0 77.0 
Distance up to more than 25 
kms 
1352 23.0 100.0 
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Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Distance up to 25 kms 4517 77.0 77.0 
Distance up to more than 25 
kms 
1352 23.0 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
 
 
Table 5 Respondent pre-tsunami marital status 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Single 1266 21.6 21.6 
Married 3777 64.4 85.9 
Widowed-by-death 722 12.3 98.2 
Widowed-by-divorce 104 1.8 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 6 Respondent post-tsunami marital status 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Single 1175 20.0 20.0 
Married 3435 58.5 78.5 
Widowed-by-death 1131 19.3 97.8 
Widowed-by-divorce 128 2.2 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 7 Respondent‘s district of origin 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Simeulue 212 3.6 3.6 
Aceh Singkil 104 1.8 5.4 
South Aceh 119 2.0 7.4 
East Aceh 140 2.4 9.8 
West Aceh 808 13.8 23.6 
Aceh Besar 836 14.2 37.8 
Pidie 802 13.7 51.5 
Bireuen 577 9.8 61.3 
North Aceh 176 3.0 64.3 
Nagan Raya 136 2.3 66.6 
Aceh Jaya 618 10.5 77.2 
Banda Aceh 1238 21.1 98.2 
Sabang 47 .8 99.0 
Lhokseumawe 56 1.0 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
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Table 8 Respondent‘s district of temporary shelter (when interviewed) 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Simeulue 200 3.4 3.4 
Aceh Singkil 109 1.9 5.3 
South Aceh 189 3.2 8.5 
East Aceh 144 2.5 10.9 
Central Aceh  65 1.1 12.0 
West Aceh 792 13.5 25.5 
Aceh Besar 1148 19.6 45.1 
Pidie 974 16.6 61.7 
Bireuen 603 10.3 72.0 
North Aceh 191 3.3 75.2 
Aceh Tamiang 37 .6 75.9 
Nagan Raya 195 3.3 79.2 
Aceh Jaya 473 8.1 87.2 
Banda Aceh 607 10.3 97.6 
Sabang 44 .7 98.3 
Langsa 66 1.1 99.5 
Lhokseumawe 32 .5 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 9 Type of temporary shelter (TLC) 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Host Family 2658 45.3 45.3 
Barrack 2035 34.7 80.0 
Tent 1176 20.0 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
Table 10 Temporary shelter (TLC) size 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
<20m2 2032 34.6 37.1 
21-40m2 1949 33.2 72.8 
41-80m2 1109 18.9 93.0 
>80m2 382 6.5 100.0 
Total 5472 93.2  
No answer 397 6.8  
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Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
<20m2 2032 34.6 37.1 
21-40m2 1949 33.2 72.8 
41-80m2 1109 18.9 93.0 
>80m2 382 6.5 100.0 
Total 5472 93.2  
No answer 397 6.8  
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 11 Whether respondent a head of household 
 Frequency Percent 
No 4600 78.4 
Yes 1269 21.6 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
 
Table 12 Whether any family member lost to tsunami or conflict 
 Frequency Percent 
No 3554 60.6 
Yes 2315 39.4 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
Table 13 Whether respondent are happy staying in the shelter 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Definitely not 
happy 
225 3.8 3.8 
Not happy 832 14.2 18.0 
Fair 1600 27.3 45.3 
Happy 2293 39.1 84.3 
Very happy 919 15.7 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 14 Number of acquaintances from original village 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Very few 333 5.7 5.7 
Few 581 9.9 15.6 
Fair 706 12.0 27.6 
Many 2703 46.1 73.7 
Very many 1546 26.3 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 15.  Whether respondent owns land in tsunami affected area 
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 Frequency Percent 
No 1918 32.7 
Yes 3951 67.3 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
Table 16 Whether respondent has friends in a new settlement 
 Frequency Percent 
No 1142 19.5 
Yes 4727 80.5 
Total 5869 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 17 Where respondent thinks she will be in the next 1-2 years 
 
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Back in original village 1804 30.7 30.7 
Will be in another settlement 267 4.5 35.3 
Will still be here 2726 46.4 81.7 
Don’t know/not sure 1072 18.3 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
Table 18 Whether respondents are hoping to return back to original back 
  
Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 4065 69.3 69.3 
Yes 1804 30.7 100.0 
Total 5869 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3.B 
 
Probit Sample Selection Model 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     1.91   Prob > chi2 = 0.1675
                                                                              
         rho    -.2924892   .2163691                     -.6440334    .1610488
                                                                              
     /athrho    -.3012862   .2366112    -1.27   0.203    -.7650355    .1624632
                                                                              
       _cons     .1119849   .0576111     1.94   0.052    -.0009308    .2249005
  familylost     .2856455   .0351044     8.14   0.000      .216842    .3544489
      headhh    -.1120804   .0472962    -2.37   0.018    -.2047793   -.0193816
  marstatpre     -.102259   .0360567    -2.84   0.005    -.1729289   -.0315891
       ageg2     .1133903   .0140173     8.09   0.000     .0859169    .1408638
having_land   
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8921916   .2194135    -4.07   0.000    -1.322234    -.462149
      friend     .4670553   .0573488     8.14   0.000     .3546537    .5794569
     numofaq    -.1150056   .0198174    -5.80   0.000    -.1538469   -.0761643
 shelter_sig    -.0524587   .0283945    -1.85   0.065    -.1081109    .0031935
     shelter     .2092539   .0347559     6.02   0.000     .1411337    .2773742
 marstatpost     .0482592    .031164     1.55   0.121    -.0128211    .1093395
next_settg1   
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -6085.883                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(5)       =    142.92
                                                Uncensored obs     =      3846
                                                Censored obs       =     1997
Probit model with sample selection              Number of obs      =     5843
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APPENDIX 3.C 
 
Multinomial Logit Model 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Where respondent thinks she will be 
in the next 1-2 years
a
 B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Back in original 
village 
Intercept -2.079 .196 112.258 1 .000   
Friend 1.100 .091 146.942 1 .000 3.005 2.515 3.590 
NumOfAq -.254 .030 69.432 1 .000 .776 .731 .824 
Shelter .513 .055 85.996 1 .000 1.670 1.498 1.861 
Shelter_SiG -.151 .045 11.072 1 .001 .860 .786 .940 
Having_land .553 .075 54.398 1 .000 1.738 1.500 2.013 
Will be in another 
settlement 
Intercept -3.105 .429 52.491 1 .000   
Friend 1.391 .235 34.979 1 .000 4.017 2.534 6.369 
NumOfAq -.306 .060 25.750 1 .000 .737 .655 .829 
Shelter .471 .111 18.088 1 .000 1.602 1.289 1.990 
Shelter_SiG -.532 .106 25.001 1 .000 .588 .477 .724 
Having_land -.030 .146 .042 1 .838 .971 .729 1.293 
I don't know Intercept -1.746 .225 60.228 1 .000   
Friend 1.021 .110 86.741 1 .000 2.777 2.240 3.443 
NumOfAq -.326 .034 91.080 1 .000 .721 .675 .771 
Shelter .404 .065 38.893 1 .000 1.498 1.319 1.701 
Shelter_SiG -.140 .053 7.118 1 .008 .869 .784 .963 
Having_land -.279 .080 12.086 1 .001 .757 .647 .885 
a. The reference category is: Will still be here.        
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